Biofuels

Lord Palmer: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether they expect to meet the European Union requirement that the United Kingdom biofuel target for the end of 2005 be submitted by 1 July.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the Government will still be consulting on that point on 1 July. It will therefore be our proposed indicative target that we shall report to the Commission by that date.

Lord Palmer: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Can he explain why there has been such a dramatic delay, when the need to submit the target has been known since last May?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, given the noble Lord's intensive knowledge of the issues, he is as well placed as anyone in the House to recognise how difficult it is to get them right. So far as we are concerned, the important thing with the consultation document is that all stakeholders should be presented with a clear indication of how the Government can take the matter forward, against a background where we have all taken some constructive action already. It is important to get the issues right. That is why the consultation document, which will be issued shortly, will clearly define the objectives.

Lord Carter: My Lords, the Government accepted an amendment to the Energy Bill at Third Reading on Tuesday that gives them a power to implement a renewable transport fuel obligation to meet the targets in the EU directive. How will the timetable for consultation to which my noble friend referred be linked to the passage of the Energy Bill in the other place? Will the draft regulations to implement the EU directive be available before the Energy Bill receives Royal Assent?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, as my noble friend knows, the timetable for the passage of the Energy Bill through the other place is tight. It is important that we get the Bill on the statute book by the end of the summer. I cannot assure the noble Lord that the regulations will be published by then, but I can assure him that we recognise that the European directive must be implemented by December this year, and we are fully on course to meet that requirement.

Lord Monro of Langholm: My Lords, does the Minister agree that, after all the Questions and debates initiated by my noble friend Lord Palmer, it seems incredible that the Government have made so little progress in the past 12 months towards getting a solution? Yet, when it comes to wind farms, which will really despoil the countryside, the Government seem to give almost willy-nilly approval to anything at 400 feet and upwards.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, first, the Government have introduced in the Budget the 20p derogation on biofuels, which is settled for the next three years. Therefore, it is not quite fair of the noble Lord to suggest that the Government have done nothing. Secondly, in this of all weeks it would be a tad churlish of noble Lords not to recognise that the acceptance of the amendment at Third Reading of the Energy Bill earlier this week regarding the possibility of a renewables obligation was a significant and constructive step.

Lord Ezra: My Lords, if the biofuel targets proposed in the EU directive were achieved, what could be the CO2 emissions savings by 2010, and what would be the cost benefit of those savings?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, that is a tough question. I do not have the briefing on the 2010 perspective. However, I can assure the noble Lord that we recognise that biofuels can contribute to the crucial reduction of emissions. We are committed, in our consultation process, to our determination to meet the requirements of the directive by December 2004, and by the action that we have already taken to encourage use of biofuels, to do our part in meeting the objectives. However, it will be recognised that all European states regard the indicative positions on the targets for 2005 and 2010 as very demanding.

Baroness Byford: My Lords, does the Minister accept that the Government are unlikely to achieve their target of 2 per cent by 2005? In a Written Answer, on 18 December, it was made clear that at the moment 2 million litres a month are being sold, which represents only 0.05 per cent. To achieve that target the Government would have to quadruple the amount being sold. How will they do that?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, that is not the Government's target; it is the indicative target in the European directive. As I have indicated, many European states regard the target as very demanding. We certainly do, because we are starting from a lower base than is Germany, for example. But the noble Baroness will recognise that we have taken action and are setting out to meet the requirements of the European directive so far as we can. Our consultation document will advance that cause, and on Tuesday this week we accepted an amendment to the Energy Bill which also adds to the possibilities with regard to the policy.

Lord Jopling: My Lords, is there evidence that energy produced through the biofuel route is any less hopelessly uneconomic compared to routes other than wind power?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, neither are hopelessly uneconomic. Both are immensely desirable, both with regard to climate change and reducing CO2 emissions. No one pretends that we can tackle these global and British problems without some significant costs being involved. We all recognise that the changes in our energy policy required by these objectives involve considerable costs.

Lord Marlesford: My Lords, does the Minister realise that many of us believe that the Government's energy policy and the Government's environment policy will lack credibility, so long as they fail to recognise that oil is both too scarce and too polluting to continue to be used in the longer term for the generation of electricity? What is needed is a much more rapid rethink of the need to move to nuclear power.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, I was taking some joy from the opening remarks presented by the noble Lord. He is so right that we cannot depend on oil to the extent that we have in the past, both in terms of its availability and, crucially, because it pollutes the atmosphere. The solution does not lie in one route only. Certainly, it is the case that both wind farms and biofuels have their contributions to make in providing clean energy.

National Health Service: Specialised Treatments

Baroness Masham of Ilton: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	How the new arrangements for commissioning of specialised treatments in the National Health Service are functioning.

Lord Warner: My Lords, all primary care trusts are now actively involved in one of the 26 local specialised commissioning groups set up across the country. As members of these groups, PCTs work together to commission specialised services. This year's work programme for each commissioning group demonstrates that a substantial number of specialised services are now being planned collectively. For certain specialised services where the financial risks are high, collective funding arrangements are in place, including financial risk-sharing between PCTs.

Baroness Masham of Ilton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Is he aware that the Specialised Healthcare Alliance and the Royal College of Physicians are concerned that while some PCTs are doing their job well, others are inadequate? Does he agree that postcode prescribing for specialised services is unacceptable, when it can be a matter of life and death, and of quality of life for patients?

Lord Warner: My Lords, I am aware of the survey that the noble Baroness mentioned, although I have not read it, because I understand that it is still in draft form. We welcome the broad findings of that survey, which was carried out by the Specialised Healthcare Alliance. It shows that a good start has been made by PCTs to work together to commission specialised services. It makes the point that a number of improvements can be made. We shall be looking at those suggestions carefully, and we hope to respond to them positively. The Government have made clear our position on postcode prescribing, and we are taking action to try to improve the implementation of NICE guidance in that area.

Lord Ashley of Stoke: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the Audit Commission and the Commission for Health Improvement have both said that some primary care trusts lack management capacity, basic information and the capacity to monitor their output? In view of these well informed comments, would not the best way forward be to focus on improving these aspects of the work of the primary care trusts?

Lord Warner: My Lords, I recognise the points made by my noble friend, but as my Answer made clear, we have made big steps forward since the Government issued guidance in March 2003 in the area of specialised commissioning. I accepted, in response to the supplementary question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, that improvements could be made that have come out of the survey. We will be taking those forward. I do not accept, however, that PCTs are not working together now to improve the way in which they collectively commission specialised services.

Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, is the Minister aware that one of the real difficulties is where a small specialty is involved? Is he aware of the situation at Hammersmith hospital regarding pulmonary hypertension? Although this is meant to be funded through the regional specialised commissioning group, unfortunately it has not considered it a priority, although it has a national designation. There must be other similar specialties where small numbers of people are suffering from a highly dangerous condition that is expensive to treat. What special arrangements are made for these people?

Lord Warner: My Lords, there are two tiers of specialised commissioning. There is commissioning in relation to specialties where the catchment area is 1 million to 2 million people, and there is another area where the specialised commissioning is done for catchment areas of 3 million to 6 million people. At the national level, there are very few rare diseases that are nationally commissioned, but these are where the treatments are extremely expensive. I do not have information on the position in Hammersmith, but I will look into it, and I will write to the noble Baroness.

Baroness Hayman: My Lords, may I declare a non-financial interest on taking up the chair of the Specialised Healthcare Alliance, which comprises 26 patient groups affected by these regulations? Is my noble friend satisfied with the role that strategic health authorities are playing at the moment in the monitoring of these arrangements? Does he agree that they must be effectively engaged if the arrangements are to be equitable for patients across the country?

Lord Warner: My Lords, as the noble Baroness mentioned, the survey suggests that improvements could be made in the way in which strategic health authorities are pursuing their role in this area. We accept that, where there is a need to make improvements, they should be made. It is certainly the role of the strategic health authorities to monitor the performance of all the trusts in their area.

Lord Addington: My Lords, does the Minister agree that there is some concern about where specialist services fall and about the position of different types within existing patterns for purchasing products? Will the Government keep that under review, and when will we hear the results of any such review?

Lord Warner: My Lords, the Government keep such issues under review, which is why we will study carefully the findings of the specialised commissioning survey that has been mentioned on several occasions. I could delight your Lordships' House with a large number of splendid examples of good specialised services commissioning. I could mention the east Midlands and South Yorkshire, where the 13 PCTs come together; the 30 PCTs doing good work in the West Midlands on haemophilia and pulmonary hypertension; or the good work going on in London in genetics, haemophilia and sickle-cell screening. There are many more such examples, and we should not give the impression that good commissioning of specialised services is not going on.

Baroness Wilkins: My Lords, is the Minister aware that those good commissioning arrangements are not working effectively for people with a spinal cord injury? The Spinal Injuries Association helpdesk receives many inquiries from people who have spent a long time in a general hospital and have developed severe complications—MRSA, pressure sores and so on—as a result. Treatment for people with a spinal cord injury has deteriorated rapidly under the new arrangements.

Lord Warner: My Lords, there are 11 spinal injury units in the UK, including eight in England. It is the responsibility of SHAs and primary care trusts to assess the healthcare needs of their population and commission services in this area. I am aware that there has been a little trouble in Stoke Mandeville, but those issues have been resolved. The Government have done much to improve services in this area.

Earl Howe: My Lords, is the Minister aware that one of the problems with specialised commissioning that does not appear to have been brought out by the survey is the bureaucratic nature of the application process? Before a doctor can prescribe a treatment, he or she must, if the treatment is expensive, apply to the PCT for approval for the treatment. That application process is extremely bureaucratic and imposes a delay that, in some cases, may be life-threatening. Will the Government examine that concern seriously?

Lord Warner: My Lords, we have shifted the balance of power so that it is down to the PCTs to decide priorities in their area and their system. I take note of what the noble Earl said, but we must accept that local priorities are the order of the day.

Smoking in Public Places

Lord Dubs: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether they are contemplating similar action to that of the Irish Government in banning smoking in public places.

Lord Warner: My Lords, the Government have consistently said that smoke-free enclosed public places are the ideal. There are no plans to ban smoking in enclosed public places, but we look forward to faster and more substantial progress on smoke-free places from employers and businesses, especially the hospitality industry.
	On 3 March, we launched a major public health consultation that included questions about smoking in public places. Responses to that consultation will inform a White Paper later in the year.

Lord Dubs: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his Answer, although I am not enthusiastic about it.
	Is my noble friend aware that, according to early reports, sales of cigarettes in the Republic of Ireland have fallen quite significantly since the introduction of the ban? Even heavy smokers in Ireland to whom I have spoken welcome the ban. Is it not the answer for the Government to show some imagination and courage on the issue and do what the Republic of Ireland has done? As we have a common border with the Republic of Ireland, it would make sense to do the same.

Lord Warner: My Lords, the Government are always looking for good ideas, from all sources. We will monitor carefully what is going on in Ireland.
	I remind my noble friend that we have started a process of consultation. It includes specific sets of questions on which we have encouraged people to make their views known. We will await the outcome of that process before taking any further measures.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, does the noble Lord agree with the estimate made by ASH that 4,800 people die every year from diseases caused by passive smoking? Does he also agree with the SmokeFree London campaign, which estimates that 1,100 beds in hospitals in our capital are taken up by people with a disease caused by smoking? In view of those horrifying statistics, is not the Minister's attitude rather complacent?

Lord Warner: My Lords, neither my attitude nor that of the Government is complacent. The Government have nothing to be ashamed of in the work that they have done to reduce the use of tobacco, to control the supply of tobacco to price tobacco products appropriately and to educate the public and make available information about the dangers of smoking. However, we have to go through a process of consultation about public places and workplaces, and we want to hear what people have to say.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff: My Lords, do the Government recognise that two-thirds to three-quarters of people in Wales consistently wish to have a ban on smoking in public places? That result is a credit to the work that they have done to raise awareness of the dangers of smoking and passive smoking. The time is coming when people should be allowed to have regulations that they specifically want.

Lord Warner: My Lords, as the noble Baroness knows, I have no responsibilities relating to Wales in this area. This is not the time to get into the terms of the noble Baroness's Bill, which we will discuss tomorrow. The Government have done much to increase public awareness of the dangers of second-hand smoking.

Lord Tomlinson: My Lords, the Government appear somewhat ambivalent, proposing that there should be a reduced level of smoking in the workplace while supporting through the common agricultural policy the promotion of the growing of tobacco in the European Union. Will my noble friend give an undertaking to the House that, at each stage of decision-making about the CAP budget, a report will be submitted to Parliament stating precisely the action that Her Majesty's Government have taken to propose the abolition of that subsidy, the way in which they promoted that point of view and their degree of success.

Lord Warner: My Lords, I say gently to my noble friend that the common agricultural policy is a little wide of the mark with regard to this Question.

Noble Lords: No.

Lord Warner: My Lords, it is good to see unanimity in the House. I am deeply touched by the support for the common agricultural policy from the Benches opposite, in particular. I shall look into the points that my noble friend made and draw them to the attention of my noble friends.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, can the Minister be diverted from the illiberal attitude of even thinking of banning smoking in public places? I am in your Lordships' House only because my father smoked and died at the age of 57. That is why I have been here for a long time. That, in itself, may be a good reason for not having me here.
	The proposal is illiberal. People are grown up enough now to know that smoking is incredibly bad for them. It is very unpleasant. People cough up globules of disgustingness, and it does them no good whatsoever. However, stopping people killing themselves in their own way—and so saving the pension money—is thoroughly illiberal.

Lord Warner: My Lords, if only the noble Earl's father had been alive during the time of this Government, we could have advised him of the dangers of his behaviour.

Baroness Hayman: My Lords, is it not dangerous to follow the noble Earl's argument that it is simply an issue of the liberty of those who want to smoke and damage their own health? The crucial point about a ban on smoking in public places is the protection of non-smokers, whose health can be harmed by others who choose to harm themselves.

Lord Warner: My Lords, my noble friend is right. Survey after survey has shown that a large number of people, including smokers, think that there should be restrictions on their exposure to second-hand smoke in public places. The Government want to hear what people have to say in the consultation that is in progress. We await the public's opinion.

Midwives

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What actions are being taken to ensure more student midwives qualify and enter the profession in view of the decline in the number of registered midwives.

Lord Warner: My Lords, the number of registered midwives is not in decline. The Nursing & Midwifery Council figures showing that there are fewer practising midwives in the UK are wrong and have been withdrawn. There are 1,300 more midwives working in the NHS now than in 2000. The Government are increasing midwifery training places. In 2002–03, 2,110 students entered midwifery training; that is, 28 per cent more than in 1996–97.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that response. Is he aware that although the figures are being readjusted by the NMC, they will still show that there is a sharp reduction in the number of midwives taking up posts? What is being done to stop some students—I believe about one-fifth—dropping out of their courses due to inadequacies of support, particularly in respect of childcare arrangements and the low level of the bursary that they receive? That creates a risk for the maternity services and urgent action is needed.

Lord Warner: My Lords, I am not sure that I accept my noble friend's position regarding numbers. The advice that I have received is that the NMC data—for example, in London alone—understated the numbers intending to practise by about 3,000 people. The council is working with the department, but I am advised that those figures are wrong and the number of midwives is increasing.
	As regards student attrition rates, there are always some students who do not complete their courses, whether in midwifery or otherwise. If they are not qualified to do the job and have not satisfied those who verify their performance, it is appropriate that they should not qualify. The Government have substantially increased the money for NHS bursaries following action by the Chancellor in 2000.

Baroness Cumberlege: My Lords, is the Minister aware that at birth centres and midwife-led units there are waiting lists for midwives who want to work there because they can give a quality of care that they cannot give elsewhere? As a result, there are fewer interventions and there is less anguish for mothers and less morbidity for babies. Is the Minister further aware that those units are under threat of closure and that some have recently closed? Indeed, a Labour Secretary of State and the Minister's predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, intervened to stop those closures. Will the Minister work with his colleagues to do likewise?

Lord Warner: My Lords, we want to have a wide range of different models of care and place of birth. We do not champion one model over another. Choice is important for all women. The birth rate has been falling substantially for 13 years. It has fallen from about 650,000 births per year to 540,000. In itself, that will mean that some adjustments of services may be necessary.

Lord Addington: My Lords, does the Minister agree that whatever the figures there is certainly a perception in the health service that too few midwives are being trained? If we are to move to a more patient-centred form of treatment during pregnancy, we must ensure that we have enough trained people. Given those circumstances and the fact that most people undergoing midwifery training are mature students, will the Government please look long and hard at their training policy and at giving sufficient support to people who are also involved in raising their own families?

Lord Warner: My Lords, I stand by what I said in my Answer about the increase in the number of midwives since 2000. The Department of Health has also funded 500 return-to-practice places. In March, we launched the 2004 recruitment campaign with television advertising. Of course, we want to generate more applications for midwifery, but the numbers of student places are increasing. Again, I make the point that the birth rate is going down.

Baroness Masham of Ilton: My Lords, does the Minister know how many midwives come from abroad?

Lord Warner: My Lords, I do not have that information to hand, but I shall write to the noble Baroness.

Earl Howe: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the shortage of midwives is evidenced by the vacancy rate which, in London and the south-east in particular, is acute? The vacancy percentage across the UK is around 5.4 per cent of funded establishment, but in London it is 18.3 per cent. Is there anything that the Government can do to ameliorate the situation, particularly in London and the south-east, where the cost of living is very high?

Lord Warner: My Lords, we accept that across the country vacancy rates rose marginally in 2003. In part, that was because we increased the number of funded posts ahead of their being filled. Vacancy rates can be cut by cutting the number of posts, just as train punctuality can be increased by saying that journeys should take longer. We can play statistical games in that area. We accept that there is a shortage of midwives in some parts of London. Agenda for Change will give more flexibility for local PCTs and trusts to offer higher rates.

Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That the instruction of 30 March to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill has been committed be varied so that the Committee consider Clause 14, and Schedules 1 and 2, after Clause 35.—(Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Higher Education Bill

Lord Grocott: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Ashton of Upholland, I beg to move the Motion standing in her name on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Higher Education Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order:
	Clauses 1 to 13,
	Schedules 1 and 2,
	Clause 14,
	Schedule 3,
	Clauses 15 and 16,
	Schedule 4,
	Clauses 17 to 29,
	Schedule 5,
	Clauses 30 to 45,
	Schedule 6,
	Clause 46,
	Schedule 7,
	Clauses 47 to 50.—(Lord Grocott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Civil Partnership Bill [HL]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
	As this House is aware, same-sex couples are unable to marry and cannot gain legal recognition of their relationships. The lack of legal recognition means that same-sex couples face many difficult issues as they seek to organise their lives together.
	Two years ago, this House discussed a Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, to whom I pay tribute today—although I see that, for some unfortunate reason, he is not in his place. During a full and constructive debate, this House acknowledged the difficulties experienced by same-sex couples. We touched on areas as diverse as hospital visiting, intestacy and pension rights.
	The Government made a commitment to explore how those inequalities could best be addressed, which, since that debate, we have endeavoured to do. The Government have undertaken a comprehensive review of the law and how it applies to same-sex couples. Over the past two years, considerable hard work has gone into that endeavour. We have considered the specific problems faced by same-sex couples as a result of the failure to give legal recognition to their relationships.
	We found that problems can arise in a wider range of areas than might immediately first spring to mind. For example, where an accident causes the death of a person in a same-sex relationship, the other person in that relationship may find that he or she faces specific difficulties in obtaining access to the body, information about circumstances leading to or surrounding the death, or, indeed, compensation. Following a partner's death, they may find themselves unable to stay in the home they have shared with that partner for many years. Sometimes there have even been difficulties about attending events as intimate as funerals.
	We have put together what we consider to be a measured and proportionate response to those problems. Civil partnership would allow those same-sex couples who wish to do so to gain legal recognition for their relationship. This legal recognition would be accompanied by a set of rights and responsibilities to reflect the commitment that the couple had made to each other.
	In June 2003, we released our proposals for public consultation in England and Wales. Since then, separate consultation exercises have followed for Scotland and Northern Ireland. This consultation has been accompanied by informed and constructive debate in the public sphere over the question of recognition of same-sex couples.
	We have, then, a Bill that is the product of two years' serious and intensive work by the Government and which has been shaped by consultation with stakeholders and the public at large, and informed by debate in this House and elsewhere. We are confident that the Bill places civil partnership firmly in the civil sphere of our national life. The strength of the Bill is that it offers a secular solution to the disadvantages which same-sex couples face in the way they are treated by our laws.
	Perhaps I may turn to some of the issues that have been widely debated over the past two years. Noble Lords will recall that when the civil partnership Bill promoted by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, sought to include opposite-sex couples, there was a great deal of debate. The debate in this House focused heavily on that element of his Bill and many felt that this would undermine marriage. This Bill does not undermine or weaken the importance of marriage and we do not propose to open civil partnership to opposite-sex couples. Civil partnership is aimed at same-sex couples who cannot marry.
	However, it is important for us to be clear that we continue to support marriage and recognise that it is the surest foundation for opposite-sex couples raising children. We also recognise, as did many in this House, that a number of people face difficulties on the breakdown of a relationship or upon the death of one partner when the couple are not married. Many of these difficulties come as a complete surprise to couples who believe in the myth of so-called "common-law marriage". The Department for Constitutional Affairs is currently doing work that will address this myth, pointing out the differences in rights and responsibilities between married and unmarried couples, and suggesting ways that unmarried couples can protect themselves if things go wrong.
	Then there is the issue of other home-sharers. Some people have discussed the position of family members, siblings, and people who share homes. This is a quite separate issue from that which the Bill seeks to address. Family members, be they parent and child or siblings, have a legally recognised relationship to each other. These relationships, which already afford certain rights, are widely acknowledged and accepted in society. A same-sex couple who have shared a relationship over many years can still be treated as complete strangers by the law.
	While home-sharers may be concerned about financial issues, the full range of issues faced by same-sex couples is something entirely different. This Bill seeks to address issues for one group of people, namely same-sex couples. It is not a cure-all for the financial problems of those outside marriage. Noble Lords may know that other distinguished minds in the Law Commission have long wrestled with this issue. Having looked at it in great detail, they have concluded that the solution in every case depended on the nature of the relationship. That is why this Bill is specifically designed to look simply at same-sex couple relationships. That is its clear purpose and that is its clear content.
	Having set out the context of our proposals, I turn now to the provisions of the Bill itself. I intend, if I may, to outline these in some detail so that noble Lords have a clear understanding of the framework that we seek to put in place.
	Part 1 defines a civil partnership and the time at which it is formed and when it ends. Eligible same-sex couples will be able to register as civil partners in England and Wales, in Scotland, or in Northern Ireland under the relevant part of the Bill. Provision will also be made by Order in Council for registration outside the United Kingdom at British consulates or by Armed Forces personnel serving overseas in circumstances similar to those where marriage can take place. In addition, same-sex relationships registered overseas that meet specific criteria would be treated as civil partnerships under our law. A civil partnership would come to an end only on the death of a partner, dissolution or annulment.
	Part 2 sets out the procedures for forming or dissolving a civil partnership in England and Wales, and the rights and responsibilities that would flow from the relationship. Chapter 1 sets out the procedures for registering as civil partners and the eligibility criteria that must be met before two people may do so. Two people of the same sex would be able to register as civil partners of each other, provided that both were either over 18 years old, or over 16 with the necessary consent from, for example, a parent or guardian; that neither was in an existing civil partnership or marriage; and that they were not within the prohibited degrees of relationship. Schedule 1 gives details of these prohibited degrees, which include the relationships between siblings and those between parents and children. So forming a civil partnership would be a secular process and Chapter 1 gives details of this.
	Having given notice to the registration authority of their intention to register, a same-sex couple would need to wait at least 15 days while the necessary checks were made on their eligibility. After this, at a time and in a place agreed between the couple and the local authority, the couple would sign the civil partnership document in the presence of a civil partnership registrar and two witnesses. In keeping with the secular nature of the process, registration could not take place in religious premises.
	A ceremony would not form part of the statutory process. Responses to the England and Wales consultation suggested that while some same-sex couples would welcome a ceremony, others would not. The local authority would be free to offer the option of a ceremony in addition if it wished. Whether or not a ceremony were to take place would be a decision for the couple and the local authority concerned.
	Chapter 2 contains provisions relating to dissolution, nullity and other proceedings. It is proposed that civil partnerships could be ended only by a formal, court-based process. This is in keeping with the serious nature of the responsibilities that civil partners would have towards each other. The person applying for a dissolution would need to provide evidence that the civil partnership had broken down irretrievably. The court would inquire as far as possible into the facts alleged by the applicant and any facts alleged by their partner. If the court was satisfied on the evidence that the civil partnership had broken down irretrievably, a dissolution order would be granted. Chapter 2 sets out the facts that have to be proved to show the irretrievable breakdown of a civil partnership. It also makes provision for annulment of void or voidable civil partnerships, and for the legal separation of civil partners.
	Chapter 3 gives details of the property and financial arrangements applying to civil partnerships, while Chapter 4 concerns the position where two people have agreed to form a civil partnership.
	There are already same-sex couples in the UK who are raising children together. Chapter 5 proposes a series of measures to ensure that the provisions relating to children will apply to the rights of children of these families in the same way as to children of a marriage.
	Chapter 6 deals with miscellaneous issues including the making of false statements and the rights of civil partners in relation to housing and tenancies, family homes and domestic violence, and fatal accidents claims.
	Part 3 deals with provisions relating to Scotland. Chapter 1 deals with formation and eligibility; Chapter 2 with registration; Chapter 3 with occupancy rights and tenancies; Chapter 4 with interdicts; Chapter 5 with dissolution, separation and nullity; and Chapter 6 with miscellaneous issues and interpretation.
	There are some differences between the provisions for civil partnership outlined for Scotland and those for England and Wales. Most of these differences are minor and of a procedural nature and reflect the distinctive character of Scots law.
	In accordance with the Sewel convention, the Scottish Executive has informed the Government that it intends to place a Motion before the Scottish Parliament, seeking its agreement that the provisions of the Bill may extend to Scotland in relation to devolved matters.
	Part 4 of the Bill deals with provisions relating to Northern Ireland. As yet, these are incomplete. We intend to add further provisions by amendment. As is the case with Scotland, there will be some differences between the provisions for civil partnership for Northern Ireland and England and Wales. Most of these differences are minor and of a procedural nature, and reflect the distinct legal system in Northern Ireland.
	Part 5 of the Bill is concerned with the treatment of relationships formed or dissolved abroad. Chapter 1 allows provision to be made by Order in Council for registration at British consulates, and in the case of Armed Forces personnel serving overseas, in circumstances similar to those where marriage can take place.
	There is no common concept of same-sex registered partnership in other countries across the world. As regards relationships formed in other jurisdictions, Chapter 2 of the Bill therefore defines the overseas relationships which can be treated as a civil partnership in the United Kingdom, and the requirements which have to be met for this to take place. Chapter 3 concerns the jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts to hear applications for dissolution, annulment or separation, and also provides for the circumstances in which overseas dissolutions, and so on, can be recognised in the United Kingdom.
	Part 6 of the Bill provides that references to certain familial relationships in legislation will be interpreted to include relationships arising through civil partnership. Parts 7 and 8 deal with a number of discrete areas of legislation which would need to be amended to reflect the existence of the new legal relationship of civil partner.
	Clause 186 introduces Schedule 17 which amends child support, social security and tax credits legislation so as to enable same-sex partners to receive similar treatment to opposite-sex couples. This schedule also amends the provisions relating to the state pension system. Those state pension benefits equally available to husbands and wives will be extended to civil partners from commencement. Other state pension benefits will be extended to civil partners as the Government begin to equalise the state pension system from 2010.
	Clause 187 provides a power to amend legislation relating to pensions, allowances or gratuities for the purpose of or in connection with making provisions with respect to pensions for surviving civil partners or other dependants of deceased civil partners. The intention is to use this power in relation to pension rights accrued after commencement of the Civil Partnership Bill.
	Your Lordships should be aware that the Government will be tabling a number of amendments to the Bill during its passage through this House, in addition to those already mentioned in relation to Part 4 which deals with Northern Ireland. However, these are mostly minor amendments to other legislation, reflecting the introduction of civil partnership. Some additional provisions on dissolution will be moved by amendment, as well as the provisions on pension sharing on dissolution.
	There will be some minor amendments to Part 5, covering recognition of partnerships entered into overseas. The inclusion of additional Northern Ireland provisions in Part 4 will have a knock-on impact on the need for amendments. The Government will also be moving some outstanding consequential provisions. I hope I will be able to write to your Lordships shortly setting out in further detail the intended amendments and their content.
	I am very pleased to bring the Bill to the House. It is a Bill that signals clearly that same-sex couple relationships should be treated with fairness and dignity. Stable relationships are valuable both to the individuals in them and to the society that benefits from them. Whether people should look to the Government for a lead in their personal lives is perhaps a debate for another day. On this issue, however, there is a clear gap between our current legal provisions and our social reality and it is a gap that needs—

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness when she is coming to the end of her extremely interesting and informative speech. Owing to the extremely stringent provisions for the dissolution of these partnerships and for their annulment, could I ask her—because it might affect the attitude of noble Lords to the Bill—what proportion of committed homosexual couples is likely to take up the opportunity of a civil partnership? It seems to be a very important point. I am sorry that I am not able to speak in the debate and therefore cannot ask the question later.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, we anticipate that it may be between 5 and 10 per cent. The important thing is that those people who have committed long-term relationships should have the choice to consolidate that relationship and have it formally recognised if they so choose. But I need to make it absolutely clear that there will be no obligation upon anyone to register their relationship. It is simply that the rights and responsibilities that flow from such registration will be available only to those who make that choice. The Bill is an opportunity to give parity of treatment to those who wish to have it.
	When we debated this issue on the last occasion—when the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, was before us—there were many moving and sad stories of real inequality and distress for those who had been in very long relationships and were not able to honour the nature of that relationship in a way that many thought to be appropriate. We are seeking to give people an opportunity to recognise the stability of those relationships. Whether they take advantage of this opportunity will be a matter entirely for them. There will be those who choose to do so; others who choose not to do so. But what we will have removed is a barrier which would have made it impossible for those who wish to have proper recognition and stability to obtain it.
	Noble Lords will want to scrutinise the Bill's drafting and seek explanations from the Government as to why we have pursued certain courses of action. However, I hope that we can agree that the Bill seeks to achieve legal recognition for same-sex couples, provision for both rights and obligations and support for committed and stable families, and represents a sensible and logical way forward. It will be a privilege and pleasure to work with the whole House on this much needed legislation. I commend the Bill to the House.
	Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)

Baroness Wilcox: My Lords, like the leader of my party, Michael Howard, I generally support the principle of the Civil Partnership Bill, as I did when a similar Private Members' Bill was introduced to this House in 2002. However, this is a Bill which touches on matters of conscience and, as always in such circumstances in our party, there will be a free vote for these Benches.
	We support the principle of the Civil Partnership Bill as a measure which offers a solution to same-sex couples in committed relationships who have previously been discriminated against on issues such as inheritance, next-of-kin status and pension rights. However, we have concerns over some of the detail of the Bill, and will subject it to the proper scrutiny to ensure that it is effective in meeting its stated objectives.
	The Bill as it stands does not deal with the circumstances of people living together platonically. Many of us know of circumstances in which people have made enormous sacrifices quietly and greatly contributed to society—for example, sons who have looked after ageing fathers, people with carers who have looked after them for many years, very often living in the same house. We believe that it is perfectly legitimate to raise this issue when discussing the principle of a Bill, the aim of which, after all, is to tackle practical issues of discrimination.
	I have listened to the Minister's stern words on these other kinds of home-sharing relationships. I understand that there is a view that including such relationships dilutes the importance of other same-sex relationships. But, as my colleague, Alan Duncan, said—and he will be taking the Bill through another place for us—we want to press this because we think these people are unfairly disadvantaged. We want the Government to consider them afresh and further; and to extend the recognition of interdependency to another section.
	The Bill has important implications for both taxation policy and social security benefits. But, given the rules which bind your Lordships' House on a Finance Bill, we would be unable to scrutinise such implications in detail on a separate Finance Bill as is proposed. Common sense surely dictates that when major changes to the law of this kind are proposed, the tax implications of the new arrangements should be considered in detail and clarified at the same time. How does the Minister propose to enable the House to do this?
	Tax legislation on opposite-sex couples distinguishes very clearly between those who are married and those cohabiting. Gifts between spouses are exempt from capital gains tax, for example, and there is no inheritance tax on death for a surviving spouse. The way the Government propose to deal with such matters for civil partners—and, indeed, other people living together but unable to marry—is of great importance and relevance to the Bill.
	But the Inland Revenue press release merely states that taxation will be included in the "first available Finance Bill". What on earth does that mean? Surely it cannot mean that the Government do not know or have not decided. Can the Minister—or, indeed, any one of the other four or five Ministers involved with the Bill—tell the House? Will it be the Finance Bill that was given its Second Reading in the Commons a few days ago which can still be amended, or will it be the next year's Finance Bill? It raises the interesting possibility that it might be for an incoming Conservative government to codify the tax aspects of this legislation. Is that what the Government intend?
	It must be wrong for the decisions which surely must have been made to be kept secret from Parliament or delayed until next year. The Bill would then have to be debated and put on the statute book without the tax or financial implications being known. That cannot be right. It would be a gross disservice to couples affected by the Bill.
	There are people who are waiting for this Bill to receive Royal Assent in order to register as civil partners. Are they, like the unfortunate small businessmen and women who incorporated at the invitation of the Chancellor, going to register as civil partners one year and discover the financial implications only afterwards? The obvious approach would be to use this year's Finance Bill, although I recognise that that may leave inadequate time for these issues, as well as those covered in this year's Budget proposals, to be properly debated.
	Another approach might be for this very important subject matter to be run in the Commons as a separate Finance Bill from the one already introduced. Failing that, and in order to probe the Government's thinking early and in depth in the House, which has so much under-used financial expertise, we could table amendments in Committee to explore these issues. This would force clarification of the Government's thinking and allow detailed discussion of these financial considerations in the House. Subject to what the Minister may say in reply, I reserve the right to do that.
	For the Conservative Party, the family remains the most immediate and important group within which people share responsibility for one another's well-being. But families are changing; not all conform to the traditional pattern. We continue to believe that the conventional marriage and family is the best environment in which to bring up children. But many couples choose not to marry and more and more same-sex couples want to take on the shared responsibility of a committed relationship.
	It is in all our interests to encourage the voluntary acceptance of such shared responsibilities but in some instances the state actively discourages it. The Bill should help to change that and make some important reforms. Far from undermining marriage the Bill will, we hope, encourage the long-term commitment and mutual support that makes marriage such a benefit to our society.
	As I have worked to familiarise myself with the Bill, I have become more and more convinced that civil partnerships should come with a health warning. They are not to be entered into frivolously and they are not for fun. As the Minister has reminded us, they contain rights and responsibilities. They are serious and constitute a legally binding agreement. Getting out of such an agreement will be expensive and painful. We encourage the Government to urge caution when promoting the Bill. Las Vegas is not where we are and not where we want to be.
	These civil contracts will, I hope, be extended or adapted to bring mutual security and comfort to spinsters, bachelors, carers and other partnerships who are also disadvantaged by not being able to marry. To these groups, such contracts would bring financial security and peace of mind, particularly in old age. Too many of us live alone; too much of our tax legislation encourages it. Society will benefit greatly if more long-term partnerships are encouraged.
	Civil partnerships, of course, differ from marriage. Marriage is a separate and special relationship which we should continue to celebrate and sustain. To recognise civil partnerships is not in any way to denigrate or downgrade marriage. As our leader in another place, Michael Howard, said:
	"It is to recognise and respect the fact that many people want to live their lives in different ways. And it is not the job of the state to put barriers in their way".
	In the coming weeks, with the support of my distinguished colleagues, the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, and the noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe, we will work hard to make the very best of the Bill. We will table amendments encouraged by the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux, by Care and by the Solicitors Family Law Association. The devil, as always, is in the detail, but I hope that the Minister will feel encouraged that the Official Opposition support the Civil Partnership Bill. I and my leader in another place do so in principle. We wish it well on its passage through the House.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, we on these Benches welcome the Bill. Of course, as with the Conservatives, there will be a conscience vote, but I think that I can predict with little doubt that the vast majority of members of my party—both in your Lordships' House and in the other place—will support the Bill.
	As the Minister pointed out, the Bill builds on the Civil Partnerships Bill introduced by my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill in 2002. I am speaking in his place today because he has an important commitment in the USA, which was fixed many months ago and which he cannot change. But he will be here for the subsequent stages of the Bill.
	Views in the United Kingdom on homosexuality have changed enormously in our lifetimes. Fewer than 40 years ago sexual activity between consenting adult males was a criminal offence. That law was repealed in 1967, to his eternal credit, by Roy Jenkins. The great majority of people in this country as a whole—and, indeed, in your Lordships' House—now recognise that sexual orientation towards the same sex is not a crime, nor is it an illness; it is something that, in all probability, people are born with and cannot be changed.
	But we have also moved on from just removing criminal penalties. We have made it illegal to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation, in employment or in the provision of goods and services. The time has now come to take another big step forward: to acknowledge that gay and lesbian people should have the same rights as heterosexuals to enter into a personal relationship recognised by law with the same consequences for taxation, succession to property and pension benefits as marriage. That is what the Bill does in general and why we support it.
	I have a few comments on the principles behind the Bill. First, my noble friend Lord Lester's Bill allowed heterosexual couples as well as same-sex couples to enter into civil partnerships. This Bill is limited to same-sex partnerships. I believe that my noble friend's Bill was right on that matter. Some heterosexual couples—perhaps not many—are put off by the historical implications of the word "marriage" but would be willing to enter a legal relationship not described as marriage.
	People in that group, even if they are only a few, would have benefited from the possibility of civil partnerships. But I recognise the strength of the argument that heterosexual couples have the alternative of marriage that same-sex couples do not. Therefore the answer may be to develop better legal rights between cohabitees; the current rights of cohabitees on the break-up of the cohabitation being plainly inadequate.
	Secondly—this is my personal view and not necessarily that of my colleagues—the provisions for dissolution of civil partnerships are based too closely on existing divorce law. I recognise that that is a controversial view and that many members, both within and outside the gay and lesbian community, would not agree with me. I regret that Parts 1 and 2 of the Family Law Act 1996, which would have made the breakdown of marriage the sole ground for divorce without having to establish fault, were never implemented.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, described divorce as expensive and painful. That is all too true. Removing the need for proof of fault would have made it less expensive and less painful. That provision cannot be applied to marriage in this Bill, but the Bill should have followed the grounds for dissolution in the 1996 Act, which represents in my view an advance on the existing divorce law. Many of those who opposed the 1996 Act provisions did so on religious grounds and would not recognise civil partnerships as having an equivalent validity to begin with and would therefore be unlikely to object to making the dissolution of civil partnerships a simpler matter. I should be interested to know views on that issue both within and outside your Lordships' House.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, speaking on behalf of the Conservative Party, said that pension and tax benefits should be extended not only to those who have a sexual relationship but to members of family and friends living together for purposes of care and companionship and that they too should be covered by the Bill. I cannot agree with that view. There is a case for some form of tax relief and pension benefits for other relationships, but that is another issue and not the issue for the Bill. Tax and pension rights changes are consequential on the Civil Partnership Bill and are not its main purpose.
	The purpose of the Bill is to give same-sex couples—who will normally, although, as in the case of marriage, not invariably, be people who are having or have had a long-term sexual relationship—the right to legal and public recognition of their status. That is the issue to which the Bill should be confined.
	Financial issues are important to the Bill. Some aspects are either undefined or defective. The effect on tax law is uncertain because it has been left to a future Finance Act. I recognise that it is unlikely to be practicable to make changes in the current Finance Bill. The normal Treasury principle is that the tax law would not be changed until the Bill was enacted and not on the basis of provisions that were merely prospective. If the Government's intention is, as I assume, to treat civil partners in a similar way to spouses for tax purposes, it should be possible for them to make a statement now to that effect. That would clarify matters and help us.
	I also hope that the Government will undertake—assuming that they are still in office—to include the necessary legislation in the Finance Act 2005. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to bring the Bill into force before the necessary tax changes have been enacted so that the right to enter into a civil partnership and the consequential tax changes will come into effect simultaneously. That means that even if the changes are in the 2005 Bill, the earliest date for commencement that I can imagine would be in October 2005. Any further delay would put the commencement off further, which would be deeply unfortunate.
	Pension issues have given rise to some concern. I shall not go into great detail, because that is a matter for later stages, but I will point out the major issues. Contracted out pension schemes are now required to make provision for the surviving spouse of a pensioner. The amount of benefit received by the surviving spouse is not dependent on the date of the marriage. But in the case of a civil partnership the survivor's benefit will be paid but based only on the period of pensionable service after the commencement of the Bill in the case of the defined benefits scheme and only on contributions made after the commencement of the Bill in a defined contributions scheme.
	That means that if a male employee marries in a conventional marriage shortly after the Bill's commencement, his widow will receive the full spouse's pension provided for by existing pensions legislation. But if that male employee enters into a civil partnership on the same date, the surviving partner is likely to receive much less. We believe that that is unfair, especially as the pensions of married employees have effectively been subsidised by the unmarried in the past. Of course a significant proportion of those who are not married are gay or lesbian.
	The main beneficiary of that provision will be the Government, because some 80 per cent of private sector schemes provide already for payment in some circumstances to a surviving unmarried partner of either sex and will have calculated their necessary pension funding on that basis; whereas only a tiny proportion of public service schemes provide similar benefits.
	The second point we wish to raise on pensions is that we believe that there should be a general obligation extending to non-contracted out schemes and to non-protected rights under contracted out schemes to provide the same benefits for surviving civil partners as provided by the scheme for surviving spouses.
	There remain some more limited issues, which we shall raise in Committee, but in principle, as I said in opening, we extend a warm welcome to the Bill. Your Lordships' House recently passed the Gender Recognition Bill, which affects perhaps some 5,000 people in the United Kingdom. The number of gay and lesbian people who will benefit from this Bill in the United Kingdom must run into hundreds of thousands, at least. This Bill will make life better for those people. It is a Bill that would have been unthinkable 40 or 50 years ago; now we believe that it is a Bill whose time has come.

The Lord Bishop of Oxford: My Lords, I, too, very much welcome the Bill. More important than my personal view, however, is the fact that the Church of England, through its official pronouncements, has recognised that at the moment same-sex partnerships are treated very unfairly in a number of ways and that this Bill will rectify a range of injustices in relation to inheritance, pensions, hospital visiting rights and so on.
	The official view of the Church of England on this issue can be taken from two sources. The first source is a motion of the General Synod, which voted, first, strongly to reaffirm that marriage is central to the stability and health of human society and warrants a unique place in the law of this country, and, secondly, to recognise that there are issues of hardship and vulnerability for people whose relationships are not based on marriage, which need to be addressed by the creation of new legal rights. That motion was passed by 248 to 27 votes.
	The second source is the response of the Archbishop's Council to the Government's consultation document on civil partnership. While reiterating the central place of marriage and the need to enshrine its uniqueness in law, the response went on to say:
	"We support the Government's wish to encourage long-term stable relationships as being more in the interests of society as a whole than a culture of transient or promiscuous relationships. Fair treatment for such relationships within a framework of legal rights and safeguards may well help to promote this objective. We also endorse the Government's intention to reinstate the rights of individuals within same-sex relationships in relation to such matters as protection from domestic violence, the registration of a death and inheritance matters, including tenancy succession. The law no longer reflects current social patterns and needs amendment to remedy injustice".
	There we can see very strong support from the official announcements of the Church of England to rectify a range of unfair anomalies.
	The Government, in paragraph 1.3 of their consultation document, said:
	"It is a matter of public record that the Government has no plans to introduce same-sex marriage".
	Nevertheless, it is a concern to some in the Churches that the legislation enshrined in the Bill parallels that for marriage at almost every point. There is an ambiguity here that some find worrying, and there are fears that the Bill could undermine the institution of marriage and its special place in the law of this country.
	I state those views because they are widely shared in Church circles, and the Government will need to address them. However, I do not myself share them. Properly understood, I believe that this Bill, which makes a place in law for committed partnerships, could strengthen rather than undermine the Christian understanding of marriage. I was very glad to hear the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, that in her view and the view of her party, in no way does the Bill denigrate or downgrade marriage.
	I shall say briefly why, from a Christian point of view, I believe that to be the case. God's will is human flourishing. On a Christian understanding, that is most likely to come about in so far as we reflect the undeviating divine faithfulness towards us. So it is that the Church has always seen in the institution of marriage, the love of a husband and wife, a reflection of the totally committed, faithful love of God for humanity.
	We know that, as a result of major social changes, the institution of marriage is under very great strain today. Society is characterised by short-term relationships and promiscuity. Clearly, the Church has failed to communicate its sublime vision of faithful loving human relationships as reflecting the divine love; or our conviction that that is what leads to human flourishing both for society and individuals. If the prime responsibility of the Church today is to communicate something of that vision, the possibility of fully committed, faithful same-sex relationships, or covenanted partnerships, will, I believe, strengthen rather than undermine what is at the heart of the Christian faith, as it is reflected in the marriage covenant.
	In relation to that point, however, I have one or two questions to raise about the Bill. The first involves Clauses 2 and 6(1)(b), relating to England and Wales, and Clause 89, relating to Scotland. Those clauses would statutorily prevent registration taking place in any premises designed or mainly used for religious purposes or, in Scotland, regarded as a "place of reverence".
	That is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it infringes the proper freedom of religious authorities to control such premises. As a matter of principle, it is for those authorities and not for the state to decide whether or not their premises should be available to be used for registration purposes—unless there is some overriding national interest, which is very difficult to identify on this issue. Secondly, the ban would deny some couples the possibility of a religious celebration in close proximity to a civil registration, which they may see as a commitment with a religious dimension. For example, they may want to have a civil registration in a church hall and then to move on afterwards to a religious ceremony in a church. Of course, that is not allowed in the Church of England and some other Christian denominations. But there may very well be religious bodies which would not only permit but welcome such a development, and it would be quite wrong to preclude them from having such a ceremony in proximity to a church hall, for example.
	My other concern with the Bill is the fact that when the partnership is registered there is no indication of what it is that the couple are committing themselves to. There is no specified wording. There is also no definition of a "civil partnership" contained within the Bill. I link that with another concern that I have, not with this Bill as such, but with what seems to be the Government's proposal in relation to civil marriage—that it will be up to the couple themselves to decide what form of words is used at their civil ceremony. I refer to the Government's document, Civil Registration: Delivering vital change, paragraph 3.4.74 on page 40. I believe that in a civil marriage it is crucial that there is an agreed form of words, making it quite clear that the couple are committing themselves to one another for life, through all the ups and downs of human existence—as the prayer book puts it,
	"for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health".
	Similarly, I would like to see the registration of a civil partnership involving not only a written statement that such a partnership now exists, but some verbal understanding that this is a commitment of two human beings to one another through all the vicissitudes of human existence. I believe that that conforms to the deepest desires and longings of those people who do in fact commit themselves to one another in such a relationship, even though, until this Bill becomes law, there is no way in which their commitment to one another can be legally recognised.
	In short, I believe that we need to ensure that in the law of this country, marriage itself is understood as it always has been in both its civil and religious form, as a commitment of two people to one another to the exclusion of all others, through all the ups and downs of human existence, for life. I would also like to see some reflection of that, in non-religious terms, in the understanding of what two people are committing themselves to when they enter into and register their civil partnership.
	As I said, I very warmly welcome this Bill. There are some aspects of it, as I have indicated, that a number of Christians will be uneasy with. However, my own conviction is that, properly understood, this Bill could very well support and strengthen the institution of marriage in our society, rather than weaken it.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, I congratulate the Government on introducing this important Bill, which will have a profound effect on the lives of many same-sex couples who choose to enter into civil partnerships. It has been very encouraging that, so far, all the speakers have supported the principle of the Bill. I also believe that it is right that the Bill should start its progress in your Lordships' House, following the principles of equity and dignity that were enshrined in the Private Member's Bill promoted by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill; it is a great pity that he cannot be with us today.
	There is no question that the law has failed to keep pace with changing social patterns in today's society. The Bill, by giving same-sex couples legal recognition for the first time, goes a long way in remedying many of the injustices that today's society imposes on them. But that legal recognition has taken 50 years to achieve. The timing of the Bill corresponds to the 50th anniversary of the setting up of the Wolfenden committee by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe. Its report recommended the decriminalisation of homosexual behaviour in private between consenting adults. That was a milestone decision. It was put into legislation, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said, some 10 years later. During that time we saw the Lord Chamberlain's ban on plays with homosexual themes lifted, allowing representation in theatre and cinema. But, regrettably, reaction to these and other changes and the growing strength of the gay movement resulted in the introduction in 1988 of the iniquitous Section 28.
	Since then, however, the age of consent has been reduced first to 18 and then equalised at 16, gay couples now have the right to adopt and Section 28 is no more. I make these points because it is important to understand that it has taken half a century for Britain to move from being a state that gaoled gay people to one that recognises that there can be love, respect and commitment in gay relationships.
	The end of this month sees the fifth anniversary of the bombing of the "Admiral Duncan" pub. So while many of us celebrate this legislation, we must also be aware that there is a cultural battle to win and that homophobic bullying and abuse still takes place. This raises the question of the possible reluctance of some gay couples to be identified and to take the opportunity to enter into civil partnerships for fear of bullying and abuse. In supporting this legislation, I think that it is important that its provisions are available to all who choose to take advantage of them and that we put no barriers in their way.
	The briefing from Christian Voice implies that this Bill is all about rights with little about responsibilities. Surely it a key responsibility of all couples, whether same-sex couples or opposite-sex couples, to care for each other and to provide reasonable maintenance for partners and for the children of the family. That is exactly what the Bill does. It is then surely right that with those responsibilities a partner should have the right to benefit from a dead partner's pension, to be recognised under inheritance and intestacy rules, to gain parental responsibility for each other's children, to have visiting rights in hospitals and to attend a partner's funeral.
	The Bill addresses many of the inequalities that I have outlined but I have two specific queries. First, can the Minister confirm that the current benefits available to a bereaved spouse will also be available to a bereaved civil partner? The secondly question is about pensions, which has been raised by other noble Lords. There is clear discrimination in the Bill as it provides survivor pensions for same-sex partners in public sector schemes only from the date of their partnership registration. A married couple may be married for only a day but their entire careers are taken into account. I know that this and many other details will be discussed as the Bill progresses through Committee.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford were right to say that the Bill does not undermine marriage, although one must be aware of, and consider sympathetically, the different views that exist. But now for the first time same-sex couples have a way of acknowledging their relationships and establishing welcome stability in those relationships. I think the position is simply summed up in a quote I read in a Scottish newspaper that said:
	"I don't think that right-minded people believe that Jim and Ken in No. 13, in a civil partnership, will undermine the marriage of June and Dave at No. 34",
	and that is absolutely right.
	A further criticism of the Bill is that it does not include cohabiting heterosexual couples, as we heard. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, I think that that is right. I was pleased to see that that view is supported by the Solicitors' Family Law Association. I appreciate the Minister explaining why the Bill concentrates on same-sex couples only. But there must be concern that too many cohabiting couples believe that there is such a thing as common law marriage. I must plead ignorance because it is not that many years ago when I believed that there was such a thing. The British Social Attitudes survey in 2000 showed that 59 per cent of cohabitees mistakenly thought that there was some form of common law marriage that gave them rights similar to those enjoyed by husbands and wives. This misconception makes them extremely vulnerable when the relationship ends. This misconception has perpetuated in spite of common law marriage being abandoned in 1753.
	I believe that there is an urgent need for reform and I was pleased to hear the Minister say that the Department of Constitutional Affairs is examining this issue. It would be helpful if, at some point during the course of the Bill, we could be told what progress has been made by the department in order to ensure that cohabiting couples have the necessary protections for their future.
	There has been great concentration on the financial aspects of the Bill. They are important, but for me the Bill is about justice, equality, security and, most importantly, dignity: the dignity of two people who want a caring, sharing, long-term relationship. In our briefings many instances have been cited of where that dignity has not existed. I want to keep dignity as my theme and to mention one particular case, which is known to me personally and which typifies the indignity, heartbreak and humiliation that can be suffered. A gay couple in Yorkshire had been together for over 40 years and both partners were in their 70s. The union was never accepted by the family of the elder partner. On his admission to hospital with cancer, his lifelong partner was denied visiting rights and heard about his declining health and ultimate death from friends. The family refused his request to attend the funeral and the ultimate humiliation was being evicted from their joint home with no keepsakes and only his memories of their happy years together. I cannot think of any worse treatment of an old man who had devoted his life to his partner.
	This legislation is too late for him but what happened to him will be prevented for others. I end with a quote from Lord Justice Ward who said in the Court of Appeal that:
	"to distinguish between same-sex and opposite sex-couples proclaims . . . that society judges their relationship to be less worthy than the relationship between members of the opposite sex. The fundamental human dignity of the same-sex couple is severely and palpably affected by that distinction".
	This Bill removes that distinction and restores their dignity.

Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, the public will struggle to understand how it is that the Government can say that they are opposed to same-sex marriage and at the same time bring forward this Bill. I realise that I am probably in a very small minority of noble Lords who are going to oppose the Bill. I have already spoken to the Minister and told her. She understands and we both understand each other's position.
	The Government have stated many times, even in recent months when they knew that the Bill was about to be introduced, that they do not intend to legalise same-sex marriage. Indeed the Minister repeated that today. At Second Reading of the Gender Recognition Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, said so, and at Report he said so and in response to a Question on 11 February this year he also said so. At that time he said:
	"The concept of same-sex marriage is a contradiction in terms, which is why our position is utterly clear: we are against it, and do not intend to promote it or allow it to take place".—[Official Report, 11/02/04; col. 1094–95.]
	This is clearly meant to be government policy. The Government's consultation document on civil partnerships said:
	"It is a matter of public record that the Government has no plans to introduce same-sex marriage".
	So apparently we are all agreed. Only gay rights groups want gay marriage. The rest of us are opposed to it.
	There is just one problem: despite what has been said already in this debate, I firmly believe that this Bill creates gay marriage. This is a gay marriage Bill. The Government may call it civil partnership but in reality it is a form of marriage for same-sex couples. Indeed, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford said that he would wish the same wording to be used introducing the relationship between same-sex people as is used in marriage.
	A civil partnership can only take place between two people of the same sex who are not already married. It must be solemnised in front of a registrar in the presence of two witnesses, exactly like marriage. It will entitle the parties to all of the legal and welfare rights of a married couple. For example, civil partnerships will mean exemption from inheritance tax and capital gains tax. As my noble friend, Lady Wilcox says, the necessary changes will be made in the first available Finance Bill, which seems rather strange. A civil partnership can only be ended by a court order on the same grounds as divorce.
	In the other place, the Government have admitted that they believe all the "significant rights and responsibilities" have been addressed to bring them into line with married couples—that is from House of Commons Hansard on 20 October 2003, cols. 491–492. The Explanatory Notes are even more telling—Paragraph 703 makes it clear:
	"The procedures for civil partnership registration in England and Wales are modelled on the proposed procedures for civil marriages outlined in the public consultation document . . . published by the Office of National Statistics, and the procedures for dissolution, annulment and financial provision on dissolution are modelled on the arrangements for bringing a marriage to an end".
	The Government may deny this, but I am sure that the man in the street will see this as being a gay marriage. The Government's friends and the media generally seem to call it that. The Guardian on 30 June called civil partnership:
	"legal marriage in all but name".
	The legal profession is under no illusions either. The leading law journal, the Lawyer, states:
	"The extent of the proposals raises the question as to why the Government did not just extend the right to marry to same-sex couples. The answer must be that to do so would be too controversial. By effectively achieving the same result under a different name, the Government has so far managed to avoid a public backlash.".
	Even the Labour Party's own website regards this as a form of marriage. The party enthusiasts who run the site, boasting about the Bill, illustrated it with a photograph of the Bill covered with confetti.
	So let there be no mistake—this is a gay marriage Bill in all but name. I believe it undermines marriage, despite what the Minister said this morning—and I have the greatest respect for the noble Baroness. That matters because, as the Government state, marriage is,
	"the surest foundation for raising children".
	Indeed, in paragraph 703 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, this is cited as the very reason why heterosexual cohabitees will not be able to enter into a civil partnership. The noble Baroness, Lady Gould, also made that point. I believe that is the only thing in this whole argument that the Government have got right. Heterosexual couples can marry at any time, but they choose not to.
	The fact that marriage is so important is sufficient reason to oppose this Bill. The Bill sends out the message that marriage—as the fundamental foundation for raising children—can be equated to a homosexual relationship. Marriage is profoundly undermined by this Bill.
	The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Winchester is sorry he cannot be with us today, but I discussed this Bill with him, and he pointed out that nowhere does it specifically define the nature of the commitment into which people are entering. At 11.30 today, I also received a copy of a statement from the Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, in which it said:
	"We accept that significant problems are faced by people in a range of relationships, including both same-sex couples (those affected by the Bill) and those in relationships that are not of a sexual nature, such as devoted brothers and sisters. However, we believe these problems which are essentially associated with finance and property matters could be remedied by legal changes other than the introduction of formal civil partnerships which, in the case of same-sex couples, is likely to be seen as a form of same-sex marriage with almost all the same rights as marriage itself."
	Although I may be alone in this House, I do not think I am alone outside.
	Why do I say civil partnership is like marriage? It is because, exactly as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford said, registration takes place in front of two witnesses. They are required to wait 15 days, they have to be over 16 and—except in Scotland—they require parental consent if they are under 18.
	Like marriage, those within the prohibited degrees of relationship by consanguinity or affinity are not able to enter. Like marriage, the relationship will have a legal status. No one in an existing marriage or civil partnership will be able to enter into a partnership until the previous relationship is legally dissolved. It is just a mirror image. Like marriage, during the existence of the legal relationship, the two partners will be treated jointly for income-related benefits and for state pensions, and they will be able to gain parental responsibility for each other's children. They will also be recognised for immigration purposes.
	Like marriage, civil partnerships can only be ended by a court order, which is granted on the same grounds as most divorces: irretrievable breakdown. Like marriage, on dissolution, the courts will consider arrangements for property division, residence arrangements and contact arrangements with children. Like marriage, on the death of one partner, the other will have the rights to register the death and to claim a survivor pension, eligibility for bereavement benefits and for compensation for fatal accidents or criminal injuries. Also, they will have recognition under inheritance and intestacy rules to tenancy succession rights—real problems for many. The Bill may not use the word "marriage", but the Government have gone to great lengths to ensure that, in almost every other way, it is identical.
	It is just wrong to create a parody of marriage for homosexual couples. It is unfair in other directions. Governments always have to decide what rights and privileges are given to non-married households. Clearly where there are children, the state has to intervene to protect their interests. However, when it comes to adult relationships the state has, until comparatively recently, privileged the status of marriage.
	If we are to extend all the rights of married couples to others, what should be the criteria? Should they be extended only to those in homosexual relationships? What of the millions of friends, relatives, brothers and sisters, daughters and mothers who share a house? This has already been referred to several times today. What of the disabled people who share a house with a friend who cares for them?
	I have no doubt that there are cases where gay couples have experienced difficulties because their relationship is not recognised by law, and I have great sympathy. We have already heard of some cases. The advocates of this Bill say that it is needed to help people who are in genuine difficulties. But there are many such people in equally difficult, heart-wrenching situations who will not be helped by this Bill. In fact, these people will become increasingly marginalised because of it. We will have two categories of people who have the sort of rights I have mentioned: those who are married and those who are in civil partnerships as same-sex couples.
	The theoretical examples are known to everybody: people who move into a flat to care for a friend with a long-term ill illness; a daughter giving up a well-paid job to care for a sick mother; or two sisters who never marry, living together all their lives in the home inherited from their parents. All of these people, when it comes to the death of one or other of them, will face a swingeing inheritance tax bill, which will in most cases lead to increasing dependency on the state by those people. These sorts of cases are appalling and something has to be done about them.
	When it comes to inheritance tax, some of us feel the whole thing is wrong. It is outrageous to punish people for having the audacity to escape the reach of the taxman by dying. Every other tax has already been paid on the estate of that person: income tax, capital gains tax, VAT. Yet, if the value of their estate exceeds the inheritance tax threshold, they are taxed again on the same property simply because it was in their possession when they stopped breathing.
	Inheritance tax merely punishes families and other beneficiaries, and does a great deal to hinder the continuation of family-owned businesses. It results in many people losing homes and property which have been in their family for years. My noble friend Lady Wilcox tangentially made the point about small and medium-sized businesses asked to incorporate, and subsequently hit by a swingeing tax bill. This will have exactly the same effect.
	In addition, all governments of whatever persuasion have encouraged people to save. The savings ratio has long been regarded as an important measure of the underlying health of the economy. Investment in housing has been encouraged—rightly, as it gives a bulwark against dependency once the earnings period of individuals is ended. I have already referred to that and said that, if the Bill goes ahead without looking at the other people that I have mentioned, there will be greater dependency. Is that right? Is it fair? Is it just?
	The Treasury records inheritance tax revenue for 2002–03 as £2.4 billion. That actually represents approximately 0.6 per cent of the total tax take. I could make all sorts of references to people who have done in-depth studies of the effects of inheritance tax, the tax yields and the cost but, in the interests of time, I shall not go through them. However, we must recognise that it is disproportionately heavy for some people. The obvious solution to all the problems caused by inheritance tax is to abolish it altogether. An inheritance tax abolition Bill would be much more popular and benefit many more people than the Civil Partnership Bill, and would prevent hardship for many more people.
	If the Bill is to become law, it must be amended radically to benefit far more people. There are many non-sexual relationships where people depend on each other for companionship, as has already been dealt with, and share the costs of living, which has not. It is obviously cheaper for two to live together than separately. The Bill does nothing for such people, however. According to the 2001 census, fewer than 80,000 people live as part of a same-sex couple, whereas 4.6 million people live together in non-sexual co-dependent relationships—almost 60 times as many.
	I hate taking issue with the Minister, but the government estimates, in an answer to my noble friend Lady Carnegy, who is no longer in her place, are that between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of homosexual couples would want to get involved in civil partnerships. According to footnote 3 on page 108 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, the figure is 3.3 per cent. That means that 96.7 per cent of homosexuals in the UK will not register a civil partnership, in the Government's own estimation. How can we justify spending all this parliamentary time on a Bill containing 196 clauses and 22 schedules, lasting 258 pages, which will take eight days in Grand Committee?
	The Bill is hardly modest. We are fundamentally rewriting the entire basis of our family law, pension law and taxation law. The reason for doing so is not to benefit deserving people in situations that they cannot get out of, in many cases. If it were, house sharers not in a sexual relationship would be included. The Bill is not inclusive; it creates yet more fragmentation and discrimination. It is wrong.
	The Bill opens a Pandora's box.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, just before we came into the Chamber, the noble Baroness reminded me that, even though I did not and would not agree with her, I should keep to nine minutes. She has taken 15 minutes, which is a long time over the ration.

Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, I apologise. I mentioned to the Minister before I came into the Chamber that I would obviously be in a very small minority and felt that I had to put the opposing case. I am sorry to have taken so much time.
	Some might say that the Bill is only small and introduces only a small change. A rudder is only a small part of a ship but, like a rudder, the Bill will steer the direction of public policy into completely uncharted waters. I will return to those issues and many more in Grand Committee.

Lord Alli: My Lords, I want to say how much I welcome the Bill. After I joined this House, the first major debate in which I participated was on 13 April 1999. I stood up at 10.29 p.m. to make my first major speech in the House. The subject was the equalisation of the age of consent. I shall let the Minister deal with her phone; I know that she wishes to undermine my arguments.
	I sat through many speeches about gay men and women—noble Lords may recall some of them—referring to us as sick, abnormal, unnatural and ruined. I remember starting my speech. Bravely—some would say naively—I stood up and said that I was 34 and proud to be gay, and that I was gay when I was 24, 20, 19, 18, 17 and 16. I looked around me, and I felt very vulnerable—but there was also a huge warmth in the House that night from colleagues all around it. I ended my speech by saying:
	"In tonight's vote I should like your Lordships to speak out for me and millions like me, not because you agree or disagree",
	with who I am or,
	"because you approve or disapprove",
	of what I do,
	"but because if you do not protect me in this House you protect no one".—[Official Report, 13/4/99; col. 738.]
	We lost that vote, and I walked away from this Chamber feeling pretty wretched.
	That was almost five years ago to the day. We have travelled such a long way since then. We have seen the equalisation of the age of consent, albeit with the use of the Parliament Act. We have seen anti-discrimination laws implemented in the workplace and in the military. We have seen same-sex couples given the opportunity to help children through adoption. Only a short time ago, we saw the repeal of Section 28. I am most proud that, since the equalisation of the age of consent, all those measures went through with your Lordships' consent and not with the use of the Parliament Act. I want to pay tribute to this House, because it has undergone a remarkable journey, and I believe that many young people will look at this place as being more relevant due to the steps that it has taken over the past few years.
	There has also been a remarkable journey for the party in opposition. Michael Howard, only a few months ago in his "British dream" speech, said that he would support the Civil Partnership Bill and believed that it made important reforms. The noble Baroness on that party's Front Bench also told us that he talked about removing the barriers that the state puts up to stop civil partnerships. It is also remarkable when the Daily Telegraph, on 25 November last year in an editorial, said that,
	"there is no good reason why a homosexual man or woman bereaved after a decade of faithful union should face the additional burden of selling a home to meet death duties when a partner dies".
	That point was amply illustrated by the noble Baroness, Lady Gould of Potternewton. The editorial went on to give its unequivocal support for civil partnerships.
	I cannot tell the House what the Bill will mean to many gay men and women, in terms of the relief that at last we might find some kind of recognition by the state, and therefore society as a whole, for our relationships. We will no longer have to think of our loved ones being turned out of the houses that they share with us. We will no longer have to suffer the indignity of seeing ourselves removed from hospitals, while relatives who have barely been on speaking terms with our partners make decisions over medical treatment. This is truly a good Bill.
	I cannot say whether or not I will be a beneficiary of this Bill—after all, a boy does like to be asked.

Noble Lords: Oh!

Lord Alli: My Lords, I have received no such proposal. However, I have been with my partner for 22 years. In fact, next month we celebrate 23 years together. This legislation might allow us to benefit from what straight couples up and down the country can do. We can if we wish register our union, not because of the fiscal benefits, important as they may be, and not only because of the protections that we wish to give each other, but because we want our partnership recognised by the state and elevated above friendships or close acquaintances. We would do it because we loved each other and we wanted, as the right reverend Prelate stressed, a lifelong relationship. The Bill is about that, recognising the special different status of committed, loving same-sex relationships and giving them legal protection on that basis.
	There will still be those who will oppose the Bill. They will talk about being sympathetic and, indeed, claim not to be homophobic. We know who they are—they have voted against every piece of legislation that I have listed. They will abuse two legitimate concerns to undermine the Bill. The first notion, of course, is that it will undermine marriage. In countries where there is gay marriage or civil partnership, there is certainly no evidence to suggest that it does that. In fact, there is evidence to suggest the reverse. More importantly—I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford—it seems illogical to argue that something that encourages stability in society should somehow undermine marriage.
	The second argument to be deployed will be, "We're very pleased to give these rights to the gay community, but we should see a way of extending beyond the gay community to others—to sisters, to brothers or to a carer. Should they not be granted the same protection?" That is a seductive argument, but it is not an issue for this Bill. Those are legitimate questions for the Government, but this Bill is not the place for those arguments. They should be considered perhaps in the context of the family and domestic partnership Bill. So should issues relating to cohabiting couples, on which I know that the Government are currently working. I was pleased to hear from the Minister of the work that is being done in the Department for Constitutional Affairs.
	I look forward to the Committee stage. I thank the Minister for the work that she has done on this Bill. I thank my colleagues in the Government who have produced a first-class Bill. Many in the gay community have waited literally a lifetime to see this Bill come forward and I hope that it will be enacted soon.

Baroness Buscombe: My Lords, it gives me real pleasure to take part in this debate today and to support the Bill in principle. I begin by expressing my sadness that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, was unable to be here today for very good reasons. I pay tribute to him, because he has championed civil partnerships. It is probably because of him in large part that we are where we are today.
	The noble Lord gave us, by way of his Private Member's Bill in January 2002, the opportunity to consider in this House both the principle and the practicalities of civil partnerships. In order to avoid doubt, particularly outside your Lordships' House, I want to make it clear that I worked closely with colleagues in the shadow Cabinet at that time, including our leader, Michael Howard, to consider the Conservative Party view. Even then—two years ago—our view was very positive. While we did not want to see the institution of marriage undermined, I stated then, with the approval of the shadow Cabinet, that in the case of those who cannot marry, we should confront any form of discrimination that compromised mutual respect and commitment within a stable and loving relationship for no good reason. I am irritated that the media, in particular, and even some colleagues in another place, are treating this subject as a new idea, given that your Lordships considered it all that time ago. We clearly need to improve the PR of your Lordships' House.
	I reiterate what my colleagues and I said then about marriage, because it is still right now. Many one-parent families, as well as cohabiting couples, bring up children incredibly well and create homes as loving and as stable as those offered by married couples. However, figures show that the commitment of marriage increases stability. As the Office for National Statistics has stated, recent research has shown that children born to cohabiting couples are twice as likely to see their parents separate as children born within marriage. Our support for marriage therefore stems not from dogma or religious values. Indeed, while many of us marry in religious ceremonies which combine a civic and spiritual bond, more than half of us choose to marry in register offices with no religious content in the ceremony. In any event, many would argue that politicians should not preach nor pry into the private reasons for entering a marriage. Simply put, our support for marriage stems from the increasingly available evidence that marriage has significant benefits for present and future generations.
	However, the Bill provides us with the opportunity seriously to consider the rights of those who are not able to marry—those couples who do not have the choice; that is, same-sex couples who have a long-term, stable relationship. There is no doubt that those couples face a number of real problems in their daily lives—problems that need to be addressed in a sensitive, respectful and practical way. The Bill clearly seeks to overcome statutory discrimination against those who want to make the commitment to share rights and responsibilities within a coherent framework.
	In addition to those economic rights and responsibilities within a union, the Bill addresses issues that test the emotional strength and heart of a relationship. Those include the right of action in respect of a fatal accident; the right to register the death of a partner; and the provision for health and welfare of a partner without capacity to act. If a couple are in a stable relationship and unable to marry, it must be right to allow them the dignity of acting on each other's behalf in the same way as a married couple.
	I agree with those noble Lords who said that the Bill will not undermine marriage. Indeed, considerable evidence from similar legislation in other countries shows that, far from undermining marriage, quite the opposite is the case. I remember that I raised that concern during the debate on the Private Member's Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, but he was able to provide us with considerable information on that evidence. More recent evidence from Denmark, Norway and other countries shows that that kind of framework can assist in supporting the institution of marriage.
	One of my main concerns about this Bill and that of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is their narrow remit. They confer rights and responsibilities only on same-sex couples. However, after much consideration of this important issue—most, if not all, noble Lords have referred to it today—I have concluded that it is a subject for another Bill. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alli, on that; it is a separate issue.
	Many different kinds of relationship need similar support. I discussed them at some length yesterday with Ben Summerskill of Stonewall. Stonewall has stated, quite clearly, that it has,
	"sympathy with people whose lives are entwined but who are not in a sexual relationship. This is particularly the case in relation to a shared home and inheritance tax".
	However, I agree with Stonewall when it states that,
	"we strongly believe that the package of rights and responsibilities contained within the Bill, when taken as a whole, are unsuitable for people such as siblings or carers. Rules governing issues such as formation and dissolution together with the possibility of more than two people being involved (e.g. three siblings)"—
	how would one legislate for that situation through this Bill?—
	"mean that the issue should be considered separately".
	I am pleased to learn that the Government are already looking at that issue. My noble friend Lady Wilcox expressed the Conservative Party view that we should look at those areas in this Bill. In that case, I look forward to considering any amendments that we put forward to confront that difficult problem, but it will be hard to convince me that it will work in the framework of this Bill.
	On unmarried heterosexual couples, I have already said that we support the institution of marriage and that the Bill does not undermine it. However, unmarried heterosexual couples have the choice to marry. There is an important job to be done—I say it without wishing to be patronising—in educating and informing the ever-growing number of heterosexual couples who choose not to marry and who think that they have "common law rights", but that is for another time. Indeed, the Minister referred to the myth of common law marriage. Many of those couples believe that they enjoy the same rights and responsibilities as those who are married just because they cohabit. That is particularly important when it comes to children of cohabiting couples. I know that this is a debate not for this Bill but for another day. However, I entirely agree with the Solicitors' Family Law Association when it states:
	"We strongly believe that urgent reform is needed to the law on cohabitation to meet the needs of the growing numbers of unmarried couples who cannot, or do not want to . . . formalise their relationships by marriage and also to protect the partners in same-sex relationships who do not register a civil partnership".
	That latter point may be less of a priority because under the Bill there will be a choice for same-sex couples to enter a partnership.
	In conclusion, in April 2000, I wrote a paper on family policy for discussion and debate among Conservative Party members throughout the United Kingdom. In that paper, I posed the questions:
	"Should the family, for the purposes of family law, taxes and benefits, also include people, whether of the same gender or not, who choose to live together in a stable relationship and share in the home economy?".
	This might include, say, two sisters who choose to cohabit together with an elderly relative in their care or a couple in a homosexual relationship. One example I gave of a radical approach to these questions was the French institution, PACS; the Pacte Civil de Solidarite. This allows two people to register their union and then three years later to enjoy some of the legal benefits of marriage.
	This system is not an alternative or an equivalent to marriage, it simply enables people who have relied on one another through life to share rights to their property and assets. Feedback from the paper I wrote across the United Kingdom found among those in the Conservative Party a genuine and widespread will further to consider these matters in a positive way.
	So four years on, I am pleased that we are here having this Second Reading debate on the Bill in your Lordships' House. While its details require further consideration and debate, I am proud to support its principle. I agree with what the right reverent Prelate the Bishop of Oxford said about the need to support, in any which way we can, commitment and stability in a loving relationship.
	The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said that 40 or 50 years ago such a Bill could not have been even thought of. Four years ago, when I wrote that paper about the possibility of rights and responsibilities for same-sex couples for the Conservative Party, I was incredibly nervous about this going out to the party at large. We have come a long way and I am very proud of that.

Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, I do not welcome the Bill. I strongly sympathise with some of the comments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Wilcox and Lady O'Cathain.
	I should not have the objections I do to giving the rights which the Bill gives to same-sex partners if common decency had prevailed in giving some of those rights also to same-sex persons such as mother and daughter, or two sisters, or two brothers, or an aunt and niece and to opposite sex persons such as a brother and sister, or a father and daughter who set up house together and where, for example, great hardship may be caused when on the death of one the other has to pay death duties or inheritance tax, whatever it is now called.
	Why should gays and lesbians be cushioned against those hardships and them not? The Government have gone out of their way in Schedule 1 to this long and complicated Bill to make absolutely certain that only same-sex couples who are outwith their list of prohibited degrees of kindred and affinity can benefit from it.
	Perhaps the Government think there are more gay and lesbian votes for them in the next election than from those in the categories I have mentioned. And no doubt the Treasury is less than enthusiastic about postponing the receipt of any more inheritance tax or any other sort of tax. I think the Government are paying tribute to the great god of expediency, the god of governments, whose worship drove my father from the Conservative Benches on to the Cross Benches nearly half a century ago.
	This is a bad Bill and should be drastically amended along the lines I have suggested, if it is possible to do so. If it is not possible, which may be the case, the Government should lose no time in introducing legislation to effect the changes I have mentioned.

Baroness Rendell of Babergh: My Lords, the long awaited Civil Partnership Bill will bring great happiness to those same-sex partners who have wondered if they will live long enough to obtain what they see as their right. Noble Lords will have received a large post-bag from such people and few letters they get will be more reasonable, more level-headed and, I think I may say, more moving.
	Several opinions from gay people were quoted in this House when the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, introduced his Private Member's Bill on this same subject two years ago. Since then, I have received many letters from gay and lesbian people living in a committed same-sex relationship writing of their anxieties and their distress. When the Bill becomes law, these will be removed, as will those of all same-sex couples who register.
	Under the Bill, members of public service pension schemes will be entitled to survivor benefits for registered same-sex partners in the same way as for a widow or widower. Same-sex partners will no longer pay inheritance tax on assets passed on after death. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has said, a man or woman in a partnership who is in a pension scheme will not be able to register his or her partnership until the Bill is enacted and their previous period of partnership will not count as part of their pensionable service. Is not the effectiveness of the Bill reduced by failing to backdate the entitlement to the beginning of the employment relationship or of the partnership relationship if later than the former? Is it not making for inequalities? A married person's pensionable service counts from the time of its commencement.
	Same-sex partners will be able to act as each other's next of kin in a situation when one is seriously ill in hospital, having therefore the right to make resuscitation decisions, for instance, and when the time comes, register a partner's death. Are we to assume that once a same-sex couple have signed a document in front of a registrar and two witnesses, or some other form of public ceremony, their partnership will be officially recognised to such a degree that the hospital authorities will regard them as next of kin to each other? Will they have to produce for inspection their registration document?
	A wife or husband is not required to produce their marriage licence, or in any other way prove they are next of kin in these circumstances. Will those in civil partnerships be treated in the same way? The term "next of kin" should be defined and given legal meaning. As things now stand, even after registration of a civil partnership, some devout hospital staff, on their Church's or faith's instructions, may feel obliged to disregard same-sex relationships, officially sanctioned or not.
	And on this question, the fact must be recognised that a large number of gay and lesbian people are still reluctant to come out of the closet. In many areas of society and of the workplace, openly declaring one's sexual orientation is a risky business. Coming out with it may lead to verbal or even physical violence or to various hate crimes or, sometimes as bad, to becoming the butt of offensive jokes. This diffidence on the part of gay people has a particular relevance in the proposed form of civil registration. Public access to the registration may place some people at risk. Should not some measure be devised in which access to names can be kept confidential where those in the civil partnerships wish for privacy and confidentiality?
	Conversely, the Bill makes no provision for those wishing to register a civil partnership having a ceremony corresponding to that of a civil marriage. In many respects, the Bill is providing something very close to a civil marriage, unwelcome though this may be to many people. One wonders if the distinction is not largely in the minds of those who drafted the Bill since the only differences seem to be that the term "spouse" is to be avoided, the concept of "bigamy" is being substituted for new "offences of perjury", and there are some pension discrepancies. Moreover, when the Bill is enacted, civil partners will not be able to be compelled to give evidence in court against each other—exactly as in marriage. The dissolution of a partnership is very like the dissolving of a marriage. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, I see no harm in this, but I would like to have the matter clarified. There is a strong emphasis in the Bill that anything in the nature of a religious service should be avoided when registering. Several gay people have written to me pointing out that they would like their partnership to be recognised with more gravity and formality, and some of them asked for a religious service. Being gay does not turn someone into an atheist. Many homosexual and lesbian people are deeply religious, as we have seen in a number of instances lately, and would like to feel their commitment to each other was made in the sight of God as well as man.
	The consultation paper, published in June 2003, accepts the argument from human rights that there must be some compelling reason to deny rights and duties to one form of partnership if they are awarded to another, but no adequate reason is put forward. United Kingdom law already accepts the marital status of couples from countries such as Sri Lanka and Canada, where the law supports same-sex marriage. It is surely difficult to accept some married couples and not others. Three European countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, have registered partnerships with similar rights and responsibilities to civil marriage, while three more, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, now have same-sex marriage. The United Kingdom will be obliged to accept these marriages to fulfil the requirements of freedom of movement within the EU. Can my noble friend the Minister tell the House in what fundamental sense proposed civil partnerships will differ from civil marriage, except in that one form was designed for heterosexuals and the other for same-sex couples?
	In 1836, when the Marriage Act, which let in civil marriage was debated in another place, Members were more concerned by the idea of people wandering from parish to parish to be married, a real fear of banns being dispensed with and by "dissenters"—I quote—being removed from the necessity of being married by a Church of England clergyman, than by the prospect of weddings without the benefit of clergy. To us today, all this seems antediluvian and a cause for wonder, as the general fear of same-sex unions will seem to everyone in the future.
	When it becomes law, this Bill will do more for gay and lesbian people than give their unions legal status. It will help to raise their profiles in a world of predominantly mixed-sex partnerships by setting them firmly in that world and drawing them in from the fringe. Unfortunately, mixed-sex couples living together feel discriminated against, in that no civil registration partnership provision is made for them. The answer they usually receive, regardless of the fact that they may be biased against marriage on principle, is that if they want the benefits awarded to same-sex couples there is nothing to stop them marrying. But what of sisters sharing a home, as many noble Lords have pointed out, or a brother and sister, or a disabled or elderly person with an unrelated carer? Usually, in our present-day world, such people are getting on in years but are none the less anxious, rather more so, for a change in the law to provide for them. We must hope for future legislation, and not too long deferred, to redress these inequalities.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, I support this Bill, because it is really a matter of liberty. I accept the arguments put forward by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford on the necessity for the Bill and its overarching Christian substance.
	Part of the problem is that the Christian Church has been in the most appalling muddle over homosexuality ever since it was founded. The Old Testament says "do not eat lobster", "do not eat crab", and "stone adulterers to death". If we were to do so, I suspect it would have the same effect on the countryside as the Black Death. God spoke to Abraham, or so we assume, six hundred years after it is assumed to have happened. Abraham changed the spelling of his name, his wife could have children at the age of 99, and they could then go and inhabit the best piece of real estate on the Eastern Mediterranean littoral. Not unsurprisingly, Abraham said "Yippee. What's the catch?" God replied: "Chop off the end of your penis with a stone axe and those of all your 10,000 slaves as well". This is called the authority of the Old Testament.
	The Old Testament accepts Lot's polygamy. Jesus was completely silent upon homosexuality. St Paul could be classed as being hung up on it. The New Testament condones slavery. The moral authority for what has been accepted for 150 years or so all started, it appears, with the great papacies, in the 11th and 12th centuries, of Gregory VI, who started to establish the discipline and the centralising attitude of the papacy over most of western Europe. He classed sodomites in the same group as Jews, heretics and lepers.
	The noble and much-loved late Lord Hailsham had a story of a French friend of his who said to him:
	"On sait tres bien ce qui est arrive a Sodome, mais qu'est-ce qu'on a fait a Gomorrhe alors?",
	assuming that people knew what actually happened at Sodom. Well, they did not, as the Church could not make up its mind. Luther, of course, got in a terrible rage about sodomy, because he said it was all to do with celibate priests in Rome. Funnily enough, the Spanish Inquisition also burnt 150 sodomites without the benefit of strangulation as well as heretics, because it was classed as heresy. There was a wonderful Venetian journalist-editor who wrote a thundering Sun-like leader in a local newspaper in 1508, blaming the catastrophic defeat of the Venetians in some battle upon randy nuns and Venetian sodomites. So one can show that the attitude on homosexuality up until very recently was based on a series of slightly hysterical myths.
	So what does this Bill really do? It arises partly because stable relationships are better than non-stable relationships, and should be encouraged, but mainly because, 10 or so years ago, the tax relationship between husband and wife changed, and now we have a desire for tax equality. I agree with my noble friend Lady O'Cathain that this Bill is concerned with death duties. There is a lovely thing in this Bill, which I had noted but had forgotten to mention. For some reason, the Biblical prohibition on close relationships is included in the Bill. Why? I cannot understand why. But I think I do. I think it is because I cannot register my son as my catamite and then hand on the whole of my property to him without death duties. When I first heard of the Bill, I thought "Yippee. That is a frightfully good idea". But one cannot do that. So it is the problem of death duties which makes it even more difficult to sustain.
	I welcome this Bill because I think it is civilised, but as your Lordships can see, I find quite a lot which is amusing, ironical and open to mockery about the reasons why it has arisen, and the reasons why it is actually necessary.

Lord Beaumont of Whitley: My Lords, in supporting the Bill, I draw to the attention of the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, the fact that Ezekiel says that the sin of Sodom and her daughters is that they,
	"had pride of wealth and food in plenty, comfort and ease, and yet she never helped the poor and the wretched".
	It is not the sin that was often ascribed to them.
	Now let thy servant depart in peace, since I see that at least one of the battles that I have fought is nearly won. I have been fighting for a provision such as this since the 1960s, when John Robinson, the former Bishop of Woolwich, and I were among the founders of the Sexual Law Reform Society.
	Since then I have not given that cause the time that it deserves, but my support for the principle has never wavered, not least because I knew that it was important for "straights" to be signed up in the cause of justice. Not even the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, who is no longer in his place, and who once pilloried me in public life as representing the archetype of Lust in the seven deadly sins, has ever thought of me as gay, except in the old-fashioned sense.
	First, I like the name of the Bill because, as a respecter of the English language no less than as an Anglican priest, I would find it intolerable to call the unions with which we are dealing "marriages". A marriage is a very different thing.
	Secondly, I suspect that, unlike most of the Bills that come to your Lordships' House these days, this one needs little amendment. I certainly would resist the suggestions made by the Mayor of London among others that the Bill should be extended to all unmarried couples regardless of sexuality. The Bill is about giving civil rights to those who have entered long-term or permanent commitments to each other, not just those who are "having it off", if noble Lords will permit the phrase. Nor, I agree with the Government, is this the Bill to regulate non-sexual home-sharers. I agree entirely that that is necessary, and I hope that the Government will provide a Bill for it shortly, but this is not the place.
	The one matter that needs amendment was mentioned by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. It is wrong to rule out premises used for religious services, or in Scotland "places of reverence"—I am fascinated by the difference in nomenclature—as premises for registration. On the contrary, it is important that reverence enters into the picture and that the religious authorities, not the state, decide what ceremonies they will or will not entertain. I am delighted to hear from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford that the Bench of Bishops will take up that point. If they do, they will certainly have my support.
	It is pleasant for once to make a Second Reading speech in this House under this Government for which one can give three cheers rather than the usual one and a half, and my party and I do that wholeheartedly today.

Lord Haskel: My Lords, in a debate on 17 March in your Lordships' House I drew attention to the injustice that current law imposes on same-sex couples. I pointed out that those injustices could be put right by a civil partnerships Bill and called for its early introduction. Here we are, six weeks later, at its Second Reading. It would be churlish of me not to thank the Minister and congratulate her on her quick response and good service.
	In that debate I gave an example of the discrimination and injustice suffered by a same-sex couple and how the Bill would put that right—by solving the practical problems mentioned by other noble Lords. There is no need for me to repeat those issues, as they have been most eloquently dealt with by my noble friends, most of whom are at our party meeting, which is why they are not here. I agree with other noble Lords that recognising these issues and laying down the rights, responsibilities and procedures for couples who wish to share a home, share their lives and perhaps bring up children together, will make a difference to their lives. That is to be welcomed.
	I wish to emphasise one point that has not been sufficiently recognised or debated: the contribution that the Bill makes to equality. Equality across a whole range of issues is important, not only for social reasons but also because we now know that economic prosperity goes together with equality and the social cohesion that it inspires. Indeed, I think that that view of economics unites many noble Lords on these Benches, which is perhaps why we are sitting on this side and not the other.
	We used to be told that a strong economy meant inequality; we now know better. We know that one of the features of a successful company is that it recognises the need for equality. That absence of discrimination and the belief in equality enables companies to build up a first-class staff and to keep them. I am surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, with her experience of business, did not mention that when she spoke about the economy, although she did so briefly. She knows that good companies purposely create a diverse workforce to deal with the complex supply chain on which they depend and to match the diversity of their customers. Those companies encourage a better balance between gender, ethnicity, disability, age and sexual orientation in their workforce in order to deal better with their customers and suppliers. We now know that that leads to tangible benefits. That is why commitment to equality is so important to our economy.
	The Bill is one more small contribution to the social cohesion through equality that is central to our country's well-being and to our economy. I hope that the Minister will bear that in mind, and I wish the Bill every success.

Lord Elton: My Lords, one never can tell how soon one will have to speak. Some noble Lords' speeches last 15 minutes and others' for two. With the ink still wet on my notes, I shall start by saying that I am relieved to see the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Peterborough in his place. I shall leave it to him to address the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, who, I hope, will be back in his place when the right reverend Prelate comes to speak—in around seven and a half minutes.
	There is a religious dimension to this discussion and the Bill. It is one that some of us find quite clear. I approach the Bill with less enthusiasm than its warmest supporters and less revulsion than its greatest opponents—revulsion is perhaps the wrong word. I am reconciled to it, because the central issue is what is love. That is what Christianity is about; it is what life is about; and it is what makes the world turn round. In this country we are handicapped by having only one word for love, and we package many different emotions into it—we love ice cream, we love our wives, we love our country and so on.
	In particular, we fail to distinguish between two sorts of love. In the authorised version St Paul reminded us that,
	"the spirit lusts against the flesh and the flesh against the spirit".
	Marriage embraces both; it is the paradigm that most of us consider when we look at the Bill, and to which I am sure many heterosexual couples genuinely aspire. I would not wish to obstruct the protection or encouragement of true love. It is wrong to assume that true love cannot exist between couples of the same sex and need not necessarily be expressed carnally by them. The state should not enter into that aspect of the relation between them. Those who favour love as the guiding principle of this world should try to provide an opportunity for the spirit to be active in a secure environment, not threatened by financial and social penalties, which are attracted at present to such relationships not recognised in law.
	That is a cloudy way of saying that. Although I recognise the difficulties that many of my noble friends and co-religionists have with this legislation, its positive effects make it worth accepting the penalties, as we see it, of what it does negatively in its relationship to the rest of society.
	Having said that, the Bill is surprising in many respects. To start with, the Children Bill, which deals with the circumstances of the entire population at one stage of their life, is 40 pages long. This Bill, as my noble friend Lady O'Cathain has demonstrated, affects 3.3 per cent of cohabiting heterosexual partnerships. If you apply national statistics to that, you get to a figure of about 5,200 people. I forget how many hundred pages the Bill is; I think it is 258 pages long. We seem to be taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut, until we look at the complexity of the matter. As my noble friend Lord Onslow, who is absent, said, the devil is in the detail.

Baroness Wilcox: My Lords, it was me.

Lord Elton: My Lords, it was my most distinguished noble friend on the Front Bench who said that. I do apologise entirely for making a confusion on which I believe it would be impossible for anyone else to venture.
	There are also, in spite of the length of the Bill, some surprising omissions. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, and others, that it is essential that some contracting words should be there. Merely to say, "we are in a partnership", and not to say what the partnership means, is ludicrous. We have a complete motor car and no engine, as far as I can see. That must be put in, I would have thought. I hope that it will be done by the Government but, if not, I am sure that many of us will be willing to make an attempt.
	The question of the exclusion of heterosexual couples of different sorts is difficult. I started looking at that issue thinking that they should be included. Then you come to specific relationships where they cannot be. Someone mentioned three sisters. What about the daughter, faithfully giving up her life to her father, as I hope no daughter of mine will have to do? They are all safely married—but I would not want my daughter to sign a contract that she was going to have to be with me until I died, in the knowledge that some wonderful, dashing knight in shining armour might come along when she was 35. There are all sorts of practical objections to doing things that way. The right place to deal with it is in taxation law. There might actually be a lot to be said for a great deal more of this Bill being dealt with in that way. That is something that can be dealt with, no doubt, in Committee.
	I am glad to see the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford back in his place, because he had a difficulty over the exclusion of places of religious worship, otherwise described in Scotland, for the ceremony, or celebration, of these contracts. I am sure that the exclusion is made in order to make a gesture in the direction of those who would not like this to be seen as being absolutely parallel with marriage. It does not pose the difficulty that the right reverend Prelate supposes. Only the church is excluded, so the ceremony can take place in the village hall, or the church hall, and the party can then progress to the church. Having been in one failed marriage, and now one extremely successful marriage, the blessing of a civil ceremony, which was all that was available to us at the time, is a wonderful and spiritual experience for those of the faith and should not be belittled. Therefore, I do not see any difficulty in that respect.
	The one area in which I have considerable concern regarding the parallel with marriage—here I am on controversial ground—is adoption. It is wrong to present same-sex and heterosexual couples as absolutely on a level with each other for the adoption process. This is another area of legislation in which I have not taken part, and I realise that there are many considerations that I have not mentioned. Prima facie, that distinction ought to be maintained.
	I am anxious, after the collapse of two of the preceding speeches, not to speak too briefly. I conclude where I started. It seems to me that those of us who look at this from the point of view of Christian believers must consider whether it advances the cause of love being protected in society. We must recognise that love comes in many sorts and that we do not distinguish them in our vocabulary. I recommend that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford reads my introduction, because what I have just said does not fully explain what I mean, and I do not want to speak any longer.

Lord Beaumont of Whitley: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, does he accept that I did not "collapse", as he put it, and that I merely wrote a short speech, which is the kind of speech that, on the whole, your Lordships approve of?

Lord Elton: My Lords, I entirely approve. I accept what the noble Lord said, and he allows me to conclude on a more elegant note than I just did.

The Lord Bishop of Peterborough: My Lords, I am honoured to follow the noble Lord, Lord Elton, and I agree with many of the things that he said about love. I am sorry that I shall disappoint him and not take up cudgels with the noble Earl, Lord Onslow.
	I too welcome what the Minister has called the measured response to a recognised need. It has, as she said, been shaped by consultation, including with the Church, and it offers a secular solution and does not seek to weaken the importance of marriage. That is an issue to which I shall return. I find it difficult, speaking at this point in the debate, to add much to the contributions made by many noble Lords, but particularly to that made by my friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. Your Lordships will know that significant groups in the Church have given the Bill a more negative reception than he did. Without necessarily agreeing with all that they say, I want to explain a little bit why I think that they have done so.
	Both the Synod, in its discussion on cohabitation, and the Archbishops' Council, in responding to the Government's consultation paper, affirmed the central importance of marriage for the stability and health of human society, but accepted that there are issues of social justice that need to be addressed in the light of the changing patterns of relationship in our society. They argued that it should be done in a way that is consistent with our continuing desire to safeguard the special position of marriage. Since the publication of the Bill, some have argued that by accepting same-sex unions in legislation that mirrors to a great extent the legal protection given to marriage, thereby creating equality in law, will at least cause confusion about the essence of marriage, and would therefore not be consistent with the desire expressed by the council and by the Government.
	Others, as my friend the right reverend Prelate has done today, argue that because this proposed partnership is clearly not a marriage, it need not affect the status of marriage in this country. Indeed, by promoting stability, faithfulness and commitment in all relationships, it is supportive of the many principles on which marriage is based.
	The Synod's motion and the Archbishops' Council endorsed two of the three principles that the then Bishop of Guildford set out in his speech two years ago in your Lordships' House in debating the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Lester. First, he said:
	"Marriage is a gift from God to the whole of creation . . . This gift is a benefit to all—married and single alike. Its blessings cascade down the generations".
	That is a view that has been endorsed by many Members of your Lordships' House today. The Government have made it clear that they do not see the introduction of civil partnerships as undermining marriage. In the consultation paper, they recognised, as others have, the distinctive place of marriage in law, and the need to preserve it. That commitment is honoured in a number of ways in the Bill; a distinctive procedure with no specific wording; a document signed before a civil partnership registrar; without religious, or indeed any, defined ceremony. The prohibition from religious premises is again distancing it from marriage. I would take a slightly different viewpoint from that taken by my friend the right reverend Prelate.
	The second principle commended by the Bishop of Guildford was that,
	"where there is clear and persistent injustice and discrimination in our land those who legislate have a duty to seek ways and means of ending such unjust discrimination for the benefit of all".
	He added:
	"The third principle is connected with the second and is that of proportionality. How do we, in seeking to offer a good to a few, not end up undermining the greatest strength for the many?".—[Official Report, 25/1/02; col. 1721.]
	In saying that, he moved us from issues of justice about which, I think, we are all agreed to matters of judgment. Many of the issues of hardship and vulnerability relating to those in non-married relationships arise because, in the past, legislators have exercised positive discrimination in favour of marriage. It is not necessarily the case that they discriminated against other relationships; they have discriminated in favour of marriage. I guess that our predecessors did so partly because they felt that they were supporting an institution—indeed, a pattern of relationship—that was beneficial to the flourishing of human beings and of society. In forming that view, they were undoubtedly influenced by a religious—indeed Christian—understanding of marriage. That still pertains, and it is good to see that, in their response to the Select Committee report on religious offences, which we will debate later, the Government state unequivocally:
	"Religious values do indeed still play a significant part in shaping social values, perhaps increasingly so".
	Because I feel that the point has not been made, I shall give a little time to thinking about the positive discrimination in favour of marriage. I guess that our predecessors did that because they recognised the stark reality of the position of, say, a widow who, having devoted her life to the upbringing of a family, needed the protection of the law to enable her to remain in the family home without penalty and to benefit from her husband's pension after his death. Positive discrimination had a just purpose, but it also had a didactic purpose.
	In the different circumstances of our present society, it is clearly right that protection should be extended to those in the range of equally devoted relationships in which each has contributed to the well-being of the other and their dependants. However, in the message that we give to society, it will remain a matter of judgment whether the extension of positive discrimination by creating a largely undefined or, perhaps, self-defined relationship will be beneficial to society, as well as to the individuals concerned. Some have therefore argued that the issues of justice will be better addressed in other ways—reference has already been made to the Roman Catholic bishops—because they feel that the covert message of the development is an equivalence between marriage and other relationships.
	Although I fully share the desire to support marriage—the Government have made it clear that it is not their intention to create such equivalence, except in issues of discrimination—I believe that how the move will be seen in practice is another matter. We must face the question of whether the provision of civil partnerships will weaken the status of marriage or the commitment to it in our society, as others have indicated. As other noble Lords have said, the evidence from other European societies suggests that it will not. However, many hold the contrary view, and, on the admittedly unreliable evidence of my postbag, the protagonists of both viewpoints, many of them Christian, are equally vocal and clear about the veracity of their judgment.
	Those who feel that the move will undermine the unique status of marriage acknowledge that law shapes people's understandings and behaviour. In their view, creating equality in law with marriage gives a signal to society that marriage and civil partnerships are equally important to the well-being of society. My brother bishop, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, has argued the contrary view, and I, personally, have some sympathy with it. However, if a bishop may admit to such a failing, I find myself to be slightly agnostic on the matter. Having listened carefully to both sides, I do not know which will prove in the event to be right. It remains a matter of difficult judgment. It deals with people's attitudes, which are always unpredictable. Where there is a degree of uncertainty, we should err on the side of caution, without denying the problems that genuinely exist. It is for that reason that I welcome the measured response that the Government have put before us.
	My time is up, but I shall make two further comments. First, I sympathise with those, including many from the gay community, who have expressed concern that, in contrast to the general understanding of the purposes of marriage, the purposes of a civil partnership are not explained. That ambiguity about the nature and purpose of the relationship means that an emphasis on rights is not necessarily balanced with an equal emphasis on responsibilities. The commitment is not clear, and nor is the nature of the unreasonable behaviour that might lead to dissolution. Those matters need clarifying.
	I agree with those, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, who say that it will not address all cases of discrimination. I have some sympathy with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and others that those matters should be dealt with in another way. Therefore, I give the Bill a cautious welcome, and I hope that some of the issues can be addressed in Committee.

Baroness Thomas of Walliswood: My Lords, I speak in this excellent debate as a foot soldier promoted to second-in-command to support my noble friend Lord Goodhart, in the absence of my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill. I share the regret expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, that he is not standing here instead of me.
	What a debate it has been: we had the young gladiator, the noble Lord, Lord Alli; the tried and tested foot soldiers in the battle for equality, the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Gould of Potternewton and Lady Rendell of Babergh; the wisdom of two Members speaking from the Bishops' Benches; and the courage and valour in opposition of the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, and the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun of Abernethy. We also had the humanity displayed by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, is his opening sentences, and the little "l" liberalism of the noble Baronesses, Lady Buscombe and Lady Wilcox. We have had an astonishing display of what this House can produce when an important subject is before us. I am not sure that I can live up to what has gone before, but I shall do my best.
	As a Liberal Democrat, I welcome the Bill. It reflects our policy, in part at least. As my noble friend Lord Goodhart said, we would have combined the provisions of the Bill with similar provisions for opposite-sex partners, as my noble friend did in his Bill of January 2002. I regret that, in the two years since then, the Government have not been able to introduce a Bill that benefits opposite-sex and same-sex partners. Can the Minister assure us that the Government still intend to work towards that objective and that the study being carried out by the Department for Constitutional Affairs means just that? Bearing in mind the comments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady O'Cathain and Wilcox, and by many others, do the Government intend to turn to the problems of people who live in platonic but nevertheless supportive relationships?
	Despite some general reservations, however, I repeat my welcome for the Bill. It will provide a legal framework of basic rights and responsibilities for same-sex couples that will encourage those who wish to do so to live together in stable partnerships for their own benefit, that of their children and of society as a whole. Rather than deal with the Bill in general, I shall concentrate on a few points of dispute raised by lobbyists or during this debate.
	The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford mentioned the worries shared by some Christians. Christian Voice, which says that it is trying to,
	"look at the Civil Partnership Bill with the mind of God",
	criticises it on several grounds, particularly for harming children, undermining marriage, putting no responsibility on same-sex partners and intending civil partnership to be marriage in all but name. As someone who believes wholeheartedly in the secular state, with freedom of religious belief and observance, I do not subscribe to the view that a particular religious belief should determine how every citizen leads his life.
	Same-sex couples can already legally adopt children and take parental responsibility for them. It is therefore for the benefit of the parents, the children and, ultimately, society as a whole, including married people, that the Bill encourages a stable and loving environment for child rearing within a same-sex couple. Nor do I believe that the Bill undermines marriage, although the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, made an impassioned defence of that view. There are two different things: namely, marriage or a partnership recognised by law. The intent of the Bill is to establish that difference.
	My next comment may seem to be contrary or illogical in the light of my previous point. However, life is sometimes illogical. Interestingly, the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement wants Clause 1 amended to ensure that those wishing to be civil partners should declare that they,
	"intend to live in mutual commitment for an indeterminate period".
	In other words; it wants to impose a duty on people who go forward for civil partnership.
	In addition, the LGCM thinks that there should be a solemn declaration of mutual commitment between the parties in the procedure for civil partnership in Clause 8, because that commitment is the essence of the relationship. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford made reference to that, which was of great interest to all noble Lords on these Benches. I am sympathetic to that approach. I am also sympathetic to the suggestion from the LGCM that clauses which statutorily prevent registration of civil partnerships from taking place in premises mainly used for religious ceremonies should be struck from the Bill.
	I do not favour the term "gay marriage". The normal definition of marriage simply cannot be massaged to cover same-sex relationships. I do not think that we are ready to redefine that ancient institution, however faulty it sometimes seems to be in practice. However, I do not think that the state should interfere with the authority of those people who govern churches and other religious premises. It may seem appropriate to some—whether or not to the Church of England—to bless civil partners immediately after the registrar has registered the civil partnership in the same building. I think that I am right to say that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford made a similar point.
	Finally, there is the major problem of pensions. Clearly, the Bill is open to criticism on grounds of justice and equality. Surviving civil partners will stand to gain only from a deceased person's pension benefits that have accrued since the commencement of the Act that will emerge from the Bill. Those people will receive a smaller pension than surviving spouses. But UNISON says that,
	"surviving partner pensions should be available to all partners who are financially interdependent irrespective of marital status, gender or sexual orientation".
	I take that very broad statement to be a sensible point of view.
	The irony is that many private pension providers already rightly recognise equality between partners and spouses. After all, they pay the same contributions. It seems that it is the public sector that lags behind. In that respect, the Bill seems to be introducing or tolerating prejudice that is not in the spirit of human rights legislation. One cannot help but fear that cost arguments may have prevailed. I hope that the Minister can reassure us on those two points.
	I hope that I have not introduced a carping tone into the debate. Like my noble friend Lord Goodhart, I want the Bill to succeed and to play a beneficial role in society. When all is said and done, it is a forward looking and brave Bill. With some modification, it may become better still. Thankful as I am that I shall not have to torture my brain with the legal nitty-gritty in which the Bill abounds, I nevertheless reaffirm my support for it both now and in future stages.

Lord Higgins: My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas of Walliswood, on the extremely high standard of debate in terms of expertise—as always in your Lordships' House—and in terms of wisdom, if I may presume to use the word. In relation to these matters, that is certainly needed.
	On listening to the debate almost 40 years after I first entered Parliament, inevitably, I have found myself reflecting on the quite extraordinary change that has taken place in public attitudes to such matters as homosexuality and so forth—indeed, not only outside, but also inside both Houses. By a strange coincidence, my major opponent in the first election that I fought in Worthing was a Mr Anthony Lester. Modesty forbids me to say the result. Indeed, it is sad that for very justified reasons he is unable to be here today. We shall certainly look forward to his contributions at later stages. Since the noble Lord has not followed the elected route, we must recognise the tremendous advantage to our constitution to have an upper House that is appointed.

A Noble Lord: Another debate!

Lord Higgins: Another debate. My Lords, soon after my election, Mr Humphrey Berkeley bravely introduced a Private Member's Bill that resulted in the criminal aspects previously imposed on homosexuals being removed. That was a very important stage in the progress of these matters. Certainly, the Bill being debated today is a major milestone concerning reform in this area.
	Of course, these issues involve deeply held views, which is why, as my noble friend Lady Wilcox said, on this side of the House we are having a free vote. I am not entirely clear whether that is true for the other side. Perhaps the Minister could clarify whether that is so. Personally—this is a personal matter to a large extent—I support the Bill, in one way for the most simple of reasons: one must surely be more in favour of stable homosexual relationships than those that are not. I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Alli, indicating assent. In some ways, that is a very important aspect of the Bill.
	Of course, we shall scrutinise the Bill very carefully at later stages. Alas, hitherto, for various reasons, we have not had an opportunity to discuss it with Ministers. I gather that a huge array of Ministers will appear at later stages. It may be more appropriate to have individual meetings with them on what will undoubtedly be highly technical matters.
	Perhaps the main stream of argument that has tended to arise time and again today is whether the Bill will undermine the institution of marriage. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford took the view that that was not the case. My noble friend Lady O'Cathain took a very strong view the other way. Of course, both views are entirely legitimate. As has been pointed out already, there are varying views inside and outside the House. My view is that on balance it will probably support marriage rather than otherwise.
	There has also been a considerable amount of discussion on whether the right to engage in a civil partnership should be extended to heterosexual couples. On listening to the debate, that seems to be the one thing that would undermine the institution of marriage. Therefore I agree strongly with the views expressed by the Government. I am reinforced in that view because it is also the opposite of that expressed by the Mayor of London.
	I raise now a number of other points which are more in my normal field. Leaving on one side the issues I have just mentioned, I turn to the question of taxation and social security provisions. The Inland Revenue has issued a mysterious press release stating that the provisions relating to this Bill would be set out in the next available Finance Bill. We do not have the remotest idea what that means. It could refer to the Finance Bill which received its Second Reading a few days ago or it could mean the one that will be brought forward after the next Budget. I hope that the Minister can give us a clear answer here. However, it seems to me important that the provisions should be included in the Finance Bill now before the Commons because it will be quite absurd for us to have to debate the Bill without knowing the situation with regard to taxation. Alternatively, perhaps the suggestion made by my noble friend Lady Wilcox should be taken up and a separate Finance Bill introduced at the same time.
	Perhaps I am being overly optimistic, but I assume that the clauses related to this Bill are in draft form. If neither of the alternatives I have proposed are acceptable to the Government, then before we consider the Bill in detail they certainly ought to publish the clauses which they are going to put forward in draft form.
	I refer briefly to an important point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Peterborough on the extent to which there are incentives to marriage in our fiscal and social security system, and the extent to which they will be duplicated in this Bill. Again, there probably is a case for giving an incentive to stable relationships, whether they be heterosexual or those formed under a civil partnership.
	To some extent this Bill opens a Pandora's box. It brings out some of the anomalies in our taxation and social security systems which have lain dormant for many years. Perhaps we agree with Walpole that we should let sleeping dogs lie, but alas this Bill will give some of those anomalies a hefty kick and the dogs will suddenly start to bark.
	Perhaps I may cite one example. The history of married women's pensions goes back to Beveridge. As my noble friend Lord Onslow pointed out, the tax system has been changing over time, along with the social environment. However, the reality is that under the present system a woman receives a widow's pension—I am sorry, I should have said a wife's pension—on the basis of her husband's contributions. At the time of Beveridge that was generally the situation because few women were likely to make contributions in their own right. However, in effect, they get that wife's pension for free in that they pay the same amount in contributions as a single person. So there is a discrimination here against the single person.
	Once one starts to bring into the system a new group of people, should one perpetuate the anomaly? I do not think that there are many votes in going in the opposite direction and saying that women will not receive a wife's pension unless they pay more for it—and I do not propose that—but there are difficulties in deciding where to draw the line. There are a number of other examples related not only to tax and social security matters, but also in regard to divorce law—on which I am totally inexpert—and a number of other areas.
	I return to a point that has been implicit in a number of the speeches in our debate. The Bill will establish a provision for a civil partnership. I have had difficulty in persuading anyone to provide me with a definition of the difference between sex and gender, which is confusing. The trouble is that the Bill implies, to some extent, that these civil partners will have a sexual relationship. However, other speeches have suggested the opposite; namely, that the Bill does not do so.

A noble Lord: It is up to them.

Lord Higgins: My Lords, while that may be the case, the problem is that the Government will not know. It is not at all clear why a same-sex couple in a sexual relationship entering into a civil partnership should enjoy the tax and other benefits which a same-sex couple entering into a civil partnership which does not have a sexual relationship would not have. This brings me immediately to the point that arose in an earlier discussion about the problem of people who are living together, but not necessarily in a sexual relationship. Should they be entitled to enter into a civil partnership and enjoy the benefits which result from that?
	I think that the situation has been complicated by a number of noble Lords. As an economist by training, it is always helpful to employ a certain amount of technical jargon, so I shall refer to the difficulty arising here as the "spinster problem", concerning two elderly spinsters living together.

Baroness Buscombe: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving me an opportunity to intervene briefly. I am sad to say that there are many married couples who are not in a sexual relationship. Surely that is relevant.

Lord Higgins: My Lords, I apologise for not being in the Chamber when my noble friend made her speech, although I realise that she is concerned about this point. It is one that is quite true. We shall run into a terrible minefield about whether there can be annulment either for a married or a same-sex couple. I shall not pursue that line for the moment, but I take the point made by my noble friend.
	I return to the spinster problem. Why should it be the case that two spinsters who have lived together for many years should not enter into a civil partnership and, as a result, enjoy the various benefits that would accrue to a same-sex couple with a sexual relationship?
	There may be an even greater problem. Again, I shall resort to the kind of jargon which may be useful in Committee by referring to the "sister spinster problem". One must then tackle the whole problem of family relationships, which are not the same for same-sex couples as they are for couples comprising both sexes. We shall run into problems. There seems to be a very strong argument for covering the spinster problem, although I have to say that I am more doubtful about the sister spinster problem. I apologise for speaking in such a technical fashion. If one lets economists contribute to debates of this nature, one must expect that kind of thing to happen.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis of Heigham, has been either nodding or shaking her head throughout my remarks. I have made a careful note of when she does one and when the other. I turn, therefore, to the whole issue of cohabitation. That will be an extraordinary mess. It is not such a difficulty in terms of taxation, but it is a substantial problem in the area of social security. One knows only too well all the issues thrown up by couples living together, whether they may be cohabiting and engaged in benefit fraud, and the extent to which the Government are responsible for deciding whether they are engaged in such fraud and so forth. We must ask whether those considerations are to be extended to same-sex couples. I look forward to hearing at a later stage what the noble Baroness has to say about that. However, the whole cohabitation aspect of this matter will present considerable problems.
	The reality is that some of these issues are even more complicated in that it may be that some engaged in civil partnerships will find that instead of gaining various benefits they actually lose them. That again is a whole area of concern. So to suppose that this is a simple Bill, even at 258 pages, is not the case. We will have to spend a lot of time on it. The noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, in her opening remarks said that an enormous amount of hard work had been done over the past two years. That is clearly the case. Alas, I feel that an enormous amount of hard work is ahead of your Lordships.
	I hope that in Committee, and so on, we will have the help and advice from the right reverend Prelates and others on a number of points which I have not referred to. I hope that we can ensure that the Bill and also the provisions with regard to taxation in particular—which do not appear in the Bill—can be adequately decided and that we will recognise when we look back some time in the future that the Bill is a milestone. It is an excellent idea for the Bill to start in your Lordships' House and I hope that it will be said that your Lordships did a good job.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I reply with a considerable sense of pride because we truly have had a splendid and well informed debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, that I am particularly pleased that when we come to the issues of state benefit and pensions I will have the encyclopaedic knowledge of my noble friend Lady Hollis, who will have the privilege and pleasure of duelling, as she always does, with the noble Lord opposite. In due course I will say a little about that.
	The reason why I say that I rise with pleasure is the nature of the debate that we have had. There has been a great deal of humanity on all sides and from all those who have spoken. There has been sympathy, even in difference. The two voices who have spoken against the Bill—the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, and the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun—spoke with moderation and precision.
	It is right that my noble friends Lord Alli and Lady Gould remind us that we have come a very long way. It was particularly telling that the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, mentioned Wolfendon of 50 years ago, because that journey has been long, painful and difficult, but it has demonstrated something which the noble Lord, Lord Elton, exemplified; namely, that we sought to concentrate on what love truly means in terms of dignity, parity of treatment, fairness and justice. That is what the Bill primarily seeks to address.
	The Government introduced the Civil Partnership Bill for reasons of social justice and equality. The Bill would be worth doing if there were 800, 8,000 or 80,000 people living in same-sex relationships in this country. The figure of 39,761 same-sex couples, identified by the Office for National Statistics in the 2001 census data, is likely to be a minimum estimate. There may be same-sex couples who, for a variety of reasons, were not identified. Details of our take-up assumptions were published in the regulatory impact assessment: we anticipated that by 2010 there will be between 11,000 and 22,000 people in civil partnerships.
	As part of the policy development process we will continually monitor that evidence from a number of sources. We have accumulated evidence from comparable systems in other jurisdictions: Sweden had the Registered Partnership Act in June 1994; Norway had the Act on Registered Partnerships in April 1993; Denmark had the Act on Registered Partnerships 1989; and the Netherlands had the Registered Partnership Act 1997. Using that evidence, the take-up figure is based on assumptions that the proportion of the lesbian and gay population who will be in civil partnerships by 2050 will be 5 per cent, which is under the low scenario, or 10 per cent, which is under the high scenario, of the proportion of the heterosexual population who are married. It is for that reason that I said in my opening remarks that the figure would be between 5 and 10 per cent. The figure of 3.5 per cent is perhaps an unduly conservative one.
	I should also make clear that the intention in relation to social security and tax credits legislation is that in general same-sex couples in civil partnerships will be treated in a similar way as married couples. Same-sex couples who are not in civil partnerships but who are living together as if they were civil partners are treated in the same way as opposite-sex, unmarried couples who are living together as husband and wife. That is the way in which we propose that those issues will be dealt with.
	The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was right in his assumption that Her Majesty's Treasury tends not to foreshadow that which may become law and deals with matters once they are law. The noble Lord was right in his surmise that it is likely that this legislation, if passed, will not come into operation until October 2005, therefore there is plenty of time for there to be another Finance Bill other than that which is currently going through Parliament in which these provisions could appear. But that is a matter which we will have to debate and I am confident that that debate will be an extensive one.
	I should also make clear that in accordance with the usual system in contracted-out schemes, members will accrue rights to survivor benefits for a civil partner from the date of implementation of the civil partnership proposals. Improvements to public service schemes and contracting-out regimes are made for future service only. As noble Lords will remember, when new benefits were introduced for members of pension schemes, they were normally introduced prospectively—for example the guaranteed minimum pensions were extended to widowers from 1988, whereas widows were entitled from 1978—so retrospection would add significant liabilities to those schemes which do not already pay survivor benefits to unmarried couples. Public sector schemes would have to shoulder most of that burden. But I absolutely understand from the comments made by a number of your Lordships in this debate that that will be an issue that we will wish to address with some care.
	In relation to the comments on the reason why we have not included others in this scheme, I very much appreciate the understanding shown by a number of noble Lords, not least the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, that these relationships are very different. I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Elton, who dealt with the issue of what would happen if you entered into a contract with a member of your family and that person subsequently wished to marry, and indeed what would happen if there were more than one sibling who entered into a contract, and how you would then disaggregate those relationships. Those issues are certainly not for this Bill.
	It is right, as I mentioned, that the Department for Constitutional Affairs is looking at what more could be done about the myth of common-law marriages and making sure that people understand the risks that they face and the choices they make when they choose not to enter marriage or in some other way regularise the nature of their relationships. Noble Lords will also know that, if one does not wish to enter into marriage, there are many legal steps one can take to better secure one's financial and long-term arrangements, which are also available for us all.
	I warmly welcome the comments of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, many of which were echoed with great sympathy by his fellow right reverend Prelate, although the emphasis was different. We believe that what was said by the Synod is very much carried through in the Bill. There is division—that was evident on the Bishops' Benches—but the Government have sought to walk a path between the areas of disagreement, one of proportionality, fairness and balance. We hope that we have created sufficient comfort for those who disagree on some of these issues to make it possible, as the debate has demonstrated, for us all to walk together, even though our steps may be at a slightly different pace. We believe that that is certainly worth doing.
	The noble Lord, Lord Elton, raised the question of adoption. He may not recall, but we dealt with many of the issues in the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Anyone who wishes to adopt must first be assessed and approved by the Adoption Agency. One of the key considerations in assessing people's suitability to adopt is their ability to provide a loving family environment in which to raise a child through childhood and beyond. So, when assessing a couple's suitability to be adoptive parents, whether they are unmarried, married or civil partners, the assessment will consider the stability and the enduring nature of the relationship.
	In England and Wales, once the relevant provisions of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 come into force in September 2005, unmarried couples—whether same sex or opposite sex—will be able to make a joint adoption application. The Bill will regularise the position of children who are part of such relationships to take advantage of the same rights as other children and other couples. I hope the noble Lord will find that these provisions accord with his aspirations as opposed to not doing so.
	I should have reassured the House that when the proposed tax changes come in they will be implemented at the same time. We anticipate that that will about a year after Royal Assent. Of course, we do not know the precise date when the Bill will finish its passage through this House and the other place.
	Let me reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, that her reticence about standing as a foot soldier is quite unmerited. We have seen her for a long time as being one of the Liberal Democrats' major-generals.
	I, too, regret that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is not in his place. He, together with many noble Lords who have spoken, would have been very warmed by the nature and extent of the debate. My noble friend Lady Rendell asked a question very similar to the one posed by the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain. I hope I have made plain that the Law Commission's report on home sharers in 2002 concluded that, because of the disparity and diversity of the relationships that are present, there is no simple solution that covers all. I hope I have made it clear that that work needs to continue.
	My noble friends Lady Gould and Lord Alli raised the question of the work that needs to be done in regard to co- habitees. I hope that I have said enough to reassure the House that this issue will continue to excite our attention.
	The Bill will undoubtedly demand a high degree of scrutiny. It is right that I should tell your Lordships that there will be a whole phalanx of Ministers helping to carry through the Bill. I make it plain immediately that we will be very happy to hold separate meetings in relation to specific areas of the Bill that particularly excite the attention of noble Lords.
	The Bill has been carefully crafted. We hope, as the debate has demonstrated, that many of the issues with which noble Lords are concerned have been covered. However, I warmly welcome the historical excitement that the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, brought to the debate. In the absence of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, it is rare indeed that we should have the whole Bible as well as a 15th-century quote rolled up in one. For that, we thank the noble Earl, who brought such colour and flavour to the debate.
	I commend the Bill to your Lordships. There is work for us to do but one is warmed by the direction in which we appear to be going. It seems to be one upon which we are all embarked.
	On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Grand Committee.

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2004

Lord Bassam of Brighton: rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 15 March be approved [13th Report from the Joint Committee].

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 introduced an order-making power to ban the manufacture, sale and importation of specified offensive weapons. Today, in an effort further to improve airline and public safety, we are seeking to add the category of stealth knives and truncheons to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988.
	Before I get too far into the discussion on the order, I must apologise to your Lordships' House for an error in the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the order. The memorandum refers to the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. That reference should not be there. It should be recorded, however, that there is a link between this order and the Prevention of Crime Act, which I shall explain shortly.
	Currently, the offensive weapons order prohibits 15 weapons, including sword sticks, push daggers, death stars, butterfly knives and disguised knives. The manufacture, sale, hire and import of flick knives and gravity knives are already banned under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
	Adding the weapons, stealth knives and truncheons, to the order will have the effect of making it an offence for a person to manufacture, sell, hire, offer for sale or hire, expose or have in their possession for the purpose of sale or hire, or lend or give to any other person, or to import, a stealth knife or truncheon. A person would be liable on summary conviction to a maximum term of six months' imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding the sum of £5,000.
	The order does not create an offence of simple possession. However, the design and construction of stealth knives and truncheons is such that their possession in public, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, may be unlawful under Section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. That section makes it an offence for a person to have an offensive weapon in a public place without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. An offensive weapon is defined in Section 1(4) of that Act as meaning,
	"any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him, or by some other person".
	In the case of DPP v Hynde (1988) the court took notice of the fact that an item was unlawful under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, in deciding it was clearly meant for causing injury. Furthermore, in the case of Houghton v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester (1986), it was held that a truncheon is an offensive weapon per se. In addition, for the possession of stealth knives, Section 139(l) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 creates an offence for a person to have with him in public a sharply pointed article or an article having a blade without good reason or lawful authority.
	Therefore I seek to reassure the House that legislation exists to deal with the possession of such items in public and what we are seeking to address with the order is their manufacture, sale and import.
	In 2002, in the light of the events of 11 September, the concern of the airport industry and our wish to ensure effective levels of airline security, we added disguised knives to the offensive weapons order. They had no legitimate purpose and were manufactured simply to evade detection and provide those so minded with a convenient means of carrying a deadly weapon. We now intend to do the same with stealth knives.
	Stealth knives are non-metallic hunting or stiletto knives, made of a range of materials, such as nylon zytel or high impact plastic. Although they look like conventional knives, they are difficult to detect because they are non-metallic. We recognise that there are legitimate uses for non-metallic knives; that is why the definition of a stealth knife includes an exemption for knives designed for domestic use or for use in the processing, preparation or consumption of food or as a toy. One company that sells stealth knives claims in publicity material that,
	"these knives are made of a super strong nylon composite that is almost as hard as steel. They can be driven through plywood like a nail. They are completely undetectable when passing through metal detectors".
	Although the knives present a general threat because of their portability and concealability, they pose a particular risk to airline security as their material is difficult to detect, especially by metal detectors. The Government consider it a priority to legislate to prohibit the manufacture, sale, hire and importation of these knives.
	Ministers have also received a number of representations from both Members of Parliament and the police about truncheons being sold to criminals and used for unlawful purposes. Telescopic truncheons are already included on the offensive weapons order 1988 list, but we intend to add straight, side-handled and friction-lock truncheons to the order. I should emphasise that these weapons can cause serious injuries should they end up in the wrong hands.
	Truncheons, both side-handled and friction-lock batons, are used by the police as an important piece of self-defence equipment. The order will not affect the police's ability to carry and use such equipment. The police, and those manufacturing and supplying otherwise prohibited weapons to the police, have a defence under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for importing, manufacturing or possessing these items. This is because they are carrying out functions on behalf of the Crown for the purposes of that Act.
	Although legislation is already in place making it illegal to carry offensive weapons and most knives in public, there is nothing to prevent the sale, import or manufacture of stealth knives and truncheons. Currently an individual can walk into a shop or log onto the Internet and get hold of these weapons with comparative ease. That is why we now intend to take action to reduce the number of stealth knives and truncheons.
	Although we are not aware of the numbers of stealth knives and truncheons in circulation, we know they are freely available and used in the commission of crime. That shows the willingness of certain manufacturers to produce such weapons and provide the public with a wide range of concealed weapons. The Police Superintendents' Association called for restrictions on the sale of truncheons following evidence of their use by criminals, in some cases resulting in serious injury.
	It is worth noting that in 2002–03 Her Majesty's Customs and Excise seized 1,983 offensive weapons at airports, sea ports and from the postal system, giving a strong indication of the willingness of a significant number of people to equip themselves with and attempt to bring dangerous weapons into the country.
	As those weapons are easily available we believe that it is of the utmost importance to prevent their sale, manufacture and import, cutting off their supply as far as possible and reducing the number in circulation. By legislating to ban the manufacture, sale and import of stealth knives and truncheons, public safety will be improved, not only at airports and on board aircraft but also at places such as nightclubs, sports grounds, courts, pubs and other public places where individuals may try to evade security and carry these weapons for criminal purposes.
	Prohibiting the manufacture, sale and import of stealth knives and truncheons is a matter of both airline and public security and safety. This measure will have clear benefits for airlines and the public. It is the most effective measure that we can take to stop the supply of wholly unacceptable and dangerous weapons which have no legitimate purpose and reduce the possibility of them ending up in the hands of those intent on criminal activity. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we introduce these measures and bring them fully into force. I urge that the Motion be supported. I beg to move.
	Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 15 March be approved [13th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

Viscount Bridgeman: My Lords, we on this side entirely support the measures, which are designed to make the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act more effective. We are up against continual ingenuity on the part of suppliers and manufacturers of such weapons. The Minister has outlined the dangers, particularly in the port context but also domestically in nightclubs and so on.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, from these Benches we support the Government's aims in introducing the order. It is for all our safety: on airlines, in clubs and restaurants, and of course particularly in the Houses of Parliament. We should not only keep up with technological development but, where possible, the law should pre-empt it—although we are not doing that in this case; we are following on behind.
	We must remember that the people who carry such weapons are up to no good. Nylon zytel and high impact plastic knives are specifically manufactured to avoid detection, so it is right that they should be put beyond the law. I understand that the Government want to cut the supply chain by banning their manufacture and selling, as this order does. But what are they doing about all the weapons washing around in the system? Unless someone carries these weapons in public, they are still not committing an offence. However, their very existence in somebody's cupboard creates a threat to society.
	Will there be an amnesty for weapons already in existence? The order comes into force in only one month. Will there be compensation for shops who have stock of such weapons? If not, the shopkeepers may try to sell them off at half price, thereby going completely contrary to the Government's intention of having fewer of these things around in the system.
	The debate in another place on the order on Tuesday revealed a great deal of concern about the definitions. Surely the point is not that an item is a knife or spike but that it is a blade or point, capable of inflicting considerable injury or threatening to do so. In the debate in another place there was an enormous amount of concern about that issue and particularly about the definition of a straight, side-handled or friction-lock truncheon, sometimes known as a baton, mentioned in the order.
	Although the side-handle and the friction-lock versions are clear, as I see it the problem lies with the definition of a straight truncheon. There are numerous sticks used for martial arts, for walking in the hills, and so on, that might fall foul of this definition. It is really not good enough to tell a martial arts expert or a hill walker that the courts will decide whether they are committing an offence when they carry a staff or stick. They need clear guidance from the statute before inadvertently breaking the law and coming up before the courts.
	My other question is about antiques and toys. I understand that antique police batons are sold in large numbers and, if they were made more than 100 years before the offence, they are excluded from the 1953 Act that bans possession of an offensive weapon. However, there are many collectable police truncheons that were made in the 1930s. Can the Minister clarify the circumstances in which it would be lawful to possess such a thing? The other concern is toys. How are they defined, and how can a parent know that he or she is not buying a toy truncheon that will fall foul of this order? Unless the Government clarify that point, it could be that every nursery teacher in the country will become a criminal.
	In another place, the Minister reassured the committee that under the 1988 Act it is already an offence to possess a pointed or bladed weapon that is not a folding knife, with a blade of 3.5 inches or more. However, a folding stealth knife with a blade of 3.2 inches is a fairly lethal weapon. I wonder whether the Minister can explain how the law, as amended by this order, protects the public from those knives. A weapon with a blade of any length, which was specifically manufactured to avoid detection, should be clearly made unlawful as to its manufacture, sale, possession, carrying and use—although use is already illegal. Why did the Government not simply lift the definition of those weapons from the 1988 Act and add,
	"which is made of material not readily detectable by apparatus used for detecting metal",
	rather than tying themselves in the sort of knots that were asked about on Tuesday in another place?
	I am not trying to be less than supportive of the Government's laudable aims—I am just trying to get it right. I absolutely concur with the Government's aims, but I fear that, unless we get some very clear answers, we may find ourselves back in this Chamber before very long to put things right, because this order is not very well drafted.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I am grateful for the support that I have had, even if I am slightly less grateful for some of the questions—although I am sure that those questions have been asked and responses invited for the best of motives. I listened carefully to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley.
	It would be fair to say, on reflection, that definition issues are not easy in this case. The noble Baroness has come up with some words of her own, and I am sure that they are valid as expressed. I believe that we should be honest and say that finding a definition, especially for a stealth knife, was problematic, and advice had to be taken.
	We wanted a definition that specifically covered non-metallic knives not used for domestic use or for use in the processing, preparation or consumption of food or as a toy. It was decided that we should adopt the approach that we did, and we decided to keep the definition of a baton as simple as possible. That is the explanation and background to that question. We may well have to look at these matters again, from time to time. There is a history to defining offensive weapons that goes back some 50 years.
	The noble Baroness asked a number of other questions relating to antiques and martial arts weapons, to which I shall respond as best I can. With regard to martial arts enthusiasts, it will in the end be for the courts to decide whether an item falls within a definition of a straight-side handled or friction-lock truncheon. The intention, broadly, is for long staffs and walking sticks not to be caught, and, accordingly, the definition applies to truncheons alone. Reference is made to the word "baton" as truncheons are occasionally described in that way.
	As for antiques, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 provides that it is not an offence to sell, hire, offer for sale or hire, or to expose or have in one's possession for the purpose of sale, hire, lending or giving to another person, or to import any of the weapons detailed in the order that are antiques. Antiques are defined for the purposes of the order as something that has been manufactured more than 100 years before the date of an offence alleged to have been committed in respect of that weapon under subsection (1) of Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
	The noble Baroness also asked about compensation. Our view is that it is incumbent on the Government to take action to deal with that problem, but we do not therefore believe that compensation is payable in these circumstances. I should add that we have not faced great swathes of pressure on that point, although consultation has been somewhat limited because of the importance of bringing the order forward.
	The toys definition applies to a stealth knife but not to a truncheon. The noble Baroness may also have raised the issue of a stealth knife in a folding pocket format. In any regard, I shall make this simple point. The legislation attempts to deal with an offence of having without good reason or lawful authority any article that has a blade or is sharply pointed. That is covered by Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Folding pocket knives are excluded from the offence if the cutting edge of the blade exceeds 3 inches. The legislation that we are dealing with derives from Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and the offence created thereunder. Accordingly, if a stealth knife was manufactured that had a folding blade, it would still be unlawful under this order.
	Finally, it is just worth saying that there will always be definition problems with regard to these issues. We appreciate that and have done our best to come up with something workable, which captures those weapons of concern. These are clearly weapons of concern, particularly in the wake of 9/11. For those reasons, I hope that your Lordships will be entirely happy with the order. While we seek at all times to cover all angles, it is not possible to be absolutely precise on every occasion, but we believe that we have done the best possible job that we can. For those reasons, I hope that your Lordships' House will approve the order this afternoon.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Travel Notification Requirements) Regulations 2004

Lord Bassam of Brighton: rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 25 March be approved [14th Report from the Joint Committee].

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, the regulations before the House today fulfil a commitment made on 19 May 2003 by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in his previous role as a Home Office Minister. Your Lordships will recall that Section 86 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides a power to the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the foreign travel notifications of "registered sex offenders". The existing regulations, made under the Sexual Offenders Act 1997, provide that all offenders subject to the notification requirements must notify the police if they intend to travel overseas for a period of eight days or more. Such notifications must be made 48 hours before departure, unless the information is not known at that time, in which case the notification must be made 24 hours prior to departure.
	During debates on the Sexual Offences Act in your Lordships' House, consideration was given to what new regulations should include. There was considerable support for reducing from eight days to three days the period that an offender can intend to spend abroad without having to notify the police.
	Making registered sex offenders notify their foreign travel is necessary for two reasons. First, such a requirement enables the police to know when and for how long an offender will be overseas. That is important as it prevents offenders evading the notification requirements in the United Kingdom by claiming they were out of the country. Secondly, the foreign travel regulations provide information that the police can pass to other jurisdictions where they believe there is a risk that the offender might commit sexual offences overseas. The police can, and do, pass information to other countries in this way and it is particularly useful as a tool in our fight against sex tourism.
	The concern raised in this House, which was echoed in another place, was that the period of eight days was simply too long as offenders could travel to abuse children overseas and return to the UK without having to notify the police. In response to these concerns we consulted with various interested bodies including the children's charities, the travel industry and law enforcement agencies. We considered carefully the range of views expressed during that consultation, taking into account the need to balance the risks to children overseas against the additional burdens on the police and offenders that would arise from any change to the requirements.
	As a result, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor announced our intentions on 19 May and the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Travel Notification Requirements) Regulations, which I am asking the House to consider today, will reduce the period sex offenders can intend to spend abroad before they have to notify the police from the current eight days to three days and additionally require offenders to notify the police seven days in advance of their intended travel, as opposed to the maximum of 48 hours in advance at present. Where an offender needs to travel at short notice, or where his travel plans change after notification, he will be required to notify the police at least 24 hours before travelling. Failure to comply with these regulations without reasonable excuse will be a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. This is provided for at Section 91 of the 2003 Act.
	These measures have been well trailed and well rehearsed. We were persuaded by the arguments made at the time and we think that these measures will go some way towards preventing awful and appalling crimes in future. For those reasons, I beg to move.
	Moved, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 25 March be approved [14th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

Viscount Bridgeman: My Lords, on this side of the House we entirely support these regulations. They come against a background of the appalling growth in sex tourism world-wide. Sex tourism in the Far East is well known but there is disturbing evidence of a growth in sex tourism much closer to home in Europe, particularly, I understand, on the border between Germany and the Czech Republic, in western Bohemia, where child sex is openly advertised in the windows of houses. For these reasons we are in agreement with the regulations, in particular with the reduction in the time limit for notification and in the period for which the offender intends to stay overseas. We support this measure.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, it is great pleasure to offer the Minister and the Government the wholehearted congratulations of these Benches on listening to organisations such as World Vision and UNICEF—in which I must express an interest as a trustee—during the course of the proceedings on the Sexual Offences Bill and to the many people who have campaigned for this change in the regulations.
	However, we need to keep a careful eye on the operation of the regulations and to look at whether they could be tightened even further at some time in the future. I gather than Interpol believes that a reduction in the period for which a person on the register could travel without notifying the authorities to 48 hours could be coped with. Perhaps the Government will be able to reassure us that they will look carefully at that because a good deal of mischief can be done in 24 hours, let alone 48 hours. We need to look at it.
	We also need to look at the causes of sex tourism and at what else we can do. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, I was horrified to discover the extent of sex tourism and to find that the UK is fifth in the league of perpetrators of sex tourism. But we must not just look at the offenders. We must look at the internal problems that cause children and young people to feel that they need to sell their bodies.
	We also need to nip the problem in the bud. The problem of first offenders needs to be looked at very hard. I think that some people go abroad and commit these offences in the mistaken belief that they can get away with them and that they are not likely to be prosecuted in this country when they return. Of course, as we all know, they are liable to prosecution but I wonder what more the Government can do to send out the message that this behaviour is quite unacceptable and will be prosecuted. Perhaps work could be done with airlines and travel agents to warn people that it is an offence and will be prosecuted.
	There is also the question of people who have been convicted but who are on remand and waiting for sentencing. When a question was asked in another place about whether these regulations would apply to them the Minister who responded was not very clear in his answer. I wonder if the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, can answer that question today.
	It is important that we see these regulations in the context of the other measures that the Government have brought forward. We also have foreign travel orders that are available to the police if they have reason to believe that a person is travelling abroad for the purposes of committing an offence. I think that, when we put these regulations together with those orders and other measures, we have a great step forward in our ability to curtail the terrible activities of these sexual predators who prey on impoverished children abroad. I am very pleased to support the regulations in general and hope that the Minster can answer the questions that I have raised.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I am grateful to both opposition parties for their support for these regulations. It comes as no great surprise because I know that we were as one on this issue when the matter was debated previously. On policy issues such as this it is particularly important that we try to achieve a high degree of consensus in bringing these measures forward.
	As ever, the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, raised interesting questions on the regulations, or, more accurately, used the regulations as a means of raising interesting questions on the issue in general. The first point she raised was whether we could consider a further reduction of the time limit to 48 hours at some point in the future. The noble Baroness expressed the view that Interpol thought it could handle that. I think that we ought to proceed with caution and monitor how this works first. In our view there is little point in having something on the statute book if it cannot be used effectively as a means of control and essentially we are trying to control human behaviour with these regulations.
	The noble Baroness made the valid point that we should try to understand the causes behind an issue. That must be right, in particular in relation to sex tourism. I thought that she made a very sensible point when she said that we ought to try to nip this in the bud and then asked what more could be done. I think that this Government's record in the field has been exemplary. When it is held up to international comparison that is undoubtedly the case.
	In the "more to be done column", what we would like to see is more international co-operation. I do not say that other jurisdictions do not take this issue seriously because they plainly do. However, it is interesting that other jurisdictions are now looking very carefully at the legislation that we have been putting in place in the United Kingdom over the past few years. I think that that means that they are now looking to achieve our levels of compliance. I am delighted that there is around a 97 per cent compliance rate with the legislation regarding the notification of movements of sex offenders that we put in place. That is important because it shows that the legislation is being perfected.
	The noble Baroness asked a final question about those on remand. Notification requirements apply from the date of conviction, unless there is a sentence threshold for the offence. I understand that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary is writing on this issue to the Member of Parliament who raised the question and I undertake to ensure that the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, is copied into that correspondence so that the matter is put on public record and made clear. I commend the regulations to the House.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Religious Offences

Viscount Colville of Culross: rose to move, That this House takes note of the report of the Religious Offences Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales (HL Paper 95).

Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, I am extremely pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, back in her place. I remember what it was like being the Home Office Minister in this House, and a sandwich was indeed a luxury. At any rate, I think she must have had one.
	When the Select Committee was appointed, nearly two years ago, it was the noble Lord, Lord Peston, who asked whether the then Lord Chairman of Committees thought that the membership would cover all ranges of opinion—including that which regards the concept of religion as nonsense. I am not sure the noble Lord, Lord Tordoff, was answering that particular question, but the membership of the committee and the declared interests were very broad, as on page 6 of our report. One of the results was that there was very little prospect of reaching much in the way of a consensus or recommendations. I am not sorry for that—it was a good idea to explore the matter in a very general way and in some cases in a very particular way—so as to see what everybody thought.
	What we had hoped for at the end of it all was that there would be a rousing debate. I am not sure what is going to happen today, but I hope it will be a rousing debate. I am extremely pleased to see that taking part are Members of this House who were not members of the Select Committee. It may be that the debate will go further than this Chamber.
	The report has brought up-to-date the Law Commission report on blasphemy and other ancient offences which was published in 1985. It has also had a big opportunity to address the clause that was eventually left out of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill at the end of 2001. What has happened is that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who introduced the Private Member's Bill which gave rise to the Select Committee, has had a very extended and comprehensive Committee stage of that Bill. He took a great part in the discussions.
	Other than mentioning the noble Lord , I am not going to do anything particular by way of paying tributes to my colleagues—it would be invidious. They know who I mean when I say that a number of them took great trouble to ensure that we had witnesses of calibre and of very great knowledge, who came before us on a number of different subjects, and assisted greatly in the deliberations. I think I am, however, allowed to pay a tribute to our Clerk, Mr Mackley. It was the first time other than in his diplomatic service that he had dealt with anything as complicated as this, and it was his introduction to your Lordships' deliberations. He has since gone on from strength to strength. He was supported by some excellent staff. In Professor Bradley we had an expert adviser from Leicester, which of all places is a multi-race and multi-faith community. He brought with him not only his legal knowledge but a great deal of local advantage as well.
	Apart from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, I am the only lawyer who is going to take part in this debate. I am sorry to say that this is a terribly legal matter, and there is no avoiding it. For the first time, I shall give my own opinion about what ought to be done next—I tried hard not to do this during the sessions of the Select Committee. I would not be in favour of repealing anything, or of enacting anything. I will elaborate on that.
	I do not disparage the motives of those who disagree with me on either of those points, but I believe that a great deal of parliamentary time would be spent dealing either with repeals or with enactments of the sort that the Select Committee had to deal with. They would be highly contentious, we would spend a great a deal time, and the noble Baroness would be sitting for even longer on the Front Bench, dealing with it all. I do not wish to see the creation of any more criminal offences than we really must have—we have quite enough as it is. The last thing I want is to see any more being created, particularly if they are going to be of minimal effect.
	I shall explain why I take this view. The starting point, which was not available to the Law Commission in 1985, is the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Select Committee was dealing only with England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own arrangements. I do not at all wish to speak about either of those. However, under the 1998 Act, the courts themselves are public authorities and it is unlawful for them to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right under the European Convention on Human Rights. The relevant rights are 7, 9, 10 and 14. They all have their bearing on the first point, which is blasphemy.
	At the beginning of the report—paragraphs 38, 37, 34—and in some of the questions later on in the volumes dealing with the evidence, there is reference to vociferous groups who look on the law of blasphemy as virtually a cornerstone of the constitution. It was interesting to find that some of the Muslim witnesses supported the law of blasphemy because at least if you could protect one of the religions, it was better than nothing. The Jewish witnesses also saw that there was nothing very much that they were worried about, but they did see problems in the extension of blasphemy to any other religions. I totally agree with them.
	I would suggest that, whatever people may think about this being the cornerstone of the constitution, there will be no more prosecutions for blasphemy. Any such case, if launched by a private individual, would be taken over by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and he would put paid to it. I do not think that he himself would allow the Crown Prosecution Service to bring such actions of its own accord. If it were to happen, however, there would be problems. Although the Human Rights Act deals with compatibility of legislation with the European Convention, it does not deal with compatibility of common law. Blasphemy is a common law offence. There could therefore be immense arguments about the impact of a number of the articles of the convention.
	There is one case on which everybody relies, or purports to rely—Wingrove, which went to Strasbourg at the end of the nineties. It was about a video, and was an appeal from the British Board of Film Classification. The prohibition of showing the video was upheld by the Strasbourg court. I do not think that the arguments on either side were fully comprehensive. In any event, the way in which the Strasbourg court moves evolves from time to time, and blasphemy need not necessarily now be upheld by that court.
	To be truthful, I believe that the problem of blasphemy is virtually insoluble. If it were to be repealed, it would produce an enormous reaction from those devoted to its existence. If it were sought to be extended, as the Law Commission minority suggested in 1985, it would be impossible to handle in terms of legislative content. The answer is that, if no one does anything about it at all, it will probably simply wither on the vine. That may not be good news to some people, but that is the reality.
	I go on to the only other piece of ancient legislation that has been in the mind of the Select Committee, which is the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act. I shall leave that matter to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who has made prodigious researches into how it works. It is not a very formidable piece of legislation, but it is still used. It is used for comparatively minor offences, sometimes in combination with other criminal offences. It deals with an issue that is worth pursuing.
	It does not matter what religion an occasion relates to, as the Act covers them all—and none, although I am not quite sure how one desecrates a religion that is not a religion. There will be occasions when one cannot charge someone who carries out desecration with criminal damage because they did not actually damage anything, and when one cannot charge them with a public order offence because there was no one there to be harassed or upset. There is an area where such legislation is useful, as a small piece of the criminal law.
	The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, discovered that there was another prosecution last year. The major difficulty is that neither the CPS, nor anyone else, knows what it was about, and there are no records at all about any of the offences. It is extremely difficult to find out what has been happening. Nevertheless there was a conviction, and someone went to prison under the legislation. It is worth keeping, because it establishes that Parliament cares about people's religions, their premises, artefacts and things that make up the basis of their beliefs, and that if those are misused or abused there will be a remedy in criminal law. I would therefore not wish to see it repealed. To that extent, I disagree with the part of the Private Member's Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that tried to do that.
	I now come on to the major part of the debate; namely, incitement. Noble Lords will remember that the clause that introduced incitement to religious hatred was left out of the 2001 Bill. Therefore—I hope that Chapter 6 is a useful reminder—we looked at the background of the law on incitement. The proposition in 2001 was to supplement the existing law on incitement to racial hatred in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 with a new offence of incitement to religious hatred. The analogy between race and religion is not necessarily very sound. Race, which now includes under case law in this context Sikhs and Jews, as well as others, is something that one cannot change. Religion is undoubtedly important to very many people, but it is not immutable and can change from time to time. The more one thinks about it, the less it is clear that the two are interchangeable concepts for the purposes of criminal law.
	I have in my mind a nutcracker, one claw of which is the existing criminal law on incitement. I shall talk about the other one in a minute. There is a very substantial amount of criminal law relating to incitement. It is a common-law offence to incite anyone to commit an offence, even if that person does not do it or even try to do it. The offence does not have to be directed towards any particular person; it may be directed towards a group, so it may be general. It must cover a great deal of the territory of those who incite people in terms of religious hatred. It is much more positive and less abstract than some people may think.
	Under the racial aspect the Attorney-General must of course consent, and I have no difficulty with that. Prosecutions have been rare but there is the point that, if prosecution occurs and results in an acquittal, it can be seriously counterproductive, as it can give validity to whatever it was that was published and was the source of the prosecution. Section 39 of the 2001 Act created a number of offences that were identified and augmented if motivated by religious hatred. Increased penalties were laid down. There is plenty of room for incitement for any of those, and much of the territory would be covered.
	The other jaw of my nutcracker is Article 10.2 of the European convention, which is on freedom of speech. We deal with that in paragraph 83 of the report. There is a constraint on both sides, as was recognised as far back as 1986. However, the full impact may not have been realised until quite recently. The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General, who gave evidence to the Select Committee and with whom we have had correspondence, was extremely helpful. He thought that incitement to religious hatred could be framed in such a way that it would not be struck down as incompatible with Article 10.2. I agree. Not only is there a margin of appreciation in Strasbourg for what is done in individual countries within the European Union, but there is a developing domestic jurisdiction that gives something like a margin of appreciation—it is called "deference"—in the internal courts of this country. I do not believe that legislation, in the terms of the second proposition in the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, would run foul of the European convention as such on compatibility.
	There is one other point on the question of incitement. I do not know whether he was right but, in the 1970s, Lord Justice Lawton gave a number of decisions that concerned incitement. He said that the common law of England continued to take the view that it was an offence to stir up hostility against any section of Her Majesty's subjects. That has always been an offence. I have looked at the origins of what he said and am bound to say that I find that very dubious, but I do not think that the matter has been explored and I did not know about it when the Select Committee was sitting.
	Other aspects of criminal law deal with incitement. Only quite recently, an imam of extremist views was convicted. He was imprisoned for stirring up hatred and convicted under Section 2 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. That is normally used for contract killers, but on this occasion, it was used for somebody who was trying to stir up religious hatred.
	Therefore, a good deal of criminal law is available. I do not believe that it has all yet been tried out before we invent something else. It is, however, a little disturbing to find that no figures are available on incitement. Not only are there no figures on the use of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860, but a Written Answer in another place last September stated that there were no figures at all for convictions for incitement. That concerns me.
	I have said that the law itself, if it were passed, would not run foul of the European Convention on Human Rights, but I am less convinced about what would happen if there were a prosecution and a conviction. I believe, first, that a defence would be raised to bring in by any means the aspects of Article 10.2. A number of issues could be avoided if that were subject to the Attorney-General's consent. He would be able to get rid of disputes between sects; he would be able to get rid of disputes that should certainly never be the subject of criminal prosecution.
	However, there really are aspects of religion that are bound to be the subject of criticism in public. What about those so-called religions which separate children from their families and which separate converts from their worldly goods? Are we really not allowed to criticise them? Yes, of course we are. It is one of our freedoms under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights that we should be able to do so. Then there are inflammatory websites. Those are very damaging. We have seen examples of them and of what they say.
	The difficulty we face with those is that, as the people who wish to propagate that kind of inflammatory material are well aware, the law allows them all kinds of loopholes. If it is a website, it does not have to originate in this country. If it is received in this country, it will be prosecutable here, but who would be the defendant? If the defendant is overseas, there is nobody that one could get hold of. The culprits, well advised as they are, may well stay in some other land.
	Therefore, it will not be the criticisms of religions that we all find distasteful or of the ultra-violent website, which probably cannot be pursued anyway, but the intermediate grade of incitement that will be made an offence under the kind of legislation that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, sought to persuade your Lordships to adopt. The defence would look at Article 10.2 of the convention, which concerns freedom of expression. It is interesting that in Section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 Parliament has told the courts to pay particular attention to any aspect of freedom of expression that comes before them. I am far from sure that a jury, if it were asked to decide on which side of the line a particular statement, article or website falls, would find it all easy to be satisfied that there was a criminal intent to stir up hatred. That would true even if hatred were described by the judge in extreme terms, which is what the Attorney-General told us would happen.
	Therefore, there is a very narrow gap in the criminal law. On the one side is existing incitement legislation and common law; on the other, the constraints of Article 10.2. I seriously wonder whether we have reached the stage where we could identify something that would bridge that gap.
	I am sure that other noble Lords will disagree with me and I rather think that the Home Office does too, because it persists with its clause in the 2001 Bill. However, I am sad to say that we cannot rely on the draft framework decision on racism and xenophobia. The Select Committee paid particular attention to that. When we discussed it, we thought that it would provide the basis for the kind of legislation that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, would have introduced. It seems to have died a death and it is unfortunate that we can no longer rely on it.
	I appreciate that I have spoken for a long time. I shall deal quickly with the final two chapters of the report, which address hate crime and aggravation. Is the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, really happy with the present situation? There are at least three regimes. First, there are ordinary crimes, which can be aggravated, including those which carry a life sentence. In them, the judge can simply take account of aggravating factors. Secondly, there is a new set of offences, which were introduced by the Criminal Justice Act of last year. Under those, factors such as hostility towards sexual orientation or disability were made aggravating factors, but not part of the offence. They therefore overlap the general jurisdiction of a judge to deal with aggravating factors. Thirdly, there are other offences, not including those which carry a life sentence, which have had their maximum penalties increased. They include offences relating to racial hatred and now to religious hatred under Section 39 of the 2001 Act. The difficulty with the latter offences is that a racial or religious motivation must be proved to the jury. That is not easy and it is not the best way to introduce the subject of telling the jury about previous convictions.
	Now that we have a serious and comprehensive set of sentencing guidelines, I suggest to the Minister that we should rather go back to square one and abandon those haphazard and rather individual approaches to aggravated sentences. We should allow courts to get on with what the Court of Appeal has been doing for some time and set up a comprehensive system whereby aggravating factors of that kind are taken into account in all sentencing, including the tariff for lifers.
	The Home Secretary said that he did not want to see "gestureism". I should like to see a lot of the clutter cleared away from this subject. The courts should be left to pass sentence on the basis of what is before them; namely, the offence, previous convictions and everything they know about, without trying to make the jury convict on a specific racial issue. I feel that the sentencing guidelines will be able adequately to deal with that. The machinery is now in place to allow it.
	However, at the end of the debate, I anticipate that the noble Baroness will say that the Home Office will not be doing anything at all. She will say that it will not repeal the blasphemy legislation or reintroduce the clause dropped from the 2001 Act and that we will not be allowed to enjoy the process of seeing whether the law works in practice. I beg to move.
	Moved, That this House takes note of the report of the Report of the Religious Offences Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales (HL Paper 95)—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

Baroness Massey of Darwen: My Lords, like other noble Lords, I am delighted that this report is finally being discussed in your Lordships' House. I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, that it is good to see so many noble Lords taking part in the debate who are not members of the Select Committee. I am particularly glad to see my noble friend Lady Uddin once more back in action.
	I declare an interest as a member of the Select Committee on Religious Offences, so ably chaired by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I thank him not only for his chairing of the committee, but also for his comprehensive introduction today. He has instructed me to be brief and, as an obedient committee member, I shall take heed. In doing so, I will attempt to draw out a couple of fundamental dilemmas from the many dilemmas with which the committee grappled. These relate to the protection of people rather than beliefs and the issue of free speech.
	I must say that this committee was one of the most informed, enlightened and dedicated I have ever worked on. The exchange of views was stimulating, respectful and lively. As we say in our conclusions to the report, our deliberations went further than discussing laws such as blasphemy and other common statute laws. We ranged over the,
	"nature of religion in today's society and the changes in that society over the last half century, both in the numbers who follow other than the Christian faith, those who reject religious belief, and those whose religious faith is usually expressed privately".
	We were agreed that any further legislation should cover all faiths or those of no faith.
	Today, I want to reflect on some of the points raised by the British Humanist Association and the National Secular Society, in which I declare an interest as a patron. It was heartening to see a briefing for the debate prepared jointly by the British Humanist Association, the British Muslim Research Centre and Justice. Collaborative working across many organisations was evident also in our deliberations as a committee.
	I should first state why I am a humanist. I believe in ethical stances. I believe that people should be encouraged to lead good and responsible lives. I believe that we should treat others with fairness and dignity. I believe in human rights and democracy. I respect the rights of others to faith or religion even though I have none myself. I respect many of the tenets of various religions—those which exhort fairness, forgiveness, mercy and respect for others; what philosophers call "the considerate way of life". In this context, that covers race, religion and human rights, both inside and outside the law, and they are featured in our discussions.
	In its submission to the Select Committee, the British Humanist Association stated that:
	"The blasphemy law protects beliefs, not people. It is right, subject to safeguards, for society through its laws to protect individuals and groups within it from hatred and attack. It is quite wrong to extend the protection of the law to propositions, creeds and truth-claims".
	It goes on to express opposition to legal constraints on vigorous debates, including satire, mockery and derision, about beliefs and doctrines, religious or otherwise. It sees a clear distinction between this and incitement to religious hatred; that is, hatred of individual persons on grounds of their religious or other beliefs. The distinction between beliefs and persons is fundamental.
	The National Secular Society, in considering offence to feelings, states:
	"The use of the criminal law to prohibit offending the sensibilities or feelings of particular groups in society is inherently problematic, creating as it does insurmountable issues of legal uncertainty and imposing a major 'chilling effect' on free speech, in other words, self censorship".
	I have briefly touched on what seems to me as a humanist fundamental problems with which we as a committee struggled. What are laws for? Can law justifiably protect certain individuals but not others because of belief? What constitutes free speech? I have to say that the Select Committee, all along, was supportive of the rights of those who do not hold religious belief as well as those who do.
	It will not surprise your Lordships to learn that we found gaps and inconsistencies in laws. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, mentioned those. Perhaps we simply have to learn to live with this. I would prefer a more vigorous approach, more clarity and more emphasis on people rather than beliefs. What was clear in our interviews and in the written submissions to the committee was that people of all persuasions could hold a debate with mutual regard, recognising that differences need to be resolved.
	The briefing from the British Humanist Association, the Muslim Research Centre and Justice points out that in eliminating gaps in the law on religious hatred, this would not,
	"infringe disproportionately on the right to freedom of expression; and potential abuse of relevant legislation can be countered by effective safeguards".
	Can the Minister say how the Government's response to the Select Committee's report will result in action? I look forward to her response, and I admire her immense stamina.

Baroness Perry of Southwark: My Lords, I speak as a member of the Select Committee. The topic it had to address was unusually difficult but unusually interesting. I pay a warm tribute to my colleagues on the committee—to their wisdom, their warmth and their tolerance in our debate. I also pay tribute to the endless patience, good humour, charm and vast and awe-inspiring expertise of the noble Viscount, our chairman.
	Like the noble Viscount, I do not believe there is any need for the abolition of existing law. However, unlike him, I believe that there is a case for new legislation. In considering any legislation in the area of religious belief, I was aware that over the centuries our society has evolved, slowly and organically, a balance between the religious and the secular. Despite the terrifying current events which may in the long term threaten that balance, bringing religion back to the centre of geopolitical events, most of our fellow citizens seem happy to have the balance left to develop in peace at its own pace. Certainly, there is no public demand for intervention from Government or Whitehall.
	Echoes of the more religious society of earlier days still remain in our times and in our laws and can sometimes surprise us by their power. For 21st century England and Wales, it may seem odd to couple together religion and criminal law in any way, as freedom of religion and speech have been such integral parts of the value on which our society is based. But although they may not be widely known or used, there are still many facets of extant criminal law which relate to religion. You could, for example, find yourself in danger of criminal conviction because of things written, said or even drawn in pictures which offend against the common law of blasphemy, even though, as our chairman said, it is unlikely ever to be used again. In theory, you could find yourself committing a criminal offence under the 19th century Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act if you exhibit "riotous, violent or indecent behaviour" in any Church of England cathedral, church or chapel, or in any certified place of religious worship.
	Laws relating to religion must strike the difficult balance between the rights of one citizen over the rights of another and the balance of one freedom against another. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated into our domestic law the European Convention and gave us some absolute rights such as the right to protection of life, but most are qualified or limited because of that necessary balance between the rights and freedoms of one citizen against the rights and freedoms of another, or indeed the rights of individual citizens balanced against the need of the state to limit those rights in order to govern.
	This comes into sharp focus in the question of the law relating to incitement to religious hatred and making that a criminal offence, where we must balance the freedom of conscience and religion in Article 9 against Article 10, which enshrines the right to freedom of expression.
	Here is my favourite example, which illustrates the difficulty: let us suppose that I am sitting at Cambridge High Table, enjoying a lively conversation with a learned historian about the place of religion in history. He makes the point, certainly tenable, that religion has been responsible throughout European history for much of the conflict, torture, abuse of civil liberties and curtailment of freedom of thought and speech. Is he inciting those around him to religious hatred? Could his remarks then constitute a criminal offence? Leaving aside whether anyone would wish to report him, on some interpretations it could be possible that his words would be found to constitute a criminal offence. Surely we need to pause before taking even the smallest step towards such a damaging curtailment of freedom of speech.
	Parliament, therefore, was right in asking the Government in 2001 to think again before creating this potentially dangerous criminal offence. Instead, our committee was asked to consider whether an offence could be created that did not breach the Article 10 right to freedom of expression, and also to consider whether some existing criminal laws, such as the blasphemy law or the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860, needed abolishing. At least, I believe, there may be some need to amend or extend them in the case of blasphemy to include other religions, perhaps most particularly the Muslim religion.
	I said earlier that there was no great public demand for alteration of the existing law. Among the witnesses from whom our committee received evidence, however, there is a great disparity of views as to what should be changed, and whether any change is necessary. Some witnesses represent those who feel that the time has come for our country to abandon its religious heritage and become overtly secular. At the other end there are those who wish to preserve the law exactly as it is, with protection for the Christian religion and none for other faiths. Either of these extremes runs the risk of tilting the delicately evolved secular and religious balance of our society.
	Religion is more than faith. The third group, perhaps representing the majority opinion now in this country, is happy to see the multi-faith nature of our society reflected in our law, with protection for the faith of all citizens, but wishes also to see respect for the Christian character of our national identity and the cultural, historical and constitutional roots of England and Wales. Many of that majority are not regular churchgoers—some might even hesitate to call themselves Christian—but they feel nevertheless a deep sense that their national and cultural identity is bound up with what has been for centuries the national religion. It is not only Christians who have this underlying sense of national identity with their religion. In evidence to the Select Committee, the Commission for Racial Equality said:
	"For many ethnic minority communities there is a close relation between race and religion, and identity through faith is as important as identity through racial origin."
	The law on blasphemy provides perhaps the quintessential example of the difficulty of tampering with existing law. It is common law, so not enshrined in statute, and lawyers themselves disagree about what it says. It is clear that it protects the essence of the faith and not its adherents, but for thousands of people—and it may well be millions—that law forms part of what has been described as the "sacred canopy" of our nation, offering protection to all Christians, certainly, and to those who sympathise with the Christian religion, but also believed by many of other faiths to be an expression of our abhorrence of those who would vilify what others hold sacred. It is therefore seen, perhaps wrongly but nevertheless importantly, as offering protection to all people of faith against abuse.
	There is a temptation to suppose that it would be simple to extend the law against incitement to racial hatred and include incitement to religious hatred. There is, though, a danger in assuming a clear parallel between the two. Being offensive to or about people on the basis of their race is patently wrong, because none of us can change the race to which we belong. Religion, however, is a personal choice. Persuasion by those who thought a choice ill-advised might change my mind and allegiance. Evangelism, of whatever creed, rests on that assumption. We may find some evangelising intrusive and tedious, but should we make that criminal?
	Although it is apparent that I am no lawyer, I find myself in agreement with the correspondent who wrote to me from a multi-racial and peaceful county in England, saying that a new law on religious hatred would be likely to stir people up, emphasises conflicts where none existed, and encourage litigation, so making matters worse, not better. Nevertheless, some protection for followers of all religions and no religion, and for the sacred objects and places of all religions, should be enshrined in law. I say it is up to the lawyers, working with, but not beyond, the pace of social opinion, to find words that will offer protection against wilful and malicious offence against people because of their faith or against their sacred beliefs and objects. Legislation on these lines must stop short of criminalising what Lord Scarman called "decent and temperate language", the language of academic debate, leaving my imaginary High Table historian to be spared.
	I would like to end with the words of an international student, on a Master of Theology course at London University. He wrote in his dissertation:
	"The doctrine of human rights is man's attempt at exercising his responsibility as God's steward on Earth, in that it seeks to challenge all the injustices that distort the image of God in man. It is an attempt to establish a social condition where there are harmonious and peaceful relations among the people of the world, and where people are able to realise their full potential as God created them."
	I can find no better words to describe the exercise in which legislators need to be engaged, as we seek to balance the freedom of faith and expression and, while so doing, to preserve, as we daily pray here,
	"the peace and tranquillity of the realm".

The Lord Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich: My Lords, I am grateful to the Select Committee and to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for this comprehensive and helpful report that laid out the issues so clearly. I was interested in his introductory speech, which seemed to throw another light on the report. Finding our way around that in this debate will be interesting. I regret that my friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth, who was a member of the committee, is unable to take part in the debate today. I know that he would have made some vigorous contributions, and we shall miss his robust presence.
	I sympathise with the committee for not being able to bring forward an agreed set of proposals in relation to religious offences legislation. From my own experience of the last years on the debate on sexuality and the Anglican communion, it is difficult enough to find a consensus in one religious system, never mind finding an inter-faith consensus, as my postbag reminds me more or less daily. Having said, that, the work of the committee, and the publication of the evidence submitted to it, has helped to focus people's minds. It has encouraged, subsequent to the report, more inter-faith discussion. Most of the original evidence and oral evidence was from representatives of particular faith groups, but more is now emerging from inter-faith conversation, and this obviously is essential to any sense of consensus.
	What common ground is there? First and foremost, discussion has highlighted the considerable and widespread concern about acts if religious hatred, in terms of attacks, threats of attack and various forms of incitement, including publications. It has been said in a number of quarters that things have gone quieter since the first responses to 11 September, but it depends on what your definition of "quieter" is. The message coming clearly from many faith communities, and expressed strongly by inter-faith groups, is that attack and the threat of attack on religious groups and individuals is a daily concern. It is dangerous to base a definition of "quieter" on the low number of prosecutions or on fewer newspaper reports. Experience is that a high proportion of incidents go unreported. But it is not difficult to see why that should be so: either because the chances of catching, let alone convicting, the perpetrators is seen as low, or simply because of the fear that involvement by the authorities may escalate a local situation and more obviously identify a target. The point is that at present all religious groups are reflecting a common concern about the level of incidence and the continuing fear associated with the threat. Things might well seem quieter but that does not mean that nothing is happening.
	In the Select Committee report, the widespread concern expressed by religious groups is the basis for urging a law that specifically addresses religious hatred and incitement to religious hatred. The report argues that existing civil and criminal law addresses most situations cited in the evidence given to it. But the Select Committee recognises that there is a gap in the law, particularly if current laws on religious offences are repealed, but de facto a very small gap.
	Having read the responses to the Select Committee report, particularly some of the inter-faith statements, I suggest that it is not the size of the gap but its significance that is the issue for those who feel vulnerable. That is probably most clearly demonstrated by the fact that the Jewish and Muslim communities argue for the retention of the law of blasphemy. Although they recognise that in practice it applies only to the Christian religion, and possibly only to the tenets of the Church of England, the apparent umbrella effect of that legislation is significant to them. They do not want it removed unless something tailor-made, covering all religions, is put in its place.
	Turning full-circle, the common ground seems to be the desire that legislation should apply equally to all faiths and religious groups. The issue of incitement to religious hatred needs to be specifically addressed in law. If that happened, concerns about the retention of the law on blasphemy would diminish and it would be allowed to go in the direction indicated by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville.
	There is a second concern about another potential gap in legislation that would emerge if most of the existing law on religious offences were repealed as the report suggests. Again, I am interested in the comments made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, in introducing the debate. I shall also be very interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, says. I tread hesitantly into this area, but if I make my point, noble Lords can tell me later where I have got it wrong.
	The particular concern, which has already been touched on, relates to desecration and the disturbance of religious services. If it is assumed that those will be covered by Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, a gap seems to emerge in relation to offences currently covered by Section 2 of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860. I understand that the Public Order Act does not criminalise desecration as such. Even if the conduct in question could be said to be "threatening, abusive or insulting", it would have to be committed,
	"within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby".
	In other words, it would not cover certain kinds of desecration—that which took place when no one was present, and when the desecration caused offence but not criminal damage. In terms of religious sensibilities, in a fairly highly charged general atmosphere I do not think that that is a marginal question. Perhaps, therefore, the 1860 Act could be left as it is. However, I am sure that we shall hear more from the noble Lord, Lord Avebury.
	I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for this helpful report. I hope that the debate that he has stimulated through the Select Committee and its report will provide a constructive basis for taking matters forward. I should add that the communities likely to be most affected also feel a sense of urgency, triggered by their daily experience.

Lord Judd: My Lords, I, too, thank warmly the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and his committee for a very distinguished and thoughtful report. Some might ask where are the recommendations. Sometimes in politics there is too much rush to make recommendations. It is important first to do the reconnaissance. This is a superb piece of intellectual reconnaissance, for which the whole House should be grateful.
	I declare an interest: I was the son of a Nonconformist father and a Church of Scotland mother, and have been led with great satisfaction into the Church of England by my wife. There I find myself very much at home when it is being what I believe the Church of England should be about: inclusive and tolerant.
	The report refers to the undoubted fact that we live in a multi-faith society. I have been troubled in recent weeks by the debate about whether we are a multicultural society. I do not understand what point is being made. Given my background, even within the broader context of Christianity, there is no doubt that we live in a multicultural society. The cultural implications of being a committed member of the Church of Scotland, or a Baptist, or a Church of England adherent, are different and far-reaching. Of course we live in a multicultural society. We should rejoice in that, because that is part of living, and the fullness of living is recognising the richness of diversity and creativity.
	If we live in a multi-faith and multicultural society, it does raise problems. I hope that the right reverend Prelate will forgive me for saying that it raises problems and challenges about the future place of the Church of England in that multi-faith culture. If we have respect for all religions, humanism and the rest equally, it is, to say the least, a little questionable whether special attributes in our society should rest with one particular denomination of one religion.
	I come down firmly in favour of a society based on human rights and mutual respect. That should be our starting point. The right to beliefs and convictions, not least faith, humanism, atheism, agnosticism, should be taken as seriously as the right to property and its protection under law. My concern is that in our tradition in Britain we give a great deal of attention in the law to protection of property, but the protection of people's sensitivities, convictions, and intellectual positions is at least equally important. The noble Viscount drew our attention to the existence of—I think his words were—the good deal of law about, and said that before we rushed off to make new law it was just as well to look at it. I wonder whether he would agree that the existing law in these areas has grown like Topsy and is a bit confusing, particularly for the layman.
	In the adjacent area of race relations, this is of course true. As the report emphasises, there are special provisions—I am glad that they, at least, are there—for Jews and Sikhs, but not for Christians or Muslims, because they are held not to have a common ethnic origin. I am not sure that it is as simple as that. I am never sure where the issue of conversion fits into this approach. Some are now arguing that a special provision should be made for Islam because of the de facto situation with which we are confronted.
	I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and we are considering this issue at the moment in our deliberations. I have some anxiety about that proposition. If people of the Islamic faith are not enjoying their human rights as they should be enjoying them in our society, that issue needs to be addressed as that. However, to try to reclassify Islam as a means of overcoming it, when we all know that there are people of different ethnic origins in the Islamic faith, seems to be unsound. I am open to persuasion, but as of now, I am not convinced.
	It is high time for a comprehensive review of the law in these areas. We often say that one of the great things about the operation of the law is that justice should always be seen to be done and not just done. If justice is to be seen to be done, the law must be clear and the layman must be able to understand it. If there is confusion or obscurity in the law, that makes it difficult to carry maximum public conviction in all circumstances about justice being done.
	I repeat that the objective that I hold is that, ideally, legal enforcement of human rights as a whole should be the basis, and we ought to be wary of sectoral legislation for special rights, because this could too easily lead to a perceived hierarchy of rights, which would be unfortunate. The Select Committee has sensitively touched on this issue with its reference to hatred. The issue is hatred; and hatred matters, whether it is against someone of a particular religious conviction, or against a homosexual, or against an asylum seeker. I thought that that was a good point made by the Select Committee. We must examine more closely the fundamental issue of the human rights that people should be able to enjoy and the safeguards that protect them as the individuals that they are, in making up our total society. If we took that kind of approach, the rather archaic preoccupation with blasphemy would quickly find its own level, as the right reverend Prelate and others have indicated.
	I finish with the observation that, whether one is talking about race relations or about religious tolerance, the law of itself is not the answer. The answer is to work and provide political leadership inspired by the principles of inclusiveness, tolerance and respect. It is when we start using the language of exclusiveness that we start dashing to the law to protect ourselves from the ugly consequences of the culture that we are generating. We need the law, but the law should be there to put the seal on and underwrite the culture of our society. If we really care about such issues, we must look to the quality of the leadership in all our political parties with regard to the kind of society that we believe in and the fact that all people in our society should be able to enjoy their rights to the full and not suffer in any way.

Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, it is always a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I share most of his views, though not all of them. On the last view that he expressed so well—the law is not itself, of itself, the answer—I could not agree with him more. I agree with the balance of the assessment made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. We do not have to bridge that gap. The Bill proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, should be allowed to die a painless death.
	As the offence of incitement to religious hatred was removed from the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill by an amendment moved by me, I have an obvious interest to declare. My opposition to that offence was and remains based on three simple reasons, reflected in the noble Lord's speech. First, there is, to put it very straight, absolutely no need for a specific offence, as any relevant conduct could be dealt with under extant law, under Clause 39 of the Bill as it was, which enabled the passing of harsher sentences if the offence was aggravated by religious hatred, building on a system set out in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for increased sentences for certain offences aggravated by religious hatred. As has been said, there is also the common law on incitement.
	The second reason is that it is not so easy to define religion for such purposes. In that context, I was rather foxed by the speech made by my noble friend Lady Perry of Southwark, although I am sure that she was right. I could not understand the distinction between faith, religion and doctrine. I was totally out of my depth. Religion, whatever it is, is not so easy to define for these purposes; nor is it so easy to determine what is an expression of hatred and what is a justifiable expression and exercise of the freedom of speech, as set out in Article 10.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
	The third reason why I opposed the offence was that the proposals in a document produced by the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General were not to the point. However, in a spirit of amity, I now withdraw the assertion that I made that they were meretricious, as that caused unintended offence. That is the basis on which that amendment was introduced and on which, before the report was published, the House accepted the removal by a substantial majority.
	My somewhat simplistic approach appears to have commended itself, by and large, to certain members of the Select Committee, but I am not pretending that this was a unanimous report. However, the report was a monumental exercise of academic importance and an exposition which clarified an extremely complex subject in the light of a mountain of evidence. It is a tribute to the chairman and to all members who served on that committee.
	On reading that report, I changed my mind in respect of blasphemy. I thought that it was otiose and therefore should not be retained. But on reading the report, there appears to be a strongly arguable case as it also affords protection for the other faiths. On that basis, I have changed my mind. But there is reason to think that Christian Voice may have misunderstood the constitutional position. I thought that my noble friend Lady Perry of Southwark put it so elegantly; that is, the balance between the religious and the secular. That is precisely what Christian Voice seemed to ignore, albeit, one accepts, that by an exchange of oaths on the coronation of King Edgar in 973, the Church in England, under the aegis of the Church of Rome, became an estate of the realm. But things have changed since 973.
	In conclusion, the Government's response to the report seems to be incredibly wishy-washy. They are equivocal as they stand by retention of the offence. All Governments stand by whatever they have done, whether they are right or wrong. It is perfectly understandable, but there is no reasoned support for the retention of that position. They then concede that further debate is requisite. For the reasons that I have given, it was inevitable that I should take note of the report with an expression of profound gratitude, as indeed I do.

Lord Bhatia: My Lords, first, I declare an interest as a Muslim and as chairman of the British Muslim Research Centre. I was also a member of the Select Committee that produced the report for your Lordship's debate today. The report highlights an important issue on which I should like to elaborate, not as a Muslim and not as person from the ethnic minority communities, but as a citizen of this country and as a parliamentarian.
	Being a member of the Select Committee, and having seen the final report being debated today, I became increasingly aware that Parliament creates new laws to ensure that democratic principles are upheld and that all citizens and institutions are required to fall within the important parameters of fairness, equality and human rights. Indeed, in order to ensure that that is translated so that it affects the real daily lives of our citizens, the Government have created institutions such as the Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights Commission to be the watchdogs with powers to prosecute those people, institutions and corporations that breach the law. Finally, all new legislation has to be certified as compliant with EU human rights legislation, to which we are a signatory.
	Despite all these safeguards, I have come to realise that there is no protection for citizens of this country when the state itself passes legislation which does not treat all its citizens equally, which does not protect all citizens equally and fairly, thereby leaving some in a dangerous and vulnerable position, even to the extent that their lives are threatened.
	Let me give some examples of how different laws and statutes have created the most undesirable position highlighted in the report. We have the law on blasphemy which goes back over a few hundred years. It protects only one sect of one faith. I should like to put on the record that even if a law protects only one faith I would not want to replace or repeal it. It is my view that at least one faith is protected against vilification or attacks by profane and ignorant people who are at times incited by extremists. I believe that in repealing the law on blasphemy, we would hurt the feelings of millions of our citizens who genuinely believe that the law provides them with a canopy of protection against the vilification of their deeply held beliefs.
	But in keeping the law in place, we are creating inequalities in law by not being able to protect other faiths. It is obvious from the report that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reframe the existing blasphemy legislation to protect the sanctity of all faiths. If that is the case, I feel that it is incumbent on all of us to ensure that new legislation is passed by Parliament to provide the same canopy of protection for all faiths.
	Under the race relations legislation there exists yet another anomaly and inequality. Only two faith communities are protected against incitement to religious hatred and discrimination. I hasten to add that this legislation protects the people and not the sacred elements of the faith or the deity, as under the law on blasphemy. I should also like to put on the record the fact that I do not in any way seek the removal of the protections afforded to the two faith groups. It is better to have the people of at least two faith groups protected than none. But any law that chooses to protect two visible faith groups against discrimination, but fails to offer such protections to other visible and demonstrably discriminated against faith groups, is in contempt of the principle of equality.
	Paragraph 41 of the Select Committee states:
	"The law of blasphemy is discriminatory. It prevents (say) a Muslim from speaking about the sacred entities of Christianity in ways that would not be criminal if a Christian were to speak in similar terms about Islam".
	Paragraph 44 goes on to observe:
	"It is difficult to justify a law which protects the sacred entities of Christianity but does not offer similar protection to other faiths".
	Parliament and the Government cannot be found to be discriminating against some of their own citizens. As matters stand, we are possibly in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and, indeed, of our own democratic principles of justice, fairness and equality.
	I turn now to the issues of human rights and freedom of speech and expression. Like most Members of this House and those of another place, I want to be sure that, in creating a new law, we do not stifle freedom of expression. It is a cherished part of our democracy and is indeed the bulwark against any attempt by the people or Government to stop anyone from expressing their right of free speech.
	However, as has been shown in the report, freedom of expression under human rights law is a qualified freedom. It carries with it duties and responsibilities and, therefore, in framing any new legislation on religious incitement, we will be able to protect the people of all faiths against hatred and incitement and yet preserve the balance and not breach the provisions on freedom of expression in human rights law. I remind noble Lords that the issue of human rights and freedom of expression were not raised or even considered a hindrance when two faith groups were protected under the race relations legislation.
	I turn briefly to the evidence given by various people to the Select Committee. I was most struck by the evidence given by the law enforcement agencies such as the Attorney-General, the director of the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and the Home Office, all of whom clearly stated that there is a gap in the law. They would like to have a law in their armoury to enable them to protect all faith groups in the United Kingdom.
	I want to bring to your Lordships' attention some key parts of the report to remind ourselves of what has been given to us during our investigations and consultation. Paragraph 13 of the report states:
	"It is, however, important to recognise that continued tranquillity depends not only upon continued mutual tolerance but, equally, on equality of protection from intolerance on the basis of religion or belief or no belief".
	In paragraph 15 the report states:
	"The general complaint at present, and particularly from the Muslim community, is hostility which, while racist in origin, is often expressed in religious terms that are not at present illegal. This concern is increased by the perception of the fact that other faith groups are protected from hostility (by the blasphemy laws, race relations and public order legislation), while theirs is not".
	Paragraph 15 goes on to state:
	"A key element of the Muslim perception of their marginalisation under the law is that they do not enjoy the widening of the definition of 'racial group' by case law, which some religions clearly, and in their view rightly, do. One result of this is that, when the Public Order Act 1986, Part III, created new criminal offences of incitement to racial hatred, it automatically applied to these groups, but not to Muslims and other faiths which draw support from more than one national or ethnic group".
	Still continuing on paragraph 15, the report states:
	"This is seen as a most damaging state into which the law has progressed. The Muslims certainly think so, and the Attorney-General, the Home Office, the Police and the DPP agreed that it is undesirable. If Sikhs and Jews are to be protected from incitement to religious hatred and if this is considered to be a legitimate restriction of free speech, the same standard should be applied to Muslims, Christians and other faith communities, otherwise there is clearly a breach of Article 9 combined with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights".
	Paragraph 137 of the Select Committee report concludes:
	"We support the protection of everyone's right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs, under Article 9 of the European Convention . . . and we consider that the ordinary law gives that protection. We agree however that there is a gap in the law as it stands. We have examined whether there needs to be any additional protection either for believers as a class, or for the objects connected with their beliefs. There is no consensus as to whether such protection should exist and, if so, the precise forms they should take, but we do agree that the civil and criminal law should afford the same protection to people of all faiths, and of none".
	The Select Committee Report has thrown up a number of interesting models that we could adopt and I would suggest that the Humanist Association's proposed draft on page 33, paragraph 112, is one that we should consider.
	In enacting new legislation, we will not only be protecting faith groups, but also in no uncertain terms signalling to those bigots and prejudiced extremists that Parliament has drawn clear lines as to what is permissible and acceptable and what is not.
	Delay in legislating on this issue is causing a great deal of concern, anxiety, fear and loss of trust in the Government of this country and indeed in its democratic processes. When sections of the population feel that there are different laws for different people, we have the making of an unstable society. Sooner or later, unrest, instability and violence will manifest themselves. That is the lesson history has taught us.
	We have seen what happened in Europe in the past century when racial prejudice, unchecked, unchallenged, cost millions of lives. The recent events in Yugoslavia are a stark reminder that religious bigotry and prejudice have to be dealt with at the right time.
	Despite all these demands, I find it difficult to accept the response to this report of the Secretary of State for the Home Office, at paragraph 14 on page 2, when he says:
	"The Government has no immediate plans to reintroduce a proposal for such an offence following its withdrawal from the 2001 Bill, but will consider doing so if an opportunity arises in the future".
	I would like to put before your Lordships this plea: is the Home Office waiting for dozens of people to be killed, to die, before you move to legislate for this? What is this prevarication, waiting for the right time to legislate? I suggest—I beg the House—that the moment is now for us to move forward to legislate in this very clearly defined gap that has been very clearly shown up by the Select Committee.

Lord Desai: My Lords, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, which distresses me very much because I have great respect for him.
	I welcome the report and the way in which the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, introduced it. I played a small part, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, in strongly opposing the introduction of the religious hatred clause when the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill was being debated. I am still not happy that the additional punishment part of it has survived. In hoping that the main clause would be deleted, we did not pay attention to it and the extra part survived. I hope that will be removed as well.
	Some of the grounds on which I opposed it have been covered already in the debate today. I think that while people need protection—and all people need equal protection—their beliefs do not. All beliefs are equally valid and I do not see why some beliefs should be privileged over others just because they involve some concept of God.
	I was born a Hindu but I am no longer a believer; I am an atheist. I very much regret the recent raising of religion to a higher level in our political discourse, especially since 9/11, when it seems that religion is seen to be the cause of all problems as well as their solution.
	We should disassociate some of the hatred that has been expressed towards Muslims and other communities and make it clear that the issue is not religion. The people who insult Muslims, Hindus, Jews or Sikhs are not making a theological or religious point; they are making a political point which is very akin to a racial point. But, because we have defined "racist" in a particular way, we cannot extend the legislation to all communities, faith or non-faith. I am very much puzzled that two communities—Jews and Sikhs—enjoy this particular protection under current race law. I have never been able to understand why and I have argued in debates that it is an anomaly.
	But I do not think that anomaly should be used to extend that protection to other particular communities. By doing that we would place those communities in greater danger than they are in now. The brunt of my comment at the time was that if Muslims were singled out and afforded special protection along with Sikhs and Jews, it would do nothing but harm the Muslim community. I strongly believe that.
	The whole point is that we should not treat communities as faith communities; we should treat people as people. If we do that and there are sufficient safeguards in the present legislation for their lives and liberty and their right to profess their faith in circumstances that they would like, we do not need to protect beliefs. I do not think that any beliefs—including my own—are of a sufficiently unchallengeable nature to enjoy the protection of the law. Everyone should be able to express their opinions; after that, having expressed one's beliefs, the common law and the criminal law can take over in relation to what one can and cannot do. I do not believe that we should privilege beliefs as such.
	That is why I welcome the report of the committee. It clearly puts forward issues which are legally technical in nature. The committee has pointed out the various aspects of inciting violence and hatred and blasphemy and so on but, quite rightly, it has not been able to come to any strong conclusions because this is a subject on which a strong conclusion either way could do nothing but harm.
	I also agree with the general tenor of what the noble Viscount who chaired the committee said. We should be careful before we start adding new laws to the existing vast body of law. We should really be looking at what we can eliminate from it. I will not take any more of your Lordships' time: I greatly welcome the report. My race is not a matter of my choice, but my religion is. Many people change religions.
	The paradox is that if there are exclusive religions that do not proselytise much and therefore their coverage is restricted, it is easier to identify those religions with races, as happened with Sikhs and Jews. If a religion is universalist and recruits people across different races, that religion would be disadvantaged, because we could never say that Christians or Muslims are a race. The Muslim religion is so universal that a variety of so-called races have been converted to Islam.
	I know that this is not going to happen, but I am famous for saying things that are not going to happen; I urge them all the time. I would very much like some clever lawyer to find a way in which the current protection that exists—the anomaly over Jews and Sikhs—could be removed so that we returned to a universal principle whereby people are protected but faiths are not.

Lord Joffe: My Lords, the excellent Select Committee report on religious offences has analysed in depth and with clarity the issues in our law relating to religious offences. That analysis will greatly facilitate the preparation of any future legislation. The noble Lords who have already spoken have covered all the relevant issues. I wish briefly to touch on the issue of the timing of future legislation relating to incitement to religious hatred.
	As my noble friend Lord Bhatia pointed out, all our main enforcement agencies, the Select Committee itself and the Home Office agree that there is a gap in our law that protects Sikhs and Jews but no other faiths or beliefs. When a gap is identified it must surely be closed, particularly when citizens and communities are placed at risk by it.
	As a Jew, and by training a human rights lawyer, I postulated to myself what my reaction would have been if there was a law in the United Kingdoms that protected Muslims but excluded Jews from its protection at a time when Jews needed protection. I would have been outraged and felt excluded, angry, nervous—I suspect—and disappointed in British justice. I would have felt unjustly deprived of protection to which I was entitled as a British citizen. It would not have begun to satisfy me to be told that it was difficult to draft such legislation and that the Government would consider getting around to it sometime.
	If it is complex and difficult to draft such legislation, the sooner the Government start work on the drafting the better. Such legislation is particularly urgent at the present time when Al'Qaeda terrorism could lead to a backlash against the British Muslim community. That community should feel and see that Government are doing whatever possible to protect them against such a backlash, including starting work urgently to put in place appropriate legislation.

Baroness Uddin: My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Joffe. I hesitated to venture into this debate about religion, and I tread with trepidation, but having listened to the debate so far, I have convinced myself of my place here. I would love to have been a lawyer and been part of the group who discussed these matters. I can imagine the prolonged debates that I would have had with my colleagues, always trying to ensure that a woman's point of view was put forward. I am pleased that that point of view has not been taken up today and that I am left having to say something that has not been said before. It is a great privilege be able to contribute to the debate.
	I went through the report a little bit yesterday. I apologise for not having done it justice, but to maintain the convention of the House and to please noble Lords I shall at least mention a line. The concluding chapter refers to the fact that the United Kingdom is not a secular state. In light of that comment, I feel comfortable raising the matters that I am about to raise.
	What does it mean to have the protection of law? I have been in the House of Lords for six years, and I ought to know better—but I obviously did not, in relation to the concept of religious offences. At its simplest, it is about being assured of receiving equal rights and treatment before law and in the institutional fabric of the society in which we live. I almost wanted to remain seated after I heard the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, speak, because I thought that he had covered everything in a few words, while I will labour to say what I have to say for a number of minutes.
	Such protection may impact on not only recourse to law, when attacked or sacked by someone, but also the services. Noble Lords should never forget that I am a social worker at heart. We are referring not only to terrorism, criminality or recourse to law for complex reasons on which lawyers like to prevaricate. We are referring also to people's rights to services, and particularly women's rights to services—and their right not to have their scarves taken off, to have pigs' trotters thrown at them or their children pulled from their buggies, after which they may say, "This was done to me because I am a Muslim". We are referring to those sorts of measures.
	We are talking about something more fundamental and basic; about having the protection of law in cases of religious discrimination. I hesitate to use the word "fanatic", but those of us on the fringes, who are suffering the debates on multiculturalism, have now become fanatics. We would argue that race relations as they have been discussed previously have failed to impact on the lives of the largest minority in the UK—the Muslim community.
	It is my contention that British citizens of the Muslim faith are excluded from such equality as they aspire to. Britain is regarded as a country of Christian faiths, where secularity sits very comfortably. I believe that 75 per cent of the electorate describe themselves as of Christian faiths. I find that very comforting. Therefore, debating whether to have protection from religious discrimination is surely an affront to the notion of free speech that we have all talked about today. Rights and protection from religious discrimination should be embedded in our psyche and our law.
	I agree that our diversity is evolving. The noble Baroness, Lady Perry, very eloquently mentioned something about balance. I would put forward the argument that, while there has been an evolution towards embracing religious faiths as part of society, Muslims—particularly Muslim women—have not been allowed to take part in the evolving nature of faith. We have not been allowed to be comfortable in developing our faith. Many of us who have brought faith with us from another country as part of who we are have not been allowed to develop ourselves or modernise our thinking. We have been sat on or oppressed. Any reaction that we have is often defensive. In a fair society that evolution should be allowed and it is not. In a fair society legal protection for an individual is taken as read. Affording protection against religious discrimination should therefore be a matter of natural justice and of rights.
	There has been some progress in protection; I am not saying that there has not been. European legislation is a case in point, but I am sad that it was not Britain—which has a proud tradition of fairness, equality and race relations law—which led on that and that we have had to rely on Europeans to dictate that legislation. Perhaps that indicates my position on Europe. Of course, much work has been done. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, and with other noble Lords who have mentioned that bodies such as CRE and other enforcement agencies have said that there is a gap. That gap must be filled. When we are debating whether we live in a free and fair society and whether certain people are suffering, we do not need to go further than to those enforcement agencies that we have brought in by legislation.
	Let us move beyond this rushed judgment about whether we need it and take it as read that we do. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Judd, who mentioned semantics and throwaway gestures—I am obviously paraphrasing him—was right to say that we do not need to hurry and that we need to look at the matter. But I also agree with the noble Lords, Lord Joffe and Lord Bhatia, that we do not have too much time to waste before legislation is proposed and that legislation should be led by our government.
	There has been a lot of discussion about impact. I said earlier that I was going to bring in the position of Muslim women in particular. I talked to women's organisations—An-Nisa Women's Society and the Muslim Women's Organisation in Brent—just before I entered the Chamber. I asked what impact it would have on them. I also talked to some of the women who are trying to get into the political process to represent various political parties. There was a consensus. They said that because they are Muslim women they experience barriers, fundamentally because it is simply assumed, for no apparent reason, that Muslim women are somehow barred by their community or their religion from entering politics.
	I can speak from experience and may have mentioned this before. I have been in local government politics for more than 10 years and not too long ago it was suggested that if I, as a Muslim woman, were to represent a well established Labour seat it would put it at risk. This experience was about 10 years ago. I have spoken to a number of Muslim women trying to infiltrate political parties now and they say the same thing. They have no recourse to law or to the political parties against that perception. You have to say that perception is two-thirds of the law. Having chaired the government working party on political representation, I know that that has not changed and, if anything, it has worsened, particularly for Muslim women. So there is every reason for considering, in a whole range of ways, why people feel that they are discriminated against, simply because of their religion. There must be some truth in it.
	I have gone on a little on a personal level, but I am deeply proud of the tradition in Britain that we honour a just equality for all. We must be able to say something without having to defend our position as British Muslims. I disagree fundamentally with my noble friend Lord Desai that religion is chosen, that it is a matter of choice. I adore him, but I do disagree with him on this. For me, religion was not chosen, it was simply a fact. I was born who I am, and for many of us that is exactly how it is. That is why we cannot separate ourselves from the unequal treatment that many of us have to receive, saying that we receive it as a woman, or because we are incompetent professionally. We feel that we receive it simply because we are Muslim. That sort of feeling has to be respected if we are talking about free speech.
	We cannot get away from those men, women and children being and feeling persecuted because of their faith, in whatever form that takes. There is also a certainty that, collectively, Muslims are having to face extreme acts of prejudice without recourse to the law. That is not acceptable.
	As a card-carrying Labour member since I was 16 years old—or in fact just before, illegally—I regret that our 1997 manifesto promise, seeking,
	"an end to unjustifiable discrimination wherever it exists,",
	has been lost among the countless dossiers of one kind or another, as well as actions arising out of the various anti-terrorist legislation measures. There is definitely a perception that we are at war against Islam world-wide, so legislation cannot be hidden under criminal or anti-terrorist measures. In the new world order of language, if the Government are not with us, they will be perceived by Muslim communities as against us. They can very quickly dispel this misunderstanding by enacting law which affords such protection. I hope my noble friend the Minister will surprise us with some kind of announcement.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, has articulated the feelings which I think are fairly common among the Muslim community, but ones that we do not very often hear and ones that we particularly welcome coming from Muslim women. I think Muslim women have not found their voice. Perhaps one of the shortcomings of the Select Committee was that it did not have enough evidence that came specifically from women's groups, and particularly from Muslim women's groups.
	I begin by paying warm tribute to the chairman of our Select Committee, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville—who has already been widely praised, and not just by those who served on the Committee. Without his patience and skill as chairman, we would never have got through the work. We were, as he described in his remarkable speech which opened this debate, made up of many different views. There were eight different religious faiths represented on the committee. The fact that we worked through questions of a more than ordinarily controversial nature without coming to blows—in fact in the spirit of mutual tolerance which we identified as being essential to the continued tranquillity of society—was largely due to his chairmanship. I thank him and pay tribute to his excellent work.
	However, I have to express some disappointment. Even though, in accordance with Erskine May, the Government had undertaken to respond to Select Committee reports within six months, it took them eight in this case, and another four have elapsed before time has been found for this debate. Perhaps the Government consider that, as the Committee had made no recommendations, our analysis of the problems could be given a low priority. We think, on the contrary, that there are important questions that need to be addressed by the House, and we have heard a great deal about them this afternoon. On the matters covered by the Religious Offences Bill, there were differences of opinion among the members of the committee, and those are for Parliament to resolve. However, I shall begin with the one matter on which the committee was unanimous, and on which the Government have chosen to move in the wrong direction. It has already been mentioned by the noble Viscount.
	In the Criminal Justice Act, the Government added to the list of crimes to which specific kinds of aggravation may be attached, with their own different penalties. While noting the committee's argument that scattering the provisions over several different statutes would lead to complication and inconsistency, the Government believed that the added complexity—although not the inconsistency—could be managed through the sentencing guidelines. The Government argue that, with higher sentences for some aggravated offences, they become triable each way.
	However, under our recommendation, those maximums would have been applicable to the basic offences, and the question of whether an offence was aggravated would have been dealt with at the point of sentencing. Therefore, the offences would have become each-way offences, to be dealt with under mode of trial guidelines without having to spell out the aggravating factor in the charge. The Minister has to address that matter. If the Government have gone in the wrong direction, and if our committee was right, we need to begin to think immediately about how to put things back on track.
	I welcome the new power that the Attorney-General has had since last September to refer unduly lenient sentences for racially or religiously motivated aggravated assault, criminal damage, public order offences and harassment to the Court of Appeal. However, does that not simply underline the inconsistency of the Government's treatment of aggravation, to which I drew attention when noble Lords discussed the new proposals relating to disability and sexual orientation in Section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act? There was no increase in the penalty for those Section 146 offences, which means that the Attorney-General's new power does not apply to them, as I read it. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong.
	The CPS has published the statistics on convictions for religiously aggravated offences between the end of 2001, when the new category came into effect, and 31 March 2003. In those 15 months there were 18 cases, of which seven were discontinued or led to acquittals, one was dropped for insufficient evidence, two led to convictions on the non-aggravated offence, and the remaining eight were convicted on the aggravated charge.
	The CPS, recognising perhaps that the public would be surprised by the small numbers, speculated that there might be more cases as publicity led to the issue being taken more seriously. In the 12 months up to the end of March 2003, the number of racially aggravated prosecutions was 3,116, and the conviction rate was 85 per cent. Considering what we know anecdotally of those offences, it may be that some offences identified as racially aggravated were actually religiously motivated, but that the CPS found it easier to use a charge with which it was more familiar.
	Under the scheme recommended by the Select Committee, it would be necessary to pin down the aggravation to one category or another only when it came to sentencing. The CPS says that 86 per cent of the cases were identified as racist by the police, and a further 14 per cent by itself. That two-stage analysis would be redundant, because it would be for the judge to decide whether there had been racial or religious aggravation. Also, it may well be that some cases not identified as aggravated by the police or CPS would be picked up at the point of sentencing and dealt with accordingly. With the law as it stands, the judge cannot treat an offence as aggravated, whatever the evidence may be, if it was not part of the charge.
	If the difficulties in proving aggravated offences are serious, there are even more problems with incitement to racial hatred, as the DPP explained to the Select Committee. "Hatred" is a strong word and it does not come into play for remarks that are simply derogatory about a particular group. As the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, lucidly explained, the boundaries of the offence are determined on one side by our freedom of expression obligations under the ECHR and, on the other, by the existing criminal offences of incitement to commit particular offences; for example, incitement to murder under Section 4 of the Offences against the Persons Act 1861. The noble Viscount mentioned the case of the Jamaican imam who was convicted under that provision. As I recall it, he was convicted at the same time of incitement to racial hatred because he called on his flock to kill Hindus and Jews. If he had called on them to kill Christians, he would not have been convicted of that second offence. That underlines the need for examination of the area in between, or "the nutcracker", as the noble Viscount described it.
	In a memorandum to your Lordships during proceedings on the anti-terrorism Bill in 2001, the Attorney-General proposed to extend that area in between to religious as well as racial hatred. Logically, we must either implement that proposal or scrap incitement altogether. Otherwise, as several noble Lords have mentioned, it continues to be lawful to incite hatred against Muslims or Christians because they cannot be identified with particular racial groups, while at the same time Jews or Sikhs are protected. The noble Viscount mentioned also the EU Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia, which would have obliged us to treat both racial and religious incitement as equally criminal. He said that that had dropped off the agenda. I understand that the Government have said that they would subscribe to the idea only if there were a consensus to that effect in Parliament. I am not sure how Parliament would express an opinion, but if the Government mean that it has to be an opinion without a dissenting voice, they will never act.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Perry, mentioned that her correspondent had suggested that a law of that kind would incite frequent litigation. Of course, it would not, because as with the incitement offence that already exists for racial hatred, the Crown Prosecution Service would have to approve the charge and it would have to be submitted to the Attorney-General. Therefore, there would be few cases of that kind in practice, just as there are few cases of incitement to racial hatred. That is not the argument. The gap is one of perception of people being treated differently. Several noble Lords have already mentioned that.
	On blasphemy too, there will always be differences of opinion, as there were among members of the committee. We reviewed the three options of leaving the blasphemy law alone; amending it to cover all religions; or abolishing it. It was clear that although all the members acknowledged that nobody could now be convicted of blasphemy since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, some were influenced by,
	"the need to respect the deeply held views of a large number of the members of our society".
	That was reinforced by a barrage of similar letters from the evangelical lobby in favour of leaving the common law of blasphemy alone as a kind of heritage symbol that would never be used. Some members of the committee were impressed by the census finding that 72 per cent of the population is part of the Christian tradition or identity. That ignored the evidence of dwindling congregations, vanishing vocations and empty collection boxes. Those members—I count the noble Baroness, Lady Perry, among them—were attracted by the idea of the "sacred canopy", hovering protectively over the nation, but which was said to be so delicate that it was at risk of destruction if an unused or unusable law were abolished. The noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Desai, said that they wanted to protect people and not beliefs. That was the general sentiment of our debate this afternoon. The noble Lords, Lord Bhatia and Lord Joffe, pointed out that the law is discriminatory and that it is surely therefore intolerable for Parliament to leave it as it is.
	In the Government's response to the Select Committee's report, they say they have not sought to amend the law on blasphemy in the absence of a consensus on how to proceed. They are happy to accept that the committee's report may be seen as a starting point in the debate, but now is the time for some leadership and not for further procrastination. The committee's report was not the starting point, but a continuation of the discussion that has been going on ever since Lord Coleridge laid down in the case of Ramsay and Foote in 1883 that it was lawful to attack the fundamentals of religion.
	The developments which have taken place up to the Gay News case in 1979 were thoroughly rehearsed in the Law Commission's Working Paper No 79 of 1981 and its survey of Offences Against Religion and Public Worship of 1985. The Select Committee relied heavily on those papers and our main contribution was perhaps the analysis of the human rights implications, now far more relevant since the incorporation of the European convention into our domestic law.
	The Government's response was equally pusillanimous on the question of the statutory offences, of which the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 is the only one that some members of the committee thought should be retained. They say it is unclear whether the ECJA addresses conduct which is not covered by other criminal offences, but where the ingredients of the case are known, it was clear that some other charge could have been preferred. The famous case of Peter Tatchell interrupting the service in Canterbury Cathedral is an outstanding example. Indeed, in many other cases, the ECJA was used in tandem with some other charge. In the past two years—2002 and 2003—there was only one charge in each year leading to conviction. As the noble Viscount said, it is impossible to discover, either from the CPS or from the Home Office statistics, what the ingredients of the offences were. But if it is so lightly used, surely it could be safely repealed and we could instead use the other offences which we know are useable in the circumstances.
	I must confess to great disappointment that although we have had the debates on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill and on the Religious Offences Bill and now a whole year's work by the Select Committee, we are still no further forward than at the time of the Law Commission's reports of 20 years ago. The balancing of the principles of freedom of expression, mutual tolerance and the protection of faith communities from extremists who would incite religious hatred is not properly achieved by the law as it stands, and it is deplorable that a government who profess to believe in those principles are ducking the opportunity for promoting them.

Viscount Bridgeman: My Lords, like other noble Lords, I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and his colleagues on the committee for their report, produced to the standards of excellence that we in this House, without question, have come to take for granted. I also pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for the work he did in the preparation of the Religious Offences Bill.
	I suggest that the clarion call of the report is its unequivocal statement that we are not a secular state—a sentiment which I am pleased to note the Government wholly endorse. But this statement recognises that we are, indeed, a multi-faith society and let it not be overlooked that one of those multi-faiths is no faith. I am sure that that has been an inspiration to the committee in producing this admirable document.
	The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has left us in no doubt that he does not want to see any repeals and that he does not want to see any new legislation. He also states that the problem of blasphemy is almost insoluble. There have been passionate pleas in dissent by, among others, the noble Lords, Lord Bhatia and Lord Joffe, speaking from a lawyer's perspective. The noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, made a most interesting comment on the role of Muslim women in this context.
	I want to pay tribute to the Government for a measured and reasoned response to the committee's report. Perhaps I am less critical than my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway and I do not believe that I carry the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, with me on that. However, the Home Office made no secret of the fact that it would like to have seen the incitement to racial hatred provisions incorporated into the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001, but it accepts that following the passing of the Act it will have to reconsider its proposal in the future.
	Several noble Lords commented on that point and I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. This has not hindered what I regard as a wholly practical approach to the committee's findings. I was going to say "constructive" approach, but I am downgrading that. The message from the committee on blasphemy is clear: there are deficiencies in the present law, but not only in the bias in favour of the Church of England. In passing, may I pay tribute to the evidence from the Muslim Council of Britain, which has been referred to by several noble Lords, including the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. The council said, in effect, that while Islam does not enjoy the protection of the law, it was better that the protection should extend to one faith rather than none. If I may say so, not as a member of this committee, I read that as not only a generous comment but a statesmanlike one, too.
	I was interested to hear the comments of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich, who assured your Lordships of the comfort which the Jewish and Muslim communities enjoy from the umbrella of the blasphemy laws. There are clearly deficiencies when legislation which is in place is so rarely used, but—speaking as a non-lawyer—is that necessarily a bad thing?
	However, I note in this section that the committee and the Government do not agree on the necessity for the definition of religion, the Home Office taking the view that this should be left to the courts, the committee arguing that this is an issue that cannot be evaded and leaving the decision to the courts would place an unreasonable burden on them and involve long delays. The Minister's comment on that would be interesting. But I am reassured that there is agreement to differ on that point, and both the committee and the Home Office share the view that further debate on the matter of blasphemy is called for. Certainly the committee's report has provided a valuable starting point.
	On freedom of speech, there were particularly valuable submissions from the Director of Public Prosecutions and the police in contrasting modes, the former expressing reservations about the criminalisation of hatred, especially if no intention to stir up hatred is required, while the police would welcome an offence of incitement to religious hatred as an additional instrument to support good community relations.
	The report in this section and elsewhere emphasises the impact that Article 9 of the ECHR on freedom of thought has on this whole subject. We have been treated by several noble Lords to the easily comprehensible example that the absence of an offence of incitement to religious hatred may be said to deprive the multi-ethnic groups, such as Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and indeed those with no formal religious allegiance, of the protection afforded to the mono-religious faith groups, such as Jews and Sikhs. Further, it is suggested that these differing impacts could fall foul of Article 14 of the ECHR, dealing with discrimination and the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.
	All this serves to remind us of the correlation between religious and racial hatred. The two are in some ways mutually self-feeding, and I was interested to hear the illustrations provided by the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, on this. However, they are two absolutely discrete subjects, and those seeking to address the problems of either or both of them ignore this at their peril. The crossover between the two must be continually monitored, and indeed it is clear that in this report the committee has been aware of this. I also draw attention to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, that religion has been used as a cloak for political motives. This report does not apply to Northern Ireland, but surely we have an example of just that very close to home.
	This House is indeed fortunate to have had the contribution of so distinguished a group of speakers, and in congratulating once again the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and his colleagues on this excellent contribution, we shall look forward to the Minister's reply with interest.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I add my voice to those of all noble Lords who complimented the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, on stimulating this interesting debate, on his helpful and comprehensive exposition of the committee's work and particularly his explanation of how it reached its findings—I shall not say "recommendations" because I now understand precisely why there were not any. I am also grateful to the noble Viscount for giving us the benefit of his own views now that he can break free of the constraints of being chairman of the committee.
	The report will remain for the foreseeable future the document of reference for anyone interested in exploring the history of existing religious offences and the many difficult issues that the legislator must consider. We must be careful before proposing any legislation on religious offences, because any new legislation must be fit for the purpose and shaped in the context of a modern Britain. Therefore, I understand the hesitation of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, although I may not entirely agree with him.
	We recognise and value the diversity of modern Britain; it is multi-ethnic and multi-faith. Therefore, we must also recognise that, although religion plays a very important part in many people's lives in modern Britain, a significant proportion of the population has no religious belief at all. That was exemplified by the comments of my noble friend Lady Massey.
	The noble Lords, Lord Campbell and Lord Judd, tended to indicate that the law does not have a significant part to play in changing culture. I cannot agree with them on that. The law can play a part in changing culture, and it is appropriate that it does so on occasion. I wanted particularly to endorse the remarks of all those who said that all people are created equal.

Lord Judd: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I think that she has misinterpreted the point. The point made was that the law could not be a substitute for the culture. You do not win the battle by having the law; you do so by winning the culture.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I can certainly understand my noble friend's point. We need both: law and culture working together in harmony, reinforcing and supporting each other, so that good practice and good behaviour are enhanced and not undermined. I am sure that my noble friend would agree with me on that.
	There must be equality, for those who are religious, in the eyes of God and equality also in the eyes of the law. Therefore, we understand the Select Committee's conclusion that civil and criminal law should afford the same protection to people of all faiths and none. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, the Government have not ducked their responsibility in that regard; nor do we share his assessment of what has happened in the past 20 years. I understand and hear his disappointment, but I do not share it, because the plethora of achievements in this area cannot be dismissed as small or insignificant.
	The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich spoke very constructively about the basis of taking the issue forward, which is what today's debate is about. I listened with great interest to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Perry, and of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich about the umbrella that the blasphemy laws provide. That was very much supported by the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, who described it as a canopy of protection.
	As was made plain by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, the blasphemy laws are used rarely. The last successful private prosecution was in 1977, and there have been no public prosecutions since 1922. Given that context and the fact that blasphemy affords protection only to the Church of England, we were attracted to repeal of the blasphemy laws. However, full consideration and a wider debate were needed to inform the way forward. Today's debate has provided a good opportunity to listen to, and to explore those views. I should make it clear that what matters to the Government is that we should bring about an integrated society in which no one is left behind and in which we draw strength and enrichment from our diversity. That is part of our fundamental beliefs.
	The Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860—which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the noble Viscount have touched on—gives rise to a number of interesting, and some difficult, issues. We believe that those of religious faith deserve the best protection that the law will allow, including protection for their places of worship. There are only a limited number of prosecutions under the Act, and it has never been used for offences against non-Christian places of worship. We feel that the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act offers additional protection in only a small number of cases, as most offences against, or in places of, religious worship would already be covered by other criminal offences, such as criminal damage and public order offences. Therefore, we do not feel that reformulating the legislation would offer any more meaningful protection than exists under current laws.
	Your Lordships know that we attempted to introduce a new offence of incitement to religious hatred in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The proposal was withdrawn, due to objections raised in this House and championed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, and ably supported by my noble friend Lord Desai, among others. The withdrawal of those provisions was based very much on the opposition of those who argued, as they have done today, that it bore little relation to the Bill's main theme of countering terrorism, and that there should be separate legislation aimed at protecting religious beliefs and their expression, following a proper public debate and a weighing of options.
	They were also concerned that such a measure would impact adversely on free speech. I hope that the report's examination of the incitement to religious hatred issue and today's debate will have gone some way to addressing many noble Lords' concerns that the proposal to introduce such a new offence was not receiving proper independent scrutiny in Parliament. Today's debate has provided an excellent opportunity for a fuller consideration of the issue in the context of a wider debate on religious offences, as has the time that has elapsed between that Bill and this debate. I must take this opportunity to thank the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, for his kindness and understanding in relation to the efforts that the Government have made. I will, of course, respectfully agree with his assessment.
	In terms of balance between protecting religious groups and protecting freedom of expression, it is clearly essential to preserve this country's long and cherished tradition of freedom of speech. People must continue to be allowed to criticise beliefs and practices with which they disagree and do so robustly. However, we believe that it is possible to distinguish in legislation between criticism of a religion, or members of a religious group, and a criminal act of inciting hatred. I want to assure the noble Baroness, Lady Perry, that we believe that historians can be safe.
	It would be necessary to ensure that the criminal threshold for any proposed offence covers the harm that is being done, without unduly interfering with the rights of free expression as enshrined in human rights legislation. We believe that this can be done. I emphasise that, as has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to define religion. What is important is that we deal with the hatred, because that is what is inherently offensive. That is what my noble friend Lord Rooker said when we were debating the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001. I do not hesitate to endorse that.
	The evidence given to the Select Committee has shown that this is a matter of real concern for many communities, and the balance of opinion was in favour of the creation of the new offence. We heard that powerfully, I respectfully suggest, in the contributions from the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, and my noble friend Lady Uddin.
	There is a level of pain being experienced in many communities that we should recognise. We also note the joint statement by the representatives of important organisations in most of the faith communities in this country, urging the Government to legislate against incitement to religious hatred as soon as possible and asking Members of both Houses to support such a move. Such a statement carries weight and must be taken seriously, not least as confirmation that faith communities perceive there to be a problem that must be addressed.
	We are very aware of the concerns of many people, in particular, as I said, the Muslim community. As members of a religious group, they are not offered the same protection against incitement to hatred as exists for mono-ethnic faith groups such as Jews and Sikhs. We also know that Christians do not have that coverage either. The noble Lords, Lord Joffe and Lord Bhatia, and my noble friend Lady Uddin spoke in particular about that gap. We went into the debate from a position of being in principle in favour of introducing a new offence of incitement to religious hatred. If recent statements and representations made to the Home Office are any indication, there would appear to be as much, if not more, support for such a measure in the wider community as existed when the report was published a year ago. We will study the arguments that we have heard in the debate, before formulating measures to address the issues that have been raised, although I cannot at this stage indicate when an opportunity to legislate on the matter might be found. Noble Lords will know the extent of the legislation that is to come to the House in this Session.
	We have no plans for a general reform of the law on hate crime. We recognise that there are groups other than racial or religious groups who may be seen to be vulnerable to attack or vilification. We sought to deal with the specific areas of race and religion because those areas presented a particular problem that needed to be addressed and posed a threat to social cohesion. However, protection against hate crime has been extended to other groups. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 provided increased sentences for crimes aggravated by hatred of a person on the grounds of sexual orientation or disability. The wealth of evidence given to the committee shows the importance of religiously motivated crime for so many of our people and the direct impact that it has on their communities. To my noble friend Lord Desai, I say that it has been impossible for many people to distinguish between their religion, their racial origin or their faith. However, I acknowledge that, because of the racial element, Asian Muslims will have protection under the Race Relations Act that others may not have.
	For that reason, we introduced the new racially and religiously aggravated offences to send a strong message that racist and religious crime would not be tolerated. The Crown Prosecution Service's policy on racist and religious crime was launched in July last year, outlining its commitment to prosecute racist and religious crime fairly, firmly and robustly. By putting policy into practice, the Crown Prosecution Service aims to build more effective cases and bring more offenders to justice. The latest CPS statistics show that there were only 18 fully finished religiously aggravated cases between 14 December 2001 and 31 March 2003. Although the numbers are small, there has been no suggestion that the prosecution authorities have had any problem with the new offences. In addition, the CPS keeps a running total of all religiously aggravated crime, including finished cases, cases still going through the system and cases in which the charge is amended to a different offence. As at 2 April 2004, there were 74 religiously aggravated cases being monitored by the Crown Prosecution Service, so there is an increasing number of cases in the system.
	It is still early days for our awareness of religiously aggravated crime, and there is more work to be done building awareness and confidence that it will be tackled. The Home Office has created a faith communities unit, and part of its remit is to examine faith-related crime issues and their impact on communities, including the under-reporting of religiously motivated crime.
	Much has been said about sentencing, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. We note the concern that the introduction of statutory racially-aggravated and religiously-aggravated offences and the powers to increase sentences for racial and religious aggravation could create sentencing inconsistencies and make sentencing more complicated for the courts.
	However, we are not aware that the introduction of those offences has, in practice, caused difficulties of that kind. The added complexity can be managed through sentencing guidelines. Any downside in terms of complexity is outweighed by the beneficial impact that specific aggravating factors can have in producing sentences which deal effectively with hate crimes that involve significant social problems, and as a signal to victims and offenders that such crimes are unacceptable. To assist judges and magistrates, sentencing guidelines have been published by the Magistrates' Association. Extensive training is also now given to magistrates and judges on aggravating and mitigating factors that impact on sentencing.
	The Criminal Justice Act 2003 created the Sentencing Guidelines Council. I know that the noble Viscount says "Well, isn't that it and don't we get rid of all the laws and complications". Bearing in mind the time, perhaps I may use a short form and say, "No". The Sentencing Guidelines Council will go a long way towards addressing the report's concerns about the new aggravated offences creating sentencing inconsistencies and making sentences complicated for the courts.
	We have noted that one of the key conclusions of the Select Committee's report is that civil and criminal law should afford the same protection to people of all faiths and of none. In December 2003, the new Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations prohibit direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in employment. The Government are working to disseminate good practice on those new regulations. They have worked with ACAS to produce good practice guidance and support an advice helpline for employers and employees.
	Changes in society in recent years have not resulted in the ebbing of religious values and the consequent emergence of the United Kingdom as a secular state. Religious values continue to play a significant part in shaping social values. We recognise the value of the role that religion plays in people's lives in Britain today.
	It is for that reason that we are being very careful. We have listened very carefully to all that has been said. We will take the report into account. I can certainly assure the House that the Government will be very careful in the way in which they take the matter forward, but it is a matter of which we are firmly seized.

Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, briefly at this time on a Thursday, I thank all those who have taken part in the debate. My colleagues on the Select Committee would have been extremely pleased to hear the gratifying comments that were made about the report. It was intended to be a contribution to the debate, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, that the proceedings today mark a further step forward.
	It is only part of the scene. The report concerned religious offences and deals therefore with criminal law. I take the point made by the right reverend Prelate that we need a full panoply by having the civil law as well. Some has recently been introduced, again coming from Europe, and that forms the other, very valuable, half of this exercise. Apart from the protection of places of worship and artefacts, which perhaps deserves a little more attention than it was given today because there are occasions when the other criminal offences do not work, everyone has rightly been talking about people. Of course that is what this is all about. When considering the gaps in the protection for people, we need to remember how careful we must be in this area. The noble Baroness just emphasised that point. When the Public Order Act 1986 was passed, I do not think that there was any idea that Part 3 relating to race would be held to relate to Sikhs and Jews, but not to any other religious entity. This was a surprise which came about as a result of case law. It was certainly not drafted into the Act and came about partly as the result of one particular case relating to a Sikh in a school and then, by development, from case law in New Zealand relating to Jews. Those are developments that one does not expect. My noble friend Lord Bhatia and others have drawn attention to the unfairness of this, and indeed it is unfair. But that is what happens when legislation is introduced which has not been thought through. I still think that there is a very small gap between the existing criminal offences which deal with issues like religious hatred and freedom of speech. What that gap is has not really been explored.
	An opportunity arose to deal with it in 2001, however careful were the noble Lords, Lord Campbell of Alloway and Lord Desai, in discussing it, but this was not the issue at the root of what they were talking about. I believe that it now is and I was glad to hear the noble Baroness say that the Home Office will be very careful. However, it is being constructive and it is clear that this is a continuing dialogue between all concerned. I hope that perhaps one day we shall revert to this matter, if not quite yet. If the Home Office does bring forward legislation to deal with offences surrounding the incitement to religious hatred, then I shall want to look very carefully at the content and drafting because I do not think that it is at all easy to do.
	Meanwhile, I hope that the House will take note of the report, which is all it has to do in accordance with my Motion. I trust that that will be agreed by all noble Lords.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

London Local Authorities Bill [HL]

Bill returned from the Commons with the amendment to which the Lords have disagreed not insisted on.
	House adjourned at eighteen minutes before six o'clock.